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This thesis is a critique of the global reproductive health and rights and 
discourse, which emanated from the 1994 International Conference on 
Population and Development. The thesis argues that far from being a new 
population policy paradigm, the reproductive rights and health discourse is a re­
working of a neo-Malthusian and neo-liberal policy agenda. The thesis begins 
with a consideration of the historical and political context in which international 
population policy has evolved, and questions the extent to which liberal notions 
of individual rights freedom and choice, enshrined in the reproductive health 
discourse, bears a relationship to the social, political and economic realities in 
which poor and socially marginalized people experience their sexual and 
reproductive health. Through a critical review of the literature the thesis questions 
the positivist/functionalist paradigms upon which mainstream demographic and 
reproductive health research is based. In rejecting both the positivism of 
mainstream demography as well as the relativism of much post-modernism, the 
thesis draws eclectically upon post-structuralist and practice theory to suggest a 
framework for “critical social analysis”, which understands sexual and 
reproductive behaviour as both historically grounded and culturally contingent.
Central to the framework is an exploration of how constructions of identity and 
difference shape social and political practice at the national and local level. 
Drawing upon case study material from Bolivia, the thesis explores how 
constructions of identity and difference are embedded in historical and structural 
conditions of inequality and exploitation. Through an ethnographic study the 
thesis considers how these structural conditions of inequality become embodied 
in and reproduced through everyday practices, which ultimately shape the 
experience of health and well being among poor migrant women. The thesis 
goes on to suggest a methodological approach entitled the “peer ethnographic 
method” for incorporating such an understanding of identity and difference into 
programme design and monitoring.
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Introduction
There is an overriding consensus in the academic and policy literature that the 
outcome of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 
held in Cairo in 1994 marked a radical turning point in international population 
policy. The post-ICPD literature refers to a major paradigm shift having taken 
place, in which notions of population control and demographic targets were 
replaced with a new feminist population paradigm, which places the sexual and 
reproductive health rights of the individual at the centre of the policy discourse. 
This thesis is a critique of the sexual and reproductive health and rights 
discourse emanating from ICPD.
Chapter 1 suggests that far from being a radical repositioning of international 
population policy, the feminist inspired fertility paradigm outlined at ICPD is a 
reworking of the neo-Malthusian and neo-liberal policy agenda that has 
underpinned the formulation of population policy during the latter half of the 
twentieth century, and continues to inform its development into the 21st century. 
The radical / neo-liberal feminist perspective which underpins the Cairo discourse 
places notions of freedoms, rights and choices of the individual within a free 
market, at the centre of population and development policy.
In considering the emergence of the sexual and reproductive health and rights 
discourse, Chapter 1 analyses the historical and political context in which 
international population policies have evolved, and the social theories that have
1
informed their development. The chapter suggests that the foundations for the 
neo-Malthusian orthodoxy which has dominated twentieth century population 
policy were laid in the eighteenth century, when the population issues began to 
assume a political significance. During this epoch the foundations were also laid 
for demography as an academic discipline and as a tool for social policy. I argue 
that, demography has provided the theoretical frameworks upon which 
international population policy, implemented through family planning and latterly 
reproductive health programmes has been based.
In arguing that all social policy is informed by theory, Chapter 1 lays the ground 
fora more detailed consideration in Chapter 2 of theoretical frameworks which 
have underpinned twentieth century demographic inquiry. Through a review of 
the literature, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the range of theory relied upon 
in mainstream demographic and family planning research, and critically assesses 
the underlying assumptions about the nature of society, culture and human 
action upon which demographic theory and method are based. The chapter 
argues that mainstream demographic theories of fertility transition have been 
underpinned by the modernisation paradigm, and that a utilitarian notion of 
human action based upon an individual means-end rationality has under-pinned 
much of the understanding of fertility-related behaviour. The chapter suggests 
that informed by structural-functionalist sociology and a positivist research 
methodology, demographic inquiry has failed to engage critically with the political
2
and social realities in which fertility, sexuality and reproduction are experienced, 
in particular by poor and socially marginalized groups.
Drawing eclectically upon developments in social theory, in particular practice 
theory, Chapter 2 suggests a theoretical and methodological approach for 
understanding the lived reality and meaning given to sexual and reproductive 
health by different social groups, in specific political, economic and cultural 
contexts. I argue that an analytical approach to understanding fertility, sexuality 
and reproductive behaviour which considers the dynamic relationship between 
structure and agency, is required. The approach, which I have termed critical 
social analysis, seeks to locate an understanding of how actors experience their 
social world through their everyday practical activity, within an analysis of the 
historical processes and structural conditions in which practice is embedded. 
Central to the framework for critical social analysis is an exploration of the two 
interlinked concepts of identity and difference. I suggest that the importance of a 
critical social analysis lies in making an examination of the relationship between 
social identity as elaborated in the narratives and practice of individuals, and the 
historical relations of power in which practice is embedded. That is, a critical 
social analysis grounds accounts of difference and identity within their political 
and historical context. Finally, the chapter suggests that some of the analytical 
concepts elaborated by Pierre Bourdieu, in particular those of social capital and 
symbolic power, provide a conceptual basis for linking social structure and social
3
relations with the negotiation of individual identities as produced and reproduced 
in practical action.
Chapters 3 and 4 apply the above theoretical framework to historical and 
ethnographic case study material from Bolivia, based upon fieldwork carried out 
in the city of El Alto. Chapter 3 outlines how historical constructions of identity 
and difference are embedded in structural conditions of domination, inequality 
and exploitation. The chapter outlines the historical emergence of categories of 
identity and difference in Bolivian society, and considers how the process of 
“modernisation” has located subjects in terms of their cultural, racial, gendered, 
and spatial identities. The chapter charts how the transformation of racial 
identities into class based categories was connected to the growth of global 
capitalism and the increased participation of the indigenous population in 
commercial markets, and their incorporation into forms of wage labour such as 
domestic service and mining.
The chapter argues that by the mid twentieth century the urban elite (of Hispanic 
colonial descent) had constructed a highly unequal social order based upon 
classifications of class, ethnicity and gender, in which supported by a social 
Darwinist view, the indigenous majority were deemed to be biologically and 
socially inferior to the white elite. This paradigm was supported by public health 
discourses relating to hygiene and infection, in which the indigenous population 
became identified with notions of the unclean and diseased native body. The
4
chapter goes on to trace the emergence of a class identity among sections of the 
indigenous population during the early part of the twentieth century, and in 
particular the emergence of the miners as a consolidated working class. By the 
mid-1980s, the power of the miners’ unions which lay in the strategic position that 
they occupied in the relations of production, began to be undermined as the 
mines became the focus for the state’s neo-liberal restructuring programme. The 
austerity measures implemented under the government’s Structural Adjustment 
Programme, resulted in the closure of many of the state-owned mines and the 
relocation of mining families to newly developing urban centres such as El Alto, 
resulting in impoverishment and the loss of class identity.
Finally Chapter 3 charts how, following the introduction of neo-liberal economic 
policies in 1985, subsequent governments in Bolivia have set in place a series of 
institutional reforms which have deepened the neo-liberal policy agenda. The 
policy reforms to the education and health sector, which emphasised privatisation 
and decentralisation, have been further consolidated under a series of liberal 
reforms, influenced by the policy framework of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Countries. The 
past decade in Bolivia has seen significant changes in official policies concerning 
population issues, and following ICPD, the Government of Bolivia produced the 
first national population policy based on principles of sustainable development 
and reproductive health and rights. The chapter suggests that in Bolivia, 
reproductive health policy has been assimilated within the neo-liberal policy
5
agenda, central to which has been a discourse of decentralisation, privatisation, 
popular participation and citizens rights.
Chapter 4 takes up the analysis outlined in Chapter 2 to demonstrate how the 
structural conditions of inequality and difference are reproduced through 
constructions of self and identity which ultimately shape the experience of 
reproduction, health and well-being among migrant urban Aymaran women. 
Through analysis of ethnographic data and the collection of narratives, the 
chapter demonstrates how the historical and structural conditions of power and 
domination, outlined in Chapter 3, become embodied in and reproduced through 
everyday practices in concrete social situations. Fundamental to this analysis is a 
consideration of how relations of domination are reinforced through symbolic 
violence exercised through institutions of the state (such as the health clinic) and 
through the operations of global institutions. However, the chapter argues that 
everyday practices do not simply reproduce existing relations of power and 
domination. Rather, through ethnographic data it explores how those most 
deprived of power continue to struggle to gain access to social, political and 
economic resources (or capital) through strategies of resistance in which social 
identity is continually negotiated. While the field of practice explored by this case 
study is that of health, I suggest that the framework of “critical social analysis” 
developed in Chapters 3 and 4 can be applied to any social sector.
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In Chapter 5 ,1 suggest that a truly reflexive and participatory approach to 
implementation and monitoring of development policy and programmes requires a 
methodology which incorporates into development practice an understanding of 
how social actors negotiate identity and difference. The chapter outlines a 
methodological approach which I call “peer ethnography” through which local 
people assume responsibility for collecting narratives among their peer networks. 
The method provides a basis for incorporating into development practice an 
understanding of how people classify their social worlds in the context of their 
everyday practice and lived experience. The basic premise of the peer 
ethnographic approach is that traditional research subjects can become active 
researchers of their social worlds, and through the research process can be 
empowered to engage in critical dialogue with programme implementers and policy 
makers. The peer ethnographic method is based upon training people within local 
communities to conduct in-depth and unstructured interviews with individuals 
selected by them from their own social networks. The method makes a break from 
positivist claims for the collection and presentation of ‘objective’ or ‘standardised’ 
data. The peer ethnographic method seeks to gather narratives and social 
commentary on the dynamics through which identity is negotiated and behaviour 
given meaning. The main focus of the method is on analysing contradiction and 
difference in the discourses of social actors within a network, rather than on 
gathering ‘social facts’.
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However, introducing into policymaking and programme implementation a truly 
participatory and reflexive approach which engages with the very complex 
contexts in which identity and diversity are negotiated and experienced, requires 
more than simply training peer educators or peer researchers in the field.
In the concluding chapter, I argue that central to the critical social analysis 
outlined in this thesis is the question of how social policy recognises and 
responds to identity and difference among the diverse groups in civil society.
The chapter begins with a consideration of sexual and reproductive health and 
rights as a global policy discourse, central to which are the concepts of neo­
liberalism, the nation-state, restructuring and reform, citizenship rights and 
gender equity, all of which are central themes also running through debates on 
the impact of globalisation. Counter to this global policy framework, the critical 
social analysis set out in the thesis argues for policy and programme approaches 
which recognise the centrality of identity and difference to the experience of 
social life. Chapter 6 suggests that the challenge, therefore, is to find an 
approach to policy and programme development that is true to the experience of 
social actors (and in particular marginalized and excluded groups), whilst being 
grounded in an understanding of social and historical conditions of inequality and 
difference.
As such, Chapter 6 argues that critical social policy analysis needs to explore the 
social infrastructure in which policies are implemented, as well as the operations 
of institutions which link the lived world of actors to the broad structures of
8
society. Policy reform cannot just be a technical issue but must also be a political 
process, which challenges the underlying structural relations of power and 
inequality which deny marginalized groups access to the necessary resources 
and capital to realise their rights. Policy analysis must be open to a critical 
discourse in which diverse groups in civil society are understood as having 
unequal chances and opportunities for action, which are embedded in historically 
specific relations of power, inequality and difference.
The concluding chapter suggests that the mechanisms for implementation of 
reproductive health and rights frameworks do not lead to social equity. Rather, 
the implementation of the ICPD discourse through national policy and 
programme frameworks, often reproduces existing inequalities and power 
relations. The abstract universal notions of rights, freedoms and choices 
encapsulated in the ICPD discourse, fail to address the underlying structure of 
power relations which underscore practices of national and global institutions in 
local social contexts and which impact on health outcomes. Indeed, until the 
social conditions which enable equitable access to power and resources are in 
place, reproductive health and rights will remain an abstract liberal ideal, as 
opposed to a concrete social and political reality for the majority of world’s poor 
and socially marginalized.
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Chapter 1 
The B irth of Reproductive Health 
(A Historical Account of International Population Policy)
“Every social policy rests on some theory of how individuals, societies, 
governments and organizations operate” (Warwick 1982:31)
“ There is nothing so impractical as a bad theory” (Warwick 1982: 31)
1. Introduction
The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) which 
took place in Cairo in 1994 is now widely held as marking a turning point in 
the formulation of international population policy. All social policy is informed 
by theory. In tracing the development of international population policy, this 
chapter explores the theoretical underpinnings of the policy discourse which 
emerged as a result of ICPD.
Much of the post-ICPD literature refers to a major paradigm shift having taken 
place in the lead-up to the Cairo Conference, resulting in a change in 
emphasis in international population policy from notions of population control 
and demographic targets to those of sexual and reproductive health and rights 
(Basu 1997). The Programme of Action (POA) agreed at ICPD, places the 
concepts of sexual and reproductive health and rights at the centre of the 
international population and development agenda. As a result, the new policy
10
paradigm replaces the focus on demographic outcomes implemented through 
family planning programmes with an emphasis on individual sexual and 
reproductive health outcomes.
It is widely agreed in the literature that this new policy paradigm emerged as a 
result of the efforts of the women’s health movement and women’s health 
activists, who through the formation of civil society networks (such as the 
International Women’s Health Coalition), effectively lobbied to replace the old 
family planning discourse with the broader concept of sexual and reproductive 
health and rights (Petchesky and Judd 1998). The Programme of Action 
incorporates a new feminist-inspired fertility paradigm which is detailed in the 
POA in the chapters on “Gender equality, equity, and empowerment of 
women” and “Reproductive rights and reproductive health” (Thomas and Price 
1999:795). The sexual and reproductive health approach broadens the scope 
of service provision from an exclusive focus on family planning to attention to 
safe pregnancy, maternal and child health care, treatment for sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs) and the prevention and control of STDs and HIV 
(Hempel 1996). This new conceptualisation of population concerns is evident 
in the statement made by Nafis Sadik, the then Executive Director of the 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and Secretary-General of ICPD, 
that “the ICPD Programme of Action recognises that population issues are 
more than just demographic concerns”. The new approach, Sadik suggests, is 
based on the right to development and equality between women and men,
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with freedom of choice of the individual being a key principle for action (Sadik 
1996:193).
In considering the emergence of the sexual and reproductive health and rights 
discourse, this chapter analyses the historical and political context in which 
international population policies have evolved, and the social theories that 
have informed their development. The chapter suggests that far from being a 
radical repositioning of population policy, the feminist fertility inspired 
paradigm outlined at ICPD is a reworking of a neo-Malthusian and neo-liberal 
political agenda that has underpinned the formulation of population policy 
during the latter half of the twentieth century, and continues to inform its 
development into the twenty-first century.
2. Population and Development in International Policy
2.1 The Cold-War and Population Policy
In the immediate post-war era the US Government led the international 
population movement in encouraging Less Developed Countries (LDCs) to 
adopt policies to reduce population growth through implementing national 
family planning programmes (Crane and Finkle 1989:23). In 1967 the United 
Nations established a Trust Fund for Population, a precursor to The United 
Nations Fund for Population Activities (now known as the United Nations 
Population Fund - UNFPA) which was established in 1969, in an effort by the
12
US government to channel additional resources for population and family 
planning activities through the UN system (Crane and Finkle 1989). UNFPA 
has since become the second largest donor for international population 
assistance after the US government itself (Crane and Finkle 1989; Thomas 
and Price 1999:780).
The dominance of population concerns in post-war US foreign policy grew out 
of Cold-War concerns in which world politics became increasingly polarised, 
and in which the East-West conflict provided the basic framework for 
international affairs and for setting the domestic policy agenda (Hodgson 
1988). The advent of the Cold-War also coincided with the collapse of the 
colonial system (Hodgson 1988:547). As the former colonial territories began 
to assert their political and economic independence the newly independent 
LDCs were assigned a new historical status as the under-developed Third 
World, contrasting with the developed West and developing East (Wolf 1982):
“Inevitably, perhaps, these reified categories became intellectual 
instruments in the prosecution of the Cold War. There was the ‘modern’ 
world of the West. There was the world of the East, which had fallen 
prey to communism, a ‘disease of modernization’... There was, finally, 
the Third World, still bound up in ‘tradition’ and strangled in its efforts 
toward modernization. If the West could only find ways of breaking that 
grip, it could perhaps save the victim from the infection incubated and 
spread by the East, and set the Third World upon the road to 
modernization - the road to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of 
the West” (Wolf 1982:7).
Within this Cold-War context, the demographic profile of the newly
independent LDCs took on a highly political significance (Hodgson, 1988).
The anticipated demographic expansion in the LDCs, resulting from rapid
13
post-war declines in mortality rates, was perceived as posing a significant 
threat to their economic and political stability (Demeny 1988, Greenhalgh 
1996, Thomas and Price 1999). The politically ‘uncommitted’ LDCs were 
increasingly seen as breeding grounds for communism and potential satellites 
to the Eastern block, thereby also threatening Western economic stability and 
international security (Hodgson 1988; Hodgson and Cotts Watkins 
1997;Thomas and Price 1999). Hence, the LDCs became a political object in 
the Cold-War struggle between the “communist and free world” (Hodgson 
1988: 547). Within the Cold-War rhetoric, US foreign policy asserted its moral 
duty to safeguard the integrity of the “free world”, founded upon the principles 
of the dignity, rights and freedom of the individual (Chomsky 1994). Wolf 
(1982:5) asserts that this Cold-War conceptualisation of the “free world” is 
based upon a construction of Western capitalist society as the final stage of 
an evolutionary historical process, in which Western capitalism stands in 
opposition to and independent of all other social forms:
“Many of us...grew up believing that this West has a genealogy, 
according to which ancient Greece begat Rome, Rome begat Christian 
Europe, Christian Europe begat the Renaissance, the Renaissance the 
Enlightenment, the Enlightenment political democracy and the 
industrial revolution. Industry, crossed with democracy, in turn yielded 
the United States, embodying the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness”.
The policy response to the apparent political threat posed by the economically 
unstable Third World was founded in the neo-Malthusian proposition that 
lowering fertility in poor countries would increase prosperity and facilitate 
social and economic development (Hodgson and Cotts Watkins 1997). The
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solution, supported by the US foreign aid programme, was seen to lie in 
organised national family planning programmes, based upon the assumption 
that providing modern contraceptive technology to the rural and urban poor 
was the most cost-effective means by which to bring about sustained fertility 
decline (Demeny 1988; Hodgson 1988). In the mid-1960s, the US 
Government began channelling a significant amount of funds in support of 
family planning programmes in LDCs, based upon the rationale that high 
population growth rates in LDCs threatened US national security (Hodgson 
1988; Thomas and Price 1999). The policy orthodoxy asserted that family 
planning programmes could be provided to LDCs at low cost, and that 
investing in overseas family planning programmes was a cost efficient way of 
increasing Third World per capita incomes. This assertion is illustrated by 
President Lyndon Johnson’s claim made at the twentieth-anniversary 
celebration of the United Nations in San Francisco, that less than five dollars 
invested in population control was worth a hundred dollars invested in 
economic growth (Demeny 1988:457).
2.2 The World Population Conference, Bucharest 1974
The inter-governmental international conferences on population and 
development, organised by UNFPA every ten years have been said to 
epitomise the conventional thinking on the relationship between population 
and development (Smyth 1994:2). The World Population Conference held in 
Bucharest in 1974 was the first global inter-governmental conference on
15
population issues (Finkle and Crane 1975). With the agenda inspired mainly 
by the United States, the aim of the conference planners was to bring about 
an international consensus on the threat that the rapid population growth 
taking place in LDCs posed to economic development (Demeny 1985; Finkle 
and Crane 1975; Hodgson 1988). However, despite careful preparation by the 
UN Secretariat in the drafting of the World Population Plan of Action, the 
conference took an unanticipated turn, becoming a forum in which Third 
World governments challenged the motives and interests of First World 
institutions (Hodgson 1988:555; Finkle and Crane 1975:87).
The final version of the Plan of Action which was agreed after intense conflict 
and negotiation, appeared to adopt by consensus a reversal of the neo- 
Malthusian principles upon which First World assistance to fertility control 
programmes had been based. Whereas the stated objective of the Draft Plan 
was to “affect population variables” (through implementation of fertility control 
programmes), the final plan stated that “the basis for an effective solution of 
population problems is, above all, socio-economic transformation” (Finkle and 
Crane 1975:88). Representatives from Third World governments shifted the 
focus of debate away from fertility targets and family planning programmes as 
the solution to population growth, to the need to bring about equitable social 
and economic development and above all a new international economic order 
(Finkle and Crane 1975:88). The position argued by Third World governments 
at Bucharest is encapsulated in the slogan coined by the leader of the India
16
Delegation that “development is the best contraceptive” (Demeny 1985:100; 
Thomas and Price 1999:781).
The outcome of the conference reflected significant changes occurring in 
international relations by the early 1970s (Finkle and Crane 1975; Thomas 
and Price 1999). Finkle and Crane (1975:89) argue that the significance of 
Bucharest lay in a new politicisation of the population issue, at the centre of 
which lay the inequitable distribution of power and resources between the 
industrial nations and developing nations of the Third World. By the time of 
the Bucharest conference the optimism held by LDCs in the 1960s regarding
rapid economic growth, was beginning to turn to a pessimism concerning their
/
place in the international economic order (Gardener and Lewis 1996:9). Third 
World countries frustrated with the slowness of development and united 
through the G-77, began to voice their discontent with inequities they 
perceived in terms of international trade. Throughout the latter part of the 
1960s, the G-77 which was formed by a caucus of 77 developing nations after 
the 1964 UN Conference on Trade and Development, formulated and 
expanded a distinct Third World perspective on the global economic situation, 
calling for a unified response from the Third World on terms of development 
and trade (Roy 1999). The G-77 argued for reduction in trade barriers 
“strengthening commodity agreements, and obtaining other concessions from 
the rich countries in order to promote economic development” (Finkle and 
Crane 1975:92). In the early 1970s gestures were made towards addressing 
some of these perceived inequities between North and South. Chomsky
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(1994:4), quoting the South Commission, argues that such initiatives were 
spurred by concern over the newly found assertiveness of the South after the 
rise in oil prices in 1973. According to Finkle and Crane (1975), the 
successful action by the Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), in rising the price of oil:
“represented a psychological breakthrough for the developing nations 
in their relations with the industrialized world. For the first time, the 
industrialized nations were shown to be highly vulnerable to 
interruptions in the supply of vital resources controlled by Third World 
countries...To the poor nations OPEC became a symbol and a model 
of what could be achieved by concerted action” (Finkle and Crane 
1975: 92).
In early 1974 the UN adopted a Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order (Thomas and Price 1999:781). The Declaration 
and associated Programme of Action incorporated a wide range of concerns 
of Third World countries such as: food; raw materials and primary 
commodities; trade; the international monetary system; multinational 
corporations and emergency assistance for LDCs unable to cope with price 
increases on the imports necessary for development (Finkle and Crane 
1975:93). The expectation was that the Declaration would have a significant 
impact on the subsequent formulation and implementation of international 
development policy. Within the Declaration and Programme of Action was a 
statement also indicating that the World Population Conference should 
contribute to the effort to establish a new economic order (Finkle and Crane 
1975:93).
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Nonetheless, the neo-Malthusian perspective that population growth was a 
serious impediment to development underpinned the position of Western 
governments at Bucharest, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada and Germany. A principle objective of these country delegations (and 
most prominently the United States) at the outset of the Bucharest Conference 
had been to increase the commitment of governments and international 
agencies to support the implementation of population and family planning 
programmes in the Third World (Finkle and Crane 1975). Finkle and Crane 
(1975:102-104) suggest that the intensity of Third World demands for major 
restructuring of the international economic system based on the principle that 
population problems are not a cause but a consequence of 
underdevelopment, had not been anticipated by the Western delegations. 
While the Bucharest conference appeared to result in an international 
consensus that the population problem is inseparable from political and 
economic conditions, Finkle and Crane (1975), argue that the LDCs had little 
or no real political bargaining power to effect change in international 
economic policy:
“Although the United States is willing to confront Third World demands 
in ‘appropriate forums’ the United States - along with most 
industrialized nations - is simply not prepared to accede to the radical 
transformation of the international economic system as proposed by the 
developing nations. The demand for a New International Economic 
Order is seen as ideologically objectionable as well as a threat to 
American wealth and power. From the American perspective, it is an 
attempt to improve economic conditions in the Third World by 
redistributing the existing wealth of the industrialized nations rather 
than by creating new wealth through development” (Finkle and Crane 
1975:104).
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2.3 The International Conference on Population, Mexico City 1984
By the time of the International Conference on Population held in Mexico City 
in 1984, the development agenda so forcefully argued at Bucharest had been 
replaced by technocratic concerns regarding the implementation of national 
family planning programmes (Thomas and Price 1999:781). Several LDCs, 
who had been key players in advancing the development agenda at 
Bucharest, had in the intervening years formulated national population 
policies implemented through state led family planning programmes. Two 
years after Bucharest, India had issued a formal population policy statement 
(Demeny 1985:100); and a few months prior to Mexico City a group of African 
nations had come together to call for effective fertility reduction programmes 
(Finkle and Crane 1985:5). The Recommendations of the Mexico City 
Conference, which strongly endorsed the position that governments should 
“as a matter of urgency” make family planning services “universally available”, 
passed uncontested by Third World delegations (Finkle and Crane 1985:1).
The driving force behind this policy sea change was the increasing economic 
crisis in the Third World (Thomas and Price 1999). Major changes in the 
political climate since 1974, had severely weakened the confidence of Third 
World governments in their power to bring about a shift in the world economic 
order. Escalating debt crisis and continuing inequality in international trade 
relations had forced many Third World governments (particularly in Africa and 
Latin America) towards accepting the rigid structural adjustment programmes
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being insisted upon by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(Gardener and Lewis 1996:8). The unity of the G-77 was also weakened, as 
some member countries (mainly in East Asia and Latin America) who were 
beginning to experience rapid economic growth pursued bi-lateral or regional 
development strategies (Finkle and Crane 1985:4). As the threat posed by the 
G-77 abated:
“terms of trade resumed their long-term shift in favor of the industrial 
societies, the core industrial powers lost interest and turned to ‘a new 
form of neo-colonialism,’ monopolizing control over the world 
economy”(Chomsky 1994:4).
The new form of “neo-colonialism” to which Chomsky refers took shape in the 
mid-1980s in the neo-liberal economic agenda. Portes (1997:229) suggests 
that the rise of neo-liberalism reflects a final turn in late twentieth century 
international policy, away from a concern for reducing the persistent economic 
and social inequalities between the industrialised world and formerly 
colonised Third World, toward an acceptance of their permanence and 
“functionality for the operation and growth of the global economy”. The neo- 
liberal agenda placed a market-oriented approach at the centre of national 
economic development, urging Third World governments to follow the “policy 
dictates of international finance organizations” (Portes 1997:229). In the mid- 
1980s a team of World Bank economists set out a new model for development 
based upon “unilaterally lifting tariff barriers, abolishing consumer subsidies, 
getting the state out of economic micro-management, and encouraging foreign 
capital inflow in all its forms” (Portes 1997:237-238). This neo-classical
21
agenda was widely adopted by ‘liberal’ reformers in Latin America who 
advocated market led solutions to social and economic problems and a retreat 
of state involvement in social welfare and economic development (Portes 
1997). According to Portes (1997:238) formal implementation of the neo­
liberal adjustment consisted of the following basic components: (1) unilateral 
opening to foreign trade; (2) extensive privatisation of state enterprises; (3) 
deregulation of goods, services, and labour markets; (4) liberalisation of the 
capital market (5) reduction in public expenditures (6) restructuring and down- 
scaling of state-supported social programs; and (7) the end of ‘industrial 
policy’ and any other form of state capitalism.
The new neo-liberal agenda (heavily promoted by the World Bank and US 
Agency for International Development) entered the international population 
arena through a dramatic re-positioning of the US policy position at Mexico 
City. In its rejection of state supported family planning programmes as a 
solution to the population problem in LDCs, the US position appeared to make 
a break from its classical neo-Malthusian population policy stance. However, 
far from signalling a return to the Bucharest debate that development is a 
prerequisite for fertility decline, the US delegation asserted that the solution to 
the population problem lay in the retreat of the state from interference in 
economic development and increased reliance on free market forces. In its 
official policy statement at Mexico City the US delegation asserted that 
“population growth is of itself a neutral phenomena” (Finkle and Crane 
1985:2), and that “ ‘governmental control of economies’ or ‘economic statism’
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had caused population growth in developing countries to change from an 
‘asset’ to a ‘peril’ ” (Finkle and Crane 1985:11). According to the US position 
statement:
“too many governments pursued population control measures without 
sound economic policies that create the rise in living standards 
historically associated with decline in fertility rates. This approach has 
not worked, primarily because it has focused on a symptom and 
neglected the underlying ailments....[Population control programs 
alone cannot substitute for the economic reforms that put a society on 
the road toward growth and, as an aftereffect (sic), toward slower 
population increase as well” (cited in Demeny 1985:101).
The US delegation suggested that the driving force behind fertility decline was 
the aspiration of individuals to improve their standard of living, facilitated 
through entrepreneurial initiatives (Demeny 1985:101). Hence the solution to 
the population problem lay not in state supported population policies, but in 
economic policies which gave prominence to the rights of the consumer, 
reliance on the free market, and the choice and aspirations of the individual. 
This revisionist position on population issues not only reflected economic 
reforms consistent with the neo-liberal agenda, but also played to the interests 
of the new right who by the mid-1980s were a dominant force in the US 
domestic political scene. Consistent with the concerns of the new right on 
issues related to sexuality and reproduction (and particularly abortion), the US 
rejected a position that could be seen as “an apology for abortion and state- 
mandated contraception” (Hodgson 1988:563). The US position emphasised 
the rights and freedoms of the individual to chose the number and spacing of
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their children, and the potential coercive nature of state intervention in family 
planning and reproduction. According to the US delegation:
“U.S. support for family planning programs is based on respect for 
human life, enhancement of human dignity, and strengthening of the 
family. Attempts to use coercive measures in family planning must be 
shunned, whether exercised against families within a society or against 
nations within a family of man” (cited in Finkle and Crane 1985:12)
The delegation went on to proclaim that US funds should not be used for 
direct support for abortion-related activities and called for assurances that 
UNFPA was not supporting abortion or coercive family planning programmes 
(Finkle and Crane 1985). In 1985 the Helms amendment was passed in the 
US Congress which stated that US funds would not be given to any 
organisation that “supports or participates in the management of a program of 
coercive abortion or involuntary sterilisation” (Crane and Finkle 1989:24). The 
condition that US funds would be withheld from organisations using others’ 
resources to support abortion related activities, led to the defunding of the 
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). Despite having lost their 
USAID funding, the IPPF did not address the issue of abortion in their policy 
statements until the early 1990s, and even then it was only to consider the 
issue of post abortion care. In 1985 the US government also withheld all 
funding from UNFPA due to their provision of technical assistance to China’s 
population programme. The defunding of UNFPA was based upon the 
interpretation of China’s one child policy as systemically coercive, involving 
peer pressure and persuasion techniques and coerced abortion to ensure 
compliance.
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The major influence behind the defunding of UNFPA and IPPF was the new- 
right Republican domestic political agenda, which combined a coalition of 
anti-abortion “right to life groups” with supporters of neo-liberal economics 
(Crane and Finkle 1989:25). The new-right position on China was based upon 
the interpretation of human rights as the absolute, sacrosanct and universal 
rights of the individual, overriding any interests of the state. China’s 
population policy was also interpreted as being uniformly and coercively 
implemented, with no power of resistance at the local level. This position on 
China is summarised in the following statement made by the Republican 
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
“there is a more important principle at stake than mere co-operation 
among nations on a perceived social problem. That principle, 
fundamental in its substance and universal in its application, is the 
natural right of married couples to conceive and procreate children 
freely as they determine without interference by any state. The family is 
a divine institution which precedes the state and has rights superior to 
the state. Accordingly, no power on Earth - not the U.N., not the United 
States Congress - has authority to dictate to married couples in China 
or elsewhere that they can have only a certain number of children” 
(cited in Crane and Finkle 1989:32, original emphasis).
Recent assessments of China’s population policy have suggested that 
national policy was variably implemented depending upon local social 
conditions, and that the power of party cadres to enforce policy through the 
mechanisms of propaganda and persuasion at their disposal were “eminently 
resistible” at the local level (Thomas and Price 1996:27). Thomas and Price 
(1996:27) suggest that it is through the power of the local government to
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control economic resources vital to village families that compliance with 
China’s national birth planning policy is most effectively enforced. According 
to Thomas (1991:392) without increasing economic security through land 
reforms, social welfare provision and effective markets for produce, no amount 
of persuasion or coercion would have induced China’s peasantry to reduce 
fertility.
In the context of China’s economic and political system where interests of the 
collective and the state override those of the individual, the new-right position 
on population policy was more about the assertion of neo-liberal political 
ideology than it was about supporting the rights of the Chinese peasantry. 
Indeed, the suspension of funds to UNFPA was the only action taken by the 
US against China on grounds of abuse of human rights (Crane and Finkle 
1989:44). Throughout the period in which USAID support to UNFPA was 
suspended, US diplomatic relations with China proceeded on friendly terms 
(based on China’s significance as a trading partner), with scarcely a reference 
to China’s population policy much less an open condemnation of it (Crane and 
Finkle 1989:25-26).
While the position taken by the US delegation at Mexico City had a limited 
impact on the final conference outcome, it had a significant impact on the 
development of population policy discourse for the subsequent decade. First, 
through the new-right moral agenda and the anti-statism of the neo-liberal 
agenda, the discourse of ‘individual rights, choice and freedom’ entered the
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international population policy arena. Second, as a result of the US 
government’s post-Mexico City stance and defunding of international family 
planning agencies, USAID’s international family planning activities, were 
repackaged under the heading of ‘maternal and child health’. The maternal 
and child health approach was later transformed into the women’s 
reproductive health approach (Hodgson and Cotts Watkins 1997). Hence the 
neo-liberal, new right agenda adopted by the US at Mexico City paved the 
way for the formation of new alliances between the population establishment 
(through organisations such as UNFPA and IPPF) and the international 
women’s health movement which found its voice at ICPD in Cairo in 1994.
2.4 The International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo 
1994
The decade between the Mexico City conference and ICPD was marked by 
the end of the Cold-War, symbolised through events such as the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989. During the late 1980s and early 1990s managerialism, 
privatisation and deregulation had become key dimensions of the profound 
globalisation of the world economy (Turner 1997:xvii). The end of the Reagan 
presidency was followed by increased multilateral co-operation through the 
UN system, and the US policy position which followed Mexico City was 
revoked leading to renewed support to international family planning 
organisations such as IPPF and UNFPA (Crane and Finkle 1989:26). It was 
against this background of the growth of globalised neo-liberal policy
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frameworks combined with renewed international support to national family 
planning programmes that the third inter-governmental International 
Conference on Population and Development was convened in Cairo in 1994.
There is an overriding consensus in the literature that the outcome of ICPD 
marked a radical repositioning of international population policy in which the 
neo-Malthusian family planning orthodoxy was replaced with a new feminist 
population paradigm (Basu 1997; Germain 1997; Hempel 1996; McIntosh and 
Finkle 1995; Petchesky and Judd 1998; Sai 1997). The Programme of Action 
is said to incorporate a feminist critique of the population orthodoxy borne out 
of years of discontent with the ideology and methods of traditional population 
policy (Basu 1997:7). The consensus in the literature rules that at ICPD:
“a new definition of population policy was advanced, giving prominence 
to reproductive health and the empowerment of women while 
downplaying the demographic rationale for population policy” (McIntosh 
and Finkle 1995:223).
The decade prior to ICPD had seen numerous attacks on the family planning 
establishment and critiques of demographically driven population policies. For 
example, Hartmann (1987) argued that neo-Malthusianism provided a smoke­
screen behind which Third World governments and Western aid agencies 
were able to hide their failure to challenge the real causes of poverty, namely 
unequal distribution of wealth and power. Analysing poverty in a rural village 
in Bangladesh, Hartmann (1987) argued that land ownership and income 
distribution are of primary importance in the question of poverty, rather than
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the number of children that people have in a context where having children is 
an important survival strategy.
In the early 1990s, this political-economic perspective gave way to a critique 
emanating from the women’s health movement, centring around two main 
strands of criticism. The first strand which developed out of the quality of care 
approach and laid the foundations for the sexual and reproductive health 
discourse, criticised vertical family planning programmes for failing to take 
account of the broader health needs of women and individual programmes 
users. The second strand attacked target driven programmes on ethical and 
political grounds as potential vehicles for abuse of human rights and in 
particular women’s rights, laying the foundations for the reproductive rights 
discourse (Petchesky and Judd 1998). The outcome of ICPD has been widely 
attributed to the influence of a number key players (individual activists and 
interest groups) who, united under the banner of the women’s health 
movement, lobbied to replace the population and family planning orthodoxy 
with a new framework of sexual and reproductive health and rights (McIntosh 
and Finkle 1995; Petchesky and Judd 1998; Sai 1997). Practical campaigns of 
women health activists leading to theoretical re-conceptualisations of women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights have been said to have contributed to the 
forcefulness of the women’s coalitions at the World Conference on Human 
Rights in Vienna in 1993, ICPD in 1994, and the Fourth World Conference on 
Women (FWCW) in Beijing in 1995 (Petchesky and Judd 1998:3). Advocates 
suggest that the international women’s movement has been responsible for
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gaining policy recognition of a core principle of feminism, which Petchesky 
and Judd (1998:3) argue
“as recently as the mid-1980s, in nearly all countries and political 
systems, was widely deemed unacceptable if not unthinkable: that even 
the most intimate areas of family, procreative and sexual life are ones 
where women’s rights to self-determination and equality must prevail”
Given this apparently radical policy transformation it seems somewhat 
surprising that ICPD has been proclaimed a victory by a most disparate group 
of political actors including:- feminist activists, NGOs, the population 
establishment (eg UNFPA and IPPF) and the US government. Even Pope 
John Paul II joined the consensus in approving the ICPD document, with 
controversy reigning only over the wording of the paragraph concerning 
abortion. This controversy was overcome by a rewording to suggest that men 
and women should have access to methods of fertility regulation of their 
choice, as long as these methods are not against the law (McIntosh and 
Finkle 1995:245). How then, has this consensus position come about when 
the previous two population conferences appeared to be dogged by 
ideological conflict? In order to understand the process by which the 
apparently uncontested notion of women’s rights and empowerment has been 
placed at the centre of population and development policy, it is necessary to 
consider the theoretical underpinnings of international population policy as it 
emerged in the twentieth century, and its relationship to the feminist agenda 
promoted at Cairo .
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3. The Theoretical Underpinnings of International Population Policy
3.1 Malthus and the Principles of Population
The foundations of the neo-Malthusian orthodoxy that has dominated twentieth 
century demography and population policy were laid in the late eighteenth 
century, with the publication of Malthus’s “Essay on the Principles of 
Population”. However, as will be shown, Malthus’s views on population, 
sexuality and family planning share more common ground with the “new right” 
position expressed at Mexico City, than they do with the twentieth century 
neo-Malthusian policy variant.
Malthus’s Essay on the Principles of Population, was essentially a counter 
argument to the utopian ideals of the romantic philosophers of the French 
Enlightenment, such as Rousseau and Condorcet. The Age of Enlightenment 
which emerged at the end of the eighteenth century, marked the beginnings of 
modernity in western Europe. This historical epoch, marked by profound 
economic transformations and the dawn of the age of competitive capitalism, 
was characterised by the increasing secularisation of society and the rise of 
scientific rationalism (Fox 1993:7). The French Enlightenment laid the 
foundations for “an enduring conception of modernity” (Delanty 2000:29), in 
which rational and scientific knowledge was seen as triumphant over 
traditionalism, superstition and religion. The social and cultural movement of 
the Enlightenment, committed to the pursuit of, ‘truth’, ‘progress’, and scientific
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knowledge, was driven by principles of materialism, rationalism, secularism 
and republicanism (Delanty 2000; Gardener and Lewis 1996). The 
development of the social sciences in the age of Enlightenment was strongly 
characterised by a positivism and empiricism, based on the belief that 
scientific analysis would provide the means by which the world could be 
known and understood (Gardener and Lewis 1996:4). Despite major post- 
Enlightenment transformations in social theory, positivism has remained the 
epistemological base of demographic inquiry into the twenty-first century (and 
promises to maintain its hold for some time).
The age of Enlightenment and the rise of capitalism were closely intertwined 
with the history of colonialism and the global expansion of the West. The 
notions of progress upon which the Enlightenment was predicated, were 
incorporated into colonial narratives in which native populations were 
portrayed as irrational and childlike and in which scientific knowledge was 
conceived of as the only foundation for rational thought (Gardener and Lewis 
1996:5). During this era dichotomies such as “ ‘primitive’ and civilised’, 
‘backward’ and ‘advanced’, ‘superstitious’ and ‘scientific’, ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ 
became commonplace” (Gardener and Lewis 1996:4). Such polarities, it will 
be argued, remain at the centre of mainstream demographic theory.
The social scientists of the Enlightenment (including Rousseau, Kant and 
Hegel) conceived of modernity in terms of the rise of civil society as a form of 
political utopia, in which a state of egalitarianism could be formed based upon
32
the principle of the social contract (Delanty 2000:23). For Rousseau, 
inequality was entirely a social creation and not the product of natural laws. 
Malthus’s Essay set out to demonstrate the impossibility of this utopian 
egalitarian vision. Malthus’s principles of population laid out a natural order of 
things, in which social inequities were conceived of as the necessary 
conditions for the maintenance of human society, acting as essential checks 
on population growth. Malthus’s analysis of population dynamics was based 
upon two main assumption:
“First, That food is necessary to the existence of man. Secondly, That 
the passion between the sexes is necessary, and will remain nearly in 
its present state....
Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. 
Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight 
acquaintance with numbers will show the immensity of the first power in 
comparison with the second. By that law of our nature which makes 
food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two unequal 
powers must be kept equal. This implies a strong and constantly 
operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence. This 
difficulty must fall some where, and must necessarily be severely felt by 
a large portion of mankind (Malthus 1993: 12-13).
According to Malthus, population growth would only be held within the limits of 
subsistence by positive checks which increase the death rate, such as 
hunger, disease and war; and preventive checks on fertility, such as abortion, 
birth control, prostitution and the postponement of marriage and celibacy. As, 
according to Malthus, the power of human reproduction exceeds the 
resources available for food production, these positive checks, which by their 
very nature condemn a large proportion of society to misery, poverty, and 
social marginalisation, are also essential to prevent overpopulation (Gilbert
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1993). Fear of destitution and the need to provide for one’s offspring (in the 
absence of state welfare) act as a major preventive check on early marriage 
and therefore high fertility among the poor:
“I said that population, when unchecked, increased in a geometrical 
ratio, and subsistence for man in an arithmetical ratio. Let us examine 
whether this position be just. I think it will be allowed, that no state has 
hitherto existed (at least that we have any account of) where the 
manners were so pure and simple, and the means of subsistence so 
abundant, that no check whatever has existed to early marriages; 
among the lower classes, from a fear of not providing well for their 
families; or among the higher classes, from a fear of lowering their 
condition in life. Consequently in no state that we have yet known has 
the power of population been left to exert itself with perfect freedom.
“The effects of this check on man are more complicated. Impelled to the 
increase of his species by an equally powerful instinct, reason 
interrupts his career, and asks him whether he may not bring beings 
into the world, for whom he cannot provide the means of subsistence.
In a state of equality, this would be the simple question. In the present 
state of society, other considerations occur. Will he not lower his rank 
in life? Will he not subject himself to greater difficulties than he at 
present feels? Will he not be obliged to labour hard? And if he has a 
larger family, will his utmost exertions enable him to support them? May 
he not see his offspring in rags and misery, and clamouring for bread 
that he cannot give them? ...”
“These considerations are calculated to prevent, and certainly do 
prevent, a very great number in all civilized nations from pursuing the 
dictate of nature in early attachment to one women” (Malthus 1993: 15- 
18).
For Malthus there were no utopian means of controlling population growth. 
Positive checks entailed the necessity for physical suffering and deprivation; 
and preventive checks, such as birth control and abortion led humanity to a 
state of vice and immorality (Gilbert 1993). The misery and deprivation of a 
substantial proportion of society (namely the peasantry and working classes)
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were, therefore, essential to check population growth. The thesis on 
population was in effect, a treatise against institutional changes aimed at 
improving the social and economic conditions of the poor. According to 
Malthus’s principles, changes in the institutional structure of society aimed at 
alleviating poverty and misery, would remove essential “preventive and 
positive checks” on population growth. For Malthus reduced fertility through 
“moral restraint” was the only means by which the poor could improve their 
conditions in life.
The Essay on the Principles of Population was, therefore, also a polemic 
against social reform, advocating for the maintenance of the existing social 
order in which poverty and misery had its place, ordained by the laws of 
nature and the will of God (Gilbert 1993:xiv). Making welfare relief available, 
through reforms such as the Poor Law would, according to Malthus, “weaken 
the ‘spirit of independence’ among the English peasantry”, increasing their 
dependence on the state (Gilbert 1993:xvi). Social reforms which increased 
the role of the state in the welfare of the poor, would remove the preventive 
checks on early marriage, exacerbating “irresponsible” and “immoral” 
behaviour among the “lower classes”. Hence, the egalitarian vision was 
inevitably doomed due to the perverse laws of population. The conditions 
necessary for the attainment of an egalitarian society would remove the 
essential checks on population growth, leading not to utopia but to 
overpopulation and an apocalyptic nightmare in which
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“sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague advance in terrific 
array, and sweep off their thousands and ten thousands. Should 
success be still incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, 
and with one mighty blow, levels the population with the food of the 
world” (Malthus 1993:61).
For Malthus inequity based on social class was part of a pre-ordained natural 
order. The only way out of poverty for the working classes was the acquisition 
of bourgeois aspirations and values, accompanied by postponement of 
marriage and pre-marital celibacy. In its denial of the structural conditions of 
poverty, advocacy for the removal of all forms of state intervention in social 
and economic reform, condemnation of pre-marital sex and contraception and 
abortion as “immoral”, and the suggestion that the impetus behind poverty 
reduction is the changing aspirations of individuals and the adoption of 
bourgeois values by the poor, the new-right’s position expressed at Mexico 
City is pure Malthusianism.
“To remove the wants of the lower classes of society is indeed an 
arduous task. The truth is that the pressure of distress on this part of a 
community is an evil so deeply seated that no human ingenuity can 
reach it. Were I to propose a palliative, and palliatives are all that the 
nature of the case will admit, it should be, in the first place, the total 
abolition of all the present Parish laws. This would at any rate give 
liberty and freedom of action to the peasantry of England, which they 
can hardly be said to possess at present. They would then be able to 
settle without interruption, wherever there was prospect of a greater 
plenty of work and a higher price for labour. The market of labour would 
then be free, and those obstacles removed, which, as things are now, 
often for a considerable time prevent the price from rising according to 
the demand” (Malthus 1993: 43-44).
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3.2 Demography and the Social Production of Knowledge
In the History of Sexuality (1990), Foucault identifies a synergy between the 
Malthusian discourse on population and emerging discourses on sexuality, in 
which during the eighteenth century, sex and sexual practices began to 
assume a critical importance as a political issue. Foucault’s analysis links 
eighteenth century discourses on sexuality with the emergence of 
demography as a scientific discipline and a tool for public policy. Central to 
this analysis is Foucault’s concern with the relationship between disciplinary 
power and the social production of knowledge.
For Foucault the Enlightenment was the historical epoch in which a major 
transformation occurred in the operations of power. Foucault conceptualises 
the age of modernism as marked by a shift in power from that wielded by a 
sovereign authority, to a diffuse and localised operation of power exerted 
through diverse institutions and mechanisms of the state aimed at the 
regulation and surveillance of the population (McHoul and Grace 1993). 
Foucault coins the term “governmentality” to describe the mechanisms of 
power which emerged during the eighteenth century, through which the 
population began to be controlled, regulated, and classified. For Foucault the 
notion of classification of individuals and populations lies at the heart of 
modern strategies of “governmentality” and social control (Jenkins 1996).
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Central to Foucault’s conception of power is that of discipline and the 
historical production of knowledge, encapsulated in the term “discourse”. 
Foucault’s narratives (1976, 1979, 1990), which focus on the rise of the 
modern period, seek to challenge the modernist assumption of historical 
progression, continuity and the unilinear development of knowledge (Bunton 
and Petersen 1997). While fields of knowledge produced in different historical 
epochs appear to be the result of an objective, continuous, evolutionary and 
apolitical progression of ideas; according to Foucault bodies of knowledge (or 
discourses) are socially, historically and politically constructed products, 
which serve to legitimise operations of disciplinary power. Foucault uses the 
term discipline in two senses. The first refers to academic disciplines or 
specialised technical fields such as medicine, psychiatry, sociology and 
demography. Foucault (1970) identifies the “Age of Enlightenment”, with the 
birth of these modern, scientific disciplines (Fox 1993:7). The second refers to 
the operations of power practised through disciplinary institutions such as the 
hospital, school and prison, which function to maintain social control, 
supported in their practice by these specialised technical bodies of knowledge 
(McHoul and Grace 1993). In other words, through the use of the term 
“discipline” Foucault stresses the connection between techniques of power 
and the forms of knowledge that have developed alongside them (McHoul and 
Grace 1993). It is in this respect that Foucault’s work has something to offer to 
an analysis of the emergence of demographic inquiry as a specialised 
technical field related to specific mechanisms of institutional power.
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The body and populations play a continuous role in the analytical structure of 
Foucault’s analysis of eighteenth century techniques of power (Turner 
1997:xv). According to Foucault, during the eighteenth century the regulation 
of the body became the focus of disciplinary power, exerted through the 
military, the church and the medical profession, with the emerging discourses 
on sex and sexuality linking two centres of social control. State regulation of 
the body as a biological organism was supported through the new discourses 
on public health (eg on control of sexually transmitted diseases), which acted 
as a form of policing of the labour force (Turner 1997:xv). Regulation of the 
population was supported through the emergence of public discourses on 
sexuality. Sex was no longer governed by taboo but rather through a series of 
techniques and regulations which were supported by demography as an 
emerging technical field:
“In concrete terms, starting in the seventeenth century, this power over 
life evolved in two basic form; these forms were not antithetical, 
however; they constituted rather two poles of development linked 
together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. One of these 
poles - the first to be formed, it seems- centred on the body as a 
machine...The second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species 
body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the 
basis of the biological processes: propagation, births, and mortality, the 
level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that 
can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an 
entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the 
population. The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the 
population constituted the two poles around which the organisation of 
power over life was deployed” (Foucault 1990:139).
Foucault identifies the notion of erotic sexuality as a modern and bourgeois 
construct, a product of discourse or discursive practices in a society
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increasingly concerned with the management of the population (Armstrong 
1997; McHoul and Grace 1993). For Foucault, the notion of sexuality had its 
origins in the bourgeois concern to maximise life and to reproduce itself as a 
social class. Hence Foucault suggests, discourses on sexuality refer to 
historically constructed system of morals, techniques of power, discourses 
and procedures designed to meet certain strategic and political ends (McHoul 
and Grace 1993):
“Sex was not something one simply judged; it was a thing to be 
administered. It was in the nature of a public potential; it called for 
management procedures; it had to be taken charge of by analytical 
discourses. In the eighteenth century, sex became a ‘police’ matter- in 
the full and strictest sense given the term at the time” (Foucault 
1990:24)...
Foucault locates the rise of demography as a “technical field” with the 
emergence of related techniques of surveillance and control concerned to 
govern aspects of life such as: fertility, mortality, contraceptive practices, life 
expectancy, and the general health of the population (McHoul and Grace 
1993:78).
“One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the 
eighteenth century was the emergence of ‘population’ as an economic 
and political problem: population as wealth, population as manpower or 
labour capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the 
resources it commanded. Governments perceived that they were not 
dealing simply with subjects, or even with a ‘people’, but with a 
‘population’, with its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: 
birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency 
of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation...
At the heart of this economic and political problem of population was 
sex: it was necessary to analyze the birth-rate, the age of marriage, the 
legitimate and illegitimate births, the precocity and frequency of sexual 
relations, the ways of making them fertile or sterile, the effects of
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unmarried life or of the prohibitions, the impact of contraceptive 
practices - of those notorious ‘deadly secrets’ which demographers on 
the eve of the Revolution knew were already familiar to the inhabitants 
of the countryside” (Foucault 1990:25-26)
For Foucault, the major societal context for the emergence of modern forms of 
population management, discipline and government, was the effect of 
demographic transformations in eighteenth century England (Turner 1997:xv).
“What is the basis for this transformation? Broadly one can say that it 
has to do with the preservation, upkeep and conservation of the ‘labour 
force’. But no doubt the problem is a wider one. It arguably concerns 
the economico-political effects of the accumulation of men. The great 
eighteenth-century demographic upswing in Western Europe, the 
necessity for co-ordinating and integrating it into the apparatus of 
production and the urgency of controlling it with finer and more 
adequate power mechanisms cause ‘population’, with its numerical 
variables of space and chronology, longevity and health, to emerge not 
only as a problem but as an object of surveillance, analysis, 
intervention, modification etc. The project of a technology of population 
begins to be sketched: demographic estimates, the calculation of the 
pyramid of ages, different life expectations and levels of mortality, 
studies of the reciprocal relations of growth of wealth and growth of 
population, various measures of incitement to marriage and 
procreation, the development of forms of education and professional 
training. Within this set of problems, the ‘body’ - the body of individuals 
and body of populations- appears as the bearer of new variables, not 
merely as between the scarce and the numerous, the submissive and 
the restive, rich and poor, healthy and sick, strong and weak, but also 
as between the more or less utilisable, more or less amenable to 
profitable investment, those with greater or lesser prospects of survival, 
death and illness, and with more or less capacity for being usefully 
trained” (Foucault 1980: 171-172)
There is a multitude of interpretations of Foucault’s work (Armstrong 1997). 
Foucault, as with many of the post-modernists, can be read as involving 
conservative and subversive political tendencies and has been interpreted as 
having both an idealist and a materialist conception of history (Armstrong
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1997; Gardener and Lewis 1996:21). Foucault’s conception of power can be 
read as a critical reaction to a deterministic Marxism which views power as 
operating only through macro-structures. For Foucault, power operates 
through relationships and practices at the micro level which are typically 
disguised and covert (Turner 1997:xi). Yet, such an analysis of power is not 
far removed from Wolfs suggestion that while class analysis and relations to 
the mode of production are at the core of Marx’s conceptualisation of power, 
production is “relational in character”, and that the concept is not merely 
economic, but also social, political and social-psychological” (Wolf 1982:21). 
The notion that power operates throughout the social structure, in diverse 
forms in different social contexts, and embodied in day to day practices such 
as those of professions, organisations and institutions, offers the potential for 
a context specific, local level analysis of the effects of power and its 
relationship to knowledge production.
It is in his formulation of the relationship between knowledge and power, that 
Foucault has been seen to make a major contribution to twentieth century 
social theory (Turner 1997:xi). Foucault’s notion of discourse has had a 
significant impact on how social theory in the 1980s and 1990s has conceived 
of knowledge production within academic and technical disciplines. Gardener 
and Lewis (1996:21) suggest that since the 1980s there has been an 
increasing awareness of the relationship between the production of 
specialised technical knowledge (discourse) and the operations of power in 
fields of practice such as international development. Drawing on Foucault’s
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notions of power and knowledge, Greenhalgh (1996) suggests that 
demography as a discipline must be understood as a distinctly historical 
product. Demographic theory or knowledge is the product of a social activity 
of particular groups, heavily influenced by the values and interests of funding 
organisations, the social structure of research institutions and the historical 
circumstances in which specific bodies of scientific knowledge are created 
(Greenhalgh 1996: 28-30).
3.3 Malthusianism and Twentieth Century Demography
The development of international population policy is inextricably linked to the 
emergence of demography as a specialised field of academic inquiry in the 
twentieth century (Demeny 1988; Greenhalgh 1996; Hodgson 1988). 
Demography has been described as the “handmaiden” of the population 
establishment (Demeny 1988), having provided the theoretical frameworks 
upon which international population policy, implemented through family 
planning programmes and in latter years sexual and reproductive health 
interventions, has largely been based.
The Cold-War concerns about the spread of communism in LDCs, 
engendered a strong demand from international planners and US policy 
makers for increased investment in demographic research (Greenhalgh 
1996:34). As a result, the funding base for demographic research in the
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latter part of twentieth century has largely been drawn from government 
departments, whose main interests have been in the collection and analysis of 
statistical data as a policy tool (Demeny 1988). Demography as an academic 
discipline has been caught between two stools, on the one hand seeking to 
gain academic legitimacy with an institutional base in university departments, 
and on the other producing tools and analytical frameworks that are of 
utilitarian value to its funders (Greenhalgh 1996). Demeny (1988:463) has 
suggested that while demography “provided the rationale for the creation of 
the population industry..., once established, the industry took command”.
The emergence of population as an issue for international policy concern 
during the inter-war years of the (1920s and 1930s), coincided with the 
establishment of population studies as an academic discipline. Leading 
demographers such as Warren Thompson [who in 1929 laid the foundations 
for demographic transition theory (Thompson 1929)] and Carr-Saunders, 
wrote in the 1920s and 1930s of the need to confront the growing Asian 
population, as it was feared that the differential growth in Europe and the East 
would undermine the prevailing global distribution of power. Western, and 
particularly US policy-makers, perceived rapid population growth in Asia as a 
threat to strategic interests, hence the coining of the term “strategic 
demography”. During this era, there was a strong eugenicist agenda behind 
the emergence of population studies as an academic discipline, linked to a 
related concern with migration, in particular migration of Asians to developed
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countries. In the mid 1940s, the influential US Malthusian publicist, Karl Sax was 
writing on immigration by third world people to the US:
“..there is no moral reason why nations which control their birth rates in 
order to maintain a high standard of living should provide for the surplus 
populations of countries which breed without consideration of economic 
and social consequences” (Sax, 1945, quoted in Furedi, 1997: 60).
The establishment of the Population Association of America in the early 
1930s, has been attributed to the need to give a scientific legitimacy to a 
class-ist and racist ideological agenda of population specialists concerned 
about high fertility among the lower classes and immigrant ethnic groups 
(Greenhalgh 1996:35). Through the work of Margaret Sanger, the early birth 
control movement which argued for women’s rights to access contraception, 
forged an ideological alliance with eugenicist Malthusianist founders of the 
population establishment (Hodgson and Cotts Watkins 1997:473).
3.4 Fertility Theory and the Neo-Malthusian Orthodoxy
By the late 1940s, the Malthusian population agenda, which had dominated 
population studies in the 1920s and 1930s, appeared to be subsiding with the 
maturation of demographic transition theory. Demographic transition theory 
which sought to provide a meta-theory for explaining fertility decline in the 
industrialised West, attributed the demographic transition in Europe to 
structural changes brought about by the modernisation process, and 
suggested that fertility would decline only in relation to economic development
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(Greenhalgh 1990:85; Hodgson 1988:542). Transition theory makes two main 
assertions about the relationship between development and demographic 
change. First, that high mortality and high fertility rates associated with 
agrarian societies will shift to a regime of low mortality and low fertility as 
society becomes increasingly industrialised. Second, that mortality will initially 
decline more rapidly than fertility, producing an interim period of high 
population growth (Hodgson 1983:7). Classical transition theory understood 
demographic change and the motivation to reduce fertility as a response to 
structural changes in the social system (Hodgson 1988). The early version of 
transition theory attributed fertility decline in Europe to the social and 
economic developments of the industrial age, which increased the economic 
costs associated with raising children and reduced economic benefits of 
having children, along with the increasing rationality which enabled couples to 
breakaway from traditionalism and fatalism (Thomas and Price 1999:782).
Transition theory is firmly rooted in the modernisation paradigm which derives 
from Durkheim’s functionalist sociology. Durkheim understood social change 
in terms of “a dichotomous typology of society”, in which society progressed 
through an evolutionary process from traditional to modern forms. According 
to Durkheim, primitive society was characterised by “mechanical forms” of 
social solidarity (based on a strong collective consciousness), in which the 
social group was the locus of identity (Delanty 2000). As societies progressed 
to more complex forms, mechanical solidarity gave way to organic social 
solidarity, characterised by a greater individualism, co-operation and the
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complementarity of difference (Wolf 1982:11). Modern society, emerging out 
of a highly differentiated division of labour was understood as involving a shift 
from social integration through religion and the family, to social differentiation 
based upon occupational groups and educational meritocracy (Delanty 
2000:35).
Modernisation theory conceptualises social change as an evolutionary 
process, through which societies progress from simple “traditional” forms 
based on subsistence agriculture, towards technologically complex and 
industrialised “modern” forms (Hobart 1993; Gardener and Lewis 1996). 
According to modernisation theorists such as Rostow, while economies are 
situated at different levels of development, all are progressing on a linear path 
towards industrialisation and capitalist economic growth (Gardener and Lewis 
1996). An underlying assumption of modernisation theory is that modern 
capitalist society is the pinnacle of the process of evolutionary social 
development, based upon a universal scientific and economic rationality. In 
contrast “traditional” social forms are conceptualised as lacking economic 
rationality and steeped in erroneous belief systems which act as an obstacle 
to change (Hobart 1993). Hence, modernisation theory presents the growth of 
global capitalism as unproblematic. Through characterising societies into 
traditional, transitional and modern forms, modernisation theory imparts an 
apolitical view of history which fails to consider the inequity of power relations 
between the developed and developing world, equating tradition with lack of
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development (Wolf 1982). According to Wolf (1982:12), through its apolitical 
characterisation of development:
“ ‘modernization theory’ became an instrument for bestowing praise on 
societies deemed to be modern and casting a critical eye on those that 
had yet to attain that achievement. The political leaders of the United 
Sates had pronounced themselves in favor of aiding the development 
of the Third World, and modernization theorists seconded that 
pronouncement. Yet modernization effectively foreclosed any but the 
most ideologically charged understanding of the world. It used the term, 
modem, but meant by that term the United States, or rather an ideal of 
a democratic, pluralistic, rational and secular United States” (Wolf 
1982:12).
Much less influential in mainstream demography has been critical political 
economy, emerging out of the Marxist understanding of modernity. As with 
Malthus, Marx also engaged in a critical debate with utopian socialism 
(Delanty 2000). However, for Marx, the utopian vision foundered not on a 
“natural law” in which the social order maintains the balance between demand 
and supply, but upon the inherent inequities in the distribution of ownership of 
resources upon which modern capitalist society is constructed. According to 
Wolf (1982:19-20), Marx was the last major theorist to produce a holistic or 
unitary human science, in which a materialist understanding of social change 
lays bare “the laws or regularities surrounding the production of wealth”, “the 
role of class in the genesis of wealth”, and “the role of the state in relation to 
different classes”.
Marx’s materialist conception of history placed the notion of dialectic and 
class conflict at the centre of the understanding of social transformation. For
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Marx, social structures are constituted by forces that are in constant conflict. 
The Marxist theory of social change is therefore one in which social structure 
is in a process of continual transformation, through forces of conflict and 
revolution (Coward and Ellis 1977). Central to Marx’s historical materialism is 
the concept of commodification, and the reduction of social relations to 
commodities within capitalist society (Delanty 2000). According to Marx, the 
production of ‘the material conditions of human life’ determines the social 
process, brought about by the need to survive (Coward and Ellis 1977:63). 
This conceptualisation of social change as embedded in material relations, 
separates Marx from the idealist philosophers who understand the central 
force for social transformation as deriving from ideational change. The 
following quotation from Marx, cited in Coward and Ellis (1977:62) provides a 
summary of Marx’s construction of capitalist social structure:
“We have seen that the capitalist process of production is a historically 
determined form of the social process of production in general. The 
latter is as much a production process of material conditions of human 
life as a process taking place under specific historical and economic 
production relations, producing and reproducing these production 
relations themselves, and thereby also the bearers of this process, 
their material conditions of existence and their mutual relations, i.e. 
their particular socio-economic form (Capital, vol 3: 818).
At the heart of Marx’s analysis of capitalism is the concept of the relations of 
production, in which capital and labour are in constant conflict. The driving 
force of modern society is profit, the accumulation of which is explained by the 
“labour theory of surplus value”, according to which profit is generated 
through the sale and purchase of labour power as a unique commodity
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(Delanty 2000:33). Labour power adds value to a product over and above that 
contained in the tools, raw materials and labour - the forces of production 
(Lovell 2000a:306). The products of labour are sold on the market as 
commodities, generating a profit which is appropriated by those who have 
bought the labour power and own the raw materials (the means of production). 
The concentration of ownership of the means of production by a small elite, 
enables the expansion of production through the exploitation of wage-labour. 
This exploitation is the production of “surplus value” created by the wage 
labourer within the capitalist relations of production (Coward and Ellis 
1977:65).
Hence, Marx did not conceive of modern society as a civil society modelled on 
the rights and responsibilities of the individual. Rather modern society was 
typified by the commodification of social relations, and the struggle for justice 
between those who sold their labour and those who owned the means of the 
production. Wolf (1982), suggests that although twentieth century social 
science disciplines appeared to have moved away from political economy, 
Marxist analysis remains a hidden force in the development of social theory:
“The several social science disciplines, ...turned their back on political 
economy, shifting instead to the intensive study of interaction among 
individuals - in primary and secondary groups, in the market, in the 
processes of government. They thus turned away from crucial 
questions about the nature of production, class and power...
Although these questions were abandoned by the social sciences, they 
persist as their hidden agenda. Because Marx raised these questions 
most persistently and systematically, he remains a hidden interlocutor 
in much social science discourse. It has been said that the social 
sciences constitute one long dialogue with the ghost of Marx” (Wolf 
1982:20).
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In the 1970s and 1980s modernisation theory underwent a sustained critique 
in the social sciences and in development theory. Drawing on Marxist analysis 
of the history of capitalism, dependency and world systems theorists such as 
Frank and Wallerstein argued that development and underdevelopment were 
not “separate phenomena”, but closely bound to the unequalising process of 
capitalist development (Gardener and Lewis 1996; Wolf 1982). Dependency 
theorists argued that the underdevelopment of countries in the South was a 
product of imperial and post-imperial exploitation, and hence a historical 
construction of capitalism (Gardener and Lewis 1996). Related to dependency 
theory, world systems theorists such as Wallerstein argued that relations of 
global inequality between the industrialised centre and the non-industrialised 
periphery (from which the centre extracts resources) is repeated in social 
relations at the local level, for example in terms of trade between rural 
producers and urban markets. However, modernisation theory and 
dependency theory share a common assumption that society progresses in a 
unilinear fashion, based upon a universal rationalist epistemology (Gardener 
and Lewis 1996). One of the main criticisms levied at dependency and world 
systems theory is that in concentrating only on the economic and political 
structures of underdevelopment, Third World societies are presented simply 
as passive victims of global capitalism. Hence dependency and world systems 
theories lack an analysis of micro-level dynamics and strategies of resistance 
and maximisation of opportunities by the poor (Gardener and Lewis). In other
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words modernisation, dependency and world systems theory share in common 
a lack of a coherent theory of the relationship between structure and agency.
Despite the dominance of the above debates in development theory over the 
past three decades, the modernisation paradigm has continued to dominate 
demographic theory. In the 1960s, classical demographic transition theory 
increasingly gave way to a new perspective which stressed the importance of 
ideational change to fertility related behaviour over and above structural 
conditions (Hodgson 1988; Thomas and Price 1999). This approach was 
strengthened by the findings of the Princeton University European Fertility 
Project (1963 to 1983), which analysed data from 700 European provinces, 
and concluded that fertility decline was precipitated more by changes in 
fertility-related behaviour in neighbouring provinces than by specific socio­
economic changes within a province itself (Thomas and Price 1999). The 
Princeton University Project introduced the notion of culture as the main 
variable influencing demographic change, emphasising diffusion of ideas as 
opposed to changes in economic and structural conditions as a major 
determining influence on fertility (Greenhalgh 1995). Changes in fertility 
related behaviour were explained in terms of the diffusion of the idea of 
contraception leading to its increasing acceptability as a social innovation and 
hence to increased usage rates (Thomas and Price 1999).
Diffusion theory offered a new variant to the modernisation paradigm. Fertility 
decline was understood as resulting from cultural change brought about
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through the diffusion of western or modernising ideas to traditional cultures. In 
particular, diffusion theorists suggest that Christianity and Western education 
(Caldwell 1982) and ideas regarding the benefits of lower fertility (Cleland 
1985), have provided the cultural context for a shift from traditionalism and 
fatalism, to fertility decision-making based upon a ‘rational’ assessment of the 
relative costs and benefits of having children (Thomas and Price 1999).
The underpinnings of cultural diffusion theory can be found in Weber’s notion 
of social change, in which cultural systems are understood to evolve through 
a process of rationalisation from magic to religion to modern materialism. For 
Weber, Christianity was a major modernising force and dynamic behind social 
change (Delanty 2000:36). In The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of 
Capitalism Weber outlines a thesis of social change in western Europe 
between the sixteenth and eighteenth century, in which the “rationalisation of 
Christianity” through the “Protestant ethic” of early Calvinism laid the moral 
and cultural foundations for early capitalism (Delanty 2000). For Weber 
ideational change preceded structural and economic transformation and the 
rise of capitalism. In its simplest form, the notion that ideational change is a 
driving force behind social transformation is one of the most persistent 
“truisms” assumed by demographic diffusion theory and the neo-Malthusian 
family planning orthodoxy.
While classical transition theory had sought only to explain fertility decline as 
a demographic trend occurring in economically developed areas of the world,
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under the diffusionist variant, fertility decline became viewed as a pre­
requisite for economic development (Hodgson 1983). Under-pinned by 
diffusion theory, the identification of demography with the Malthusian 
principles of population as an independent variable re-emerged within the 
population orthodoxy (Hodgson 1983). By the 1960s mainstream population 
studies had adopted a neo-Malthusian position, seeing reduced rates of 
population growth as essential aspects of social and economic development 
in the Third World (Hodgson 1988). Within this orthodoxy, the relevance of 
economic factors to fertility decline all but disappeared from mainstream 
demographic inquiry, replaced by a perspective which saw demographic 
trends as the determinants of economic development. Fertility decline in the 
worlds poorest and economically least developed areas became a core policy 
objective and providing modern contraceptive technology to peasant couples 
the means for achieving it (Hodgson 1988:542). Demeny (1988:457) notes 
that:
“ [t]he discovery of a potentially important contribution to development 
from an induced change in demographic behaviour gave a mighty 
impetus to policy-oriented population studies. Studies in turn spawned 
programmatic action, soon embraced by scores of countries, assisted 
by international development agencies”.
Recent critiques, have demonstrated the failure of transition theory and its 
diffusion variants to adequately explain micro-level variations in fertility 
behaviour (Greenhalgh 1990; Thomas and Price 1999). These critiques have 
demonstrated the fundamental importance of structural and economic factors 
in explaining differences in fertility behaviour at the local level. An historical
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analysis of demographic transition in Hungary carried out by Cook and 
Repetto (1982), indicated that variants in marital fertility were related to social 
inequalities and distributional factors such as: the real wage index; 
inequalities in landholdings and the average income of landless households 
(Thomas and Price 1999:782). These developmental and economic factors 
were shown to have a far greater significance for fertility related behaviour 
than explanations based on transition theory or diffusion models would allow 
(Thomas and Price 1999:782). A study by Kertzer and Hogan (1989) 
demonstrates that macro-level social and economic changes had differential 
affects on fertility behaviour of different classes living in the same community 
(Greenhalgh 1990:85). This micro-level analysis makes a break with the 
modernisation paradigm suggesting that fertility decline “does not follow 
changes in such indexes of modernisation as literacy, women’s work or female 
autonomy”, but rather that fertility decline follows “alterations in the value of 
children in the class-specific family economy” (Greenhalgh 1990:86). Political 
and developmental factors such as laws making school attendance 
compulsory and restricting child labour in factories, were shown to be key 
catalysts for fertility change, as opposed to ideational factors (Greenhalgh 
1990:86). Other studies have also demonstrated micro-level fertility 
differentials by social class and occupation, which suggests the existence of a 
“strong negative relationship between equitable development and fertility” and 
that fertility behaviour is largely predicated upon structural conditions such as 
equitable distribution of resources (Thomas and Price 1999:784).
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3.5 The Family Planning Discourse
Despite the evidence of its explanatory shortcomings, variants of diffusion 
theory have remained the received wisdom of demographic inquiry and social 
science research on family planning (Demeny 1988). Until the late 1980s, 
family planning research was preoccupied with technical aspects of 
programme interventions. Resource allocation from donor agencies to 
population research emphasised technical products that would provide 
practical assistance to improving family planning programme effectiveness, 
through action (operations) research, systems analysis and programme 
evaluation (Demeny 1988). According to Warwick (1982:40) family planning 
programming was largely based on a Weberian ideal type model informed by 
a “machine theory” of implementation:
“a quasi-mechanical exercise in which organizational units and 
individual implementers form a delivery system and program clients 
become receptacles for the services delivered”.
Within the family planning orthodoxy, fertility behaviour based upon a cost- 
benefit calculation has been the predominant framework within which the 
demand for contraceptives has been understood. Fertility decision-making is 
understood in terms of a decontextualised universal rationality based on 
economistic notions of maximisation of scarce resources (Hammel 1990). 
Within this framework, the key determinants of fertility-related behaviour are 
understood as the supply of births, the demand for births, and the cost of
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fertility regulation (Easterlin and Crimmins 1985; Behrman and Knowles 
1998). When the biological supply of births (which is not behaviourally 
controlled) and the demand for births (which is behaviourally controlled) are 
both high, it is assumed that so is the relative cost of regulating fertility, and 
therefore the demand for fertility control will be low. If supply of births begins 
to outstrip demand (either because of the rising economic cost of having 
children, or because of changing ideas about the value of children and the 
importance of the nuclear family), then it follows that the cost of fertility rises, 
the relative cost of fertility control decreases and the demand for fertility 
control increases. Within this equation, as the actual cost of fertility control 
decreases (through increased access to modern contraceptive technologies) 
so there will be an increasing demand for fertility regulation services reflected 
in increased utilisation rates. Hence, utilisation of services (and particularly 
high continuation rates) becomes a proxy measure of demand.
A neo-Malthusian understanding of the relationship between poverty and 
fertility, also based upon the classical economic demand-supply paradigm, 
underlies this family planning orthodoxy. Poverty and ill-health are seen as 
resulting from too much demand being placed on finite resources and services 
(including land, food, wealth-generating natural resources and health and 
medical services) as a result of population growth (Kibirige 1997:247). This 
perspective on poverty melded with diffusion theory, underlies the assertion 
that the systematic implementation of technically sound, well-managed, 
quality family planning programmes, will effectively reduce fertility irrespective
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of social and economic context (Thomas 1991; Thomas and Price 1999). Ttie 
economic theory of fertility suggests, that in economic crises and conditions of 
extreme poverty, demand for children will decline as a direct result of their 
increasing cost relative to income levels (Thomas and Price 1999:785). The 
neo-Malthusian orthodoxy suggests that if quality health and family planning 
services are provided to the poor in such contexts, fertility rates will 
subsequently decline (and consequently so will poverty). This position has 
been advocated by numerous pillars of the population establishment. For 
example, Harvey (1996:283) asserts that:
“Simultaneously with the recognition that family planning programmes 
need not necessarily concentrate on ‘health’ to be effective came a 
growing realization that improved levels of education and economic 
development were not necessarily pre-requisites for the adoption of 
family planning, either. ‘Development is the best contraceptive’ was a 
rallying cry of many developing countries’ governments in the early 
years, no doubt in part to help attract donor nations’ investment in other 
development activities, but surely, too, because assistance provided for 
economic development was and remains less controversial than 
support for ‘pure’ family planning. But as fertility control proved its 
worth, that conviction dissipated too”.
In recent years the assertion that fertility decline can be brought about 
through implementation of family planning programmes irrespective of social 
and economic development has been strengthened by national fertility 
declines in countries such as Bangladesh and Kenya, which have poor 
indicators of equitable development (Thomas and Price 1999:785). An often 
cited example of the impact of family planning programmes on fertility decline 
in the context of extreme poverty is the Matlab experiment in Bangladesh 
which increased contraceptive prevalence rates through provision of
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organised family planning services, despite poor social and economic 
indicators (Harvey, 1996). Malcolm Potts (1996:116) has argued that such 
fertility declines:
“are not the result of socio-economic improvement (Bangladesh is 
amongst the poorest countries in the world), but they are the result of 
governmental and non-governmental systems making a range of family 
planning choices available through a variety of channels and of a 
concerted effort to deal with the public health consequences of unsafe 
abortion”.
Within the neo-Malthusian orthodoxy, family planning programme 
performance has been judged on two basic criteria: effectiveness and 
efficiency. Effectiveness is measured by the extent to which a programme has 
achieved the goals set by the implementing organisation (eg to increase 
contraceptive prevalence rates) and efficiency by the ratio of resources put in 
to achieve the output (Warwick 1982:41). Hence, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
family planning research focused almost exclusively on the collection and 
analysis of aggregate data on fertility outcomes and family planning service 
utilisation. The dominant measures of programme effectiveness have been 
contraceptive prevalence rates and its widely-used proxy Couple Years of 
Protection. Acceptor rates have been used as a common intermediate 
measure of effectiveness, along with continuation rates which identify the 
proportion of acceptors who continue to use a commodity or service for a 
given period of time after first acceptance. These data are rarely 
disaggregated by client profile, thereby failing to provide any indication of the 
impact of programmes on specific social and economic groups. By focusing
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on outcomes alone, family planning programmes have generally failed to 
collect or analyse data on the social contexts in which fertility related 
behaviour takes place. Warwick (1982: 34-37) suggests that the core 
elements of the traditional family planning approach have rested upon a set of 
assumptions regarding individual fertility behaviour. First, that irrespective of 
social context (income levels, ethnicity, religion etc) women of reproductive 
age want to limit their fertility. Second, that this desire to limit fertility will be 
translated into active utilisation of organised family planning programmes. As 
a result of these assumptions access to modern contraceptives is taken as a 
major predictor of fertility behaviour. A further assumption (based upon 
diffusion theory) is that those who do not initially express a desire to limit 
fertility, can be made interested in contraception through information, 
education and communication (IEC) programmes.
Based upon the above assumptions, the concept of the ‘unmet need’ for 
modern contraception is often used synonymously in the family planning 
literature, with the concept of demand. However, while demand is linked to a 
particular theoretical understanding of fertility-related behaviour, unmet need 
is a conceptual tool of programme planners, borne out of the application of 
survey methods and used as a policy instrument to determine that a need 
exists, even though it has not necessarily been expressed as such either in 
the minds or behaviour of survey respondents (Behrman and Knowles 
1998:721). The unmet need for contraception was first demonstrated through 
data collected by knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) surveys. Using a
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questionnaire method, KAP surveys ask women (and some men) respondents 
about family size preference, and about knowledge, attitudes and practice 
related to family planning. The difference between the stated reproductive 
preferences and birth control practices (eg between preferred number of 
children and actual number, and between desire to stop child-bearing and 
modern contraceptive use) has become known as the “KAP gap”, and taken to 
indicate an unmet need for contraception (Bongaarts 1991). There has been a 
long running debate in the family planning literature over the significance of 
the KAP gap for estimating the unmet need for contraception. Westoff 
(1988:231) argues that a large number of non-users of modern contraceptives 
are women who are not currently exposed to the risk of pregnancy and that 
the unmet need is not, therefore, significant. Bongaarts (1991), however, 
suggests that the estimate of unmet need would be substantially higher if it 
included need for birth spacing as well as birth limiting. Dixon-Mueller and 
Germain (1992) have suggested an even broader definition that would extend 
the concept of unmet need to include comprehensive sexual and reproductive 
health services, as well as including data on men and women who are not well 
served by existing contraceptive methods (eg unmet need for method 
switching).
Similarly, there has been an ongoing debate in the family planning literature 
on the causes of unmet need for contraception. Ross (1995) has taken issue 
with the assertion by Bongaarts and Bruce (1995a) that the key determinant of 
use of modern contraceptive services is quality of care (in particular client-
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provider interactions). For Ross (1995), the question of access to services is a 
significant contributor to contraceptive use in much of the developing world. In 
response, Bongaarts and Bruce (1995b:243) argue that while accepting the 
importance of access, “offering relevant, flexible, good-quality care is the key 
to successful services”. The impasse reached in this debate illustrates a 
failure throughout the family planning literature to distinguish conceptually 
between the perspective and needs of programme implemented (supply 
issues) and the differential perspectives and needs of the community (demand 
issues).
It is in the quality of care framework that family planning discourse has come 
closest to considering demand issues and considering the impact and 
effectiveness of family planning programmes from the community perspective. 
The pressure for improved sensitivity of family planning programmes is 
reflected in work carried out by the Population Council in the 1980s on the 
users’ perspective, which laid the foundations for the quality of care 
framework in the early 1990s (Bruce 1990; Thomas and Price 1999; Hempel 
1996). In the 1970s the population establishment became increasingly 
concerned by the findings of various studies which indicated low contraceptive 
continuation rates in a number of developing countries (Zeidenstein 1980).
The family planning establishment responded with a framework which 
introduced the ‘users’ perspective’ into family planning programme design, in 
order to bridge the identified ‘gap in perception’ between programme 
implementers and programme users. The users’ perspective places the
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individual as the analytical focal point for programme design and evaluation, 
on the basis that the “perception and experience” of individual programme 
users determines acceptance and continuation rates and hence the overall 
impact of the service delivery system (Brucel 980:30). Despite the apparent 
recognition by Zeidenstein (then president of the Population Council) of the 
relationship between fertility and equitable development, the users’ 
perspective is based upon an understanding of the individual as a consumer 
of services, operating in a free market irrespective of social context:
“Many of us today think that the intensity and seeming exclusivity of the 
earlier interest in fertility and the profitable economics of reducing it 
was excessively narrow. We are, moreover, supported these days by a 
substantially enlarged and broadened set of standards regarding 
development itself...For in addition to continuing attention to economic 
activity and growth as measured by per capita GNP, there is increasing 
attention to improving the quality of human life; that is, among other 
things, to more equitable distribution of income and wealth, to creation 
of employment opportunities, and to development strategies to enable 
poor people to satisfy certain fundamental needs on a sustained 
basis...Contraceptive service programs need to become better oriented 
to the perceptions of individuals who use or want to use contraceptives, 
including the problems they perceive in sustained use. Unless this is 
done, we will continue to disappoint or fail too many of the individuals 
who have sought out organized programs for supplies, services and 
information” (Zeidenstein 1980: 25-26).
The users’ perspective maintains the classical demand-supply paradigm in its 
understanding of fertility behaviour, framing demand issues in terms of the 
perspectives, needs and wants of individual contraceptive service users. The 
needs and preferences of the individual are understood as synonymous with 
demand, and hence qualitative and quasi-anthropological approaches are 
proposed as the methodological tools for integrating the user perspective into
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mainstream family planning research and evaluation. Bruce (1980:31) 
suggests that through using “modified anthropological techniques”, 
anthropology and operations research could be combined to “yield a full and 
realistic description of the interaction of the individual and the birth planning 
system under study”.
By the late 1980s the users’ perspective was beginning to incorporate 
debates concerning women’s rights and gender issues related to family 
planning programming. For example, Bruce (1987) integrates the users’ 
perspective into an apparently radical “framework of feminist concerns”, which 
considers the acceptability of new contraceptive technology and family 
planning service delivery systems from a women’s perspective. Bruce 
(1987:362) argues that as modern contraceptive services are delivered to 
communities through “the vehicle of women’s bodies”, information regarding 
women’s roles and gender inequalities is essential for the implementation of 
user responsive delivery systems. In other words, in order to be user 
sensitive, programmes must be gender sensitive. The pivotal relationship in 
the elaboration of the proposed feminist framework is between the individual 
client and the service provider. With the increase in provider dependent 
technologies, the framework suggests that a central role of the provider is to 
protect women’s rights, through developing the client’s understanding of her 
right to chose at the outset of the client-provider interaction (Bruce 1987:378). 
Bruce’s analysis also develops out of the demand-supply paradigm which 
considers the reproductive couple as the unit of fertility decision making,
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simply adding the gender dimension as pivotal in the relationship between 
individual users and the family planning delivery system. This proposed 
feminist perspective centres around the notion that fertility behaviour can be 
influenced by improving the gender sensitivity of service delivery systems 
towards individual women users, irrespective of the changes to structural 
conditions in which gender and power relations are embedded.
“[C]hoice in childbearing is the center of women’s autonomy dilemma. 
Women’s ability to exercise this choice is conditioned by their lack of 
economic power as individuals, few avenues to social security and 
esteem apart from childbearing, gender roles, and family systems to 
promote high fertility. The developers and purveyors of contraceptives 
cannot directly affect structural limitations on women’s lives, but they 
can define their mission in terms that offer women dignity and 
increasing freedom...Service delivery systems rarely transcend the 
structural limitations characteristic of their societies. More frequently, 
they reflect these limitations or even extend prevailing discriminatory 
concepts about women’s roles and entitlements. But they, too can be 
realigned to be conscious in ideology and design of the needs of their 
clients. How do we reach these women? How do we protect their 
interests, their pride, and their privacy? What fears and limits can we 
help overcome?” (Bruce 1987:380).
The quality of care framework (Bruce 1990) which emerged in the early 1990s 
combines the users’ perspective with a women’s health approach (see 
Winikoff 1988), which suggests that the scope of programme interventions 
should be broadened to address women’s health needs throughout the life 
cycle. The framework identifies six core elements of quality of care: choice of 
methods, information given to clients, technical competence of service 
providers, interpersonal relations, mechanisms to encourage continuity, and 
appropriate constellation of services (Bruce 1990; Jain, Bruce and Mensch 
1992). The component of the “appropriate constellation of services” suggests
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that the range of services should be broadened (based upon clients identified 
needs) to enable women to safely and effectively regulate their fertility 
(including access to safe abortion care) as well as to enable them to “remain 
free of disease, disability or death associated with reproduction or sexuality” 
(Bruce 1990:82).
Smyth (1994) argues that it is with the issue of quality of care that the 
population establishment has come closest to a “woman-centred” perspective, 
and in which demand issues have received most consideration. Despite the 
assertion that the focus of the quality of care approach is not on demographic 
targets but on enabling individuals to achieve their reproductive intentions 
(Jain, Bruce and Mensch 1992:392), the approach maintains a neo- 
Malthusian rationale which links fertility decline to family planning utilisation. 
Protagonists suggest that while the emphasis is on the rights and informed 
choice of the individual client, improvements in quality will lead to fertility 
reduction through increasing contraceptive use and sustained continuation 
rates (Jain, Bruce and Mensch 1992:392). The quality of care approach also 
separates the relationship between individual clients and service providers 
from the broad social and economic conditions within which health systems 
operate, and within which social and economic groups and classes 
experience differential access to health care resources:
“The hypothesis underlying the quality of care approach was that better 
quality would result in user-friendly services, thereby assuring greater 
contraceptive acceptance, continuity and higher ‘success1 rates. It is 
almost entirely focused on individual fertility management through 
delivery systems that are isolated from a comprehensive health
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programme. The framework also fails to address the impact of broader 
social processes on the health system, such as drastically reduced 
funding for public services, migration of professionals to urban areas, 
discrimination and other forms of social disadvantage that limit poor 
women’s access to services” (Correa 1994:86).
Drawing heavily upon the total quality notion of private enterprise the quality 
of care framework proposes a “market led” approach, in which family planning 
services are responsive to the demands of the individual consumer (Correa
1994). The approach sits easily with the free market ideology of structural 
adjustment programmes, imposed on many LDCS during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, in which state responsibility for basic needs and social welfare 
was retracted in favour of market forces and rapid privatisation of the health 
sector (Correa 1994).
4 ICPD: A Feminist Critique of Neo-Malthusianism?
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, wide acclaim has been given 
in the literature to the role of women’s activists in promoting the women’s 
health and feminist agenda at ICPD, as a major critique of the neo-Malthusian 
orthodoxy of the family planning establishment. However, throughout the 
history of the women’s movement activism and grassroots feminism has been 
less than explicit about its relationship to social theory (Lovell 2000a). It is this 
separation of activism from its theoretical underpinnings that has led to many 
contradictory claims about the political positioning of the ICPD Programme of 
Action.
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Feminism is presented in the ICPD literature as a unified social movement 
sharing an uncontested social theory. A general feminist perspective is 
understood as uniting activists and interests groups within the women’s health 
movement (Smyth 1994). For example, the Population Council has defined the 
women’s health movement as being formed by “those groups and individuals 
whose prime concern is to promote and protect women’s reproductive rights 
and health” (Population Council cited in Smyth 1994:4). Historically, feminism 
has been far from a united social movement, with different political strands 
emanating out of divergent theoretical perspectives on the nature of gender 
based power and inequality. Weedon (1999) argues that the assumption of 
natural difference between men and women, grounded in biology has been 
fundamental to western culture. Throughout its history feminism has taken 
issue with the ascription of hegemonic meanings based upon this biological 
distinction, which has tended to focus on men and women’s reproductive roles 
(Weedon 1999:10). Weedon (1999:13) suggests that until the advent of the 
contemporary Women’s Movement, feminism in the West was predominantly 
liberal in character, largely concerned with the political and religious rights 
and freedoms of the individual. Liberal feminism was criticised by “second 
wave” feminists for its failure to problematise categories such as the 
individual, choice and freedom; and hence for not offering a political challenge 
to structural inequities within which gender relations are embedded. Second 
wave feminism, which developed in the late 1960s, sought to transform the 
domain of the “personal” into the “political”, taking much of its impetus from
68
radical feminism which also largely set the agenda for the Women’s 
Movement (Lovell 2000a; Weedon 1999).
The concept of reproduction has been central to theoretical debates within 
feminist thought (Smyth 1994). Radical feminism conceptualises human 
reproduction in terms of patriarchy, turning its attention to the body as the site 
of women’s oppression (Coward 1983; Weedon 1999). In so doing radical 
feminism has sought to identify certain core issues which all feminist theory 
must confront, in particular: sexuality and power; sexual violence and 
domination, and the universal cultural construction of women and femininity as 
inferior (Lovell 2000a). Central to radical feminism is the concept of 
patriarchy, which understands the subordination of women to men as the 
fundamental determinant of all social relations and cultural forms. Radical 
feminism rejects any theoretical frameworks (such as Marxism) which locates 
gender power relations within wider economic and political systems and 
inequitable social relations. For radical feminists women’s oppression by men 
is ubiquitous and irreducible to other forms of domination.
For Marxist or socialist feminists specific forms of family and gender relations 
are understood as embedded in relations of production and reproduction of 
the labour force. The primary focus of Marxist feminism has been on the 
gendering of the labour force and on the division of labour within the 
household as the unit of biological and social reproduction. With its focus on 
the family as the site of reproduction of material life, radical feminists take
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issue with socialist and Marxist feminism for failing to provide a theory of 
sexuality, and for its failure to provide an analysis of the family as the site of 
men’s sexual domination over women (Lovell 2000). However, the radical 
feminist conceptualisation of patriarchy has been shown to be highly 
problematic and extremely limited in its explanatory power concerning the 
structure of social relations. One of the limitations that Coward (1983:271) 
highlights is that there have been definitive transitions in the form of family 
arrangements throughout different historical epochs, and that the structure of 
the contemporary family often maintains few of the features of classical 
patriarchy. Similarly, family forms and kinship structures are highly variable 
across different social and economic contexts. Hence a generalised, 
universal, concept of patriarchy does little to enhance our understanding of 
difference in the construction of family forms and the complexity of gender and 
power relations in different social and historical contexts (Coward 1983).
With its insistence on the universal nature of patriarchy, radical feminism 
ultimately falls back upon a determinism in which the structure of power 
relations is embedded within a biologically pre-defined natural order. It follows 
that if all societies across history and culture share an irreducible hierarchy of 
power relations based upon male domination over women, then there must be 
a predisposing factor which reverts back to an essential biologism (Lovell 
2000a: 311). Nonetheless, it is the radical feminist conceptualisation of 
patriarchy combined with apolitical and ahistorical liberal notions of the rights 
and freedoms of the individual, that underpin the new population paradigm
produced at ICPD (Thomas and Price 1999). The sexual and reproductive 
health and rights agenda emphasises the empowerment of women as the only 
real motivating factor behind social development. Within this discourse the 
empowerment of women to have control over their bodies and sexuality is 
seen as fundamental to social change. The biologism implicit in this position is 
evident in the following quote from Correa (1994:5) who conflates elements of 
socialist feminism with a radical determinist position :
“In every human society ...women’s daily invisible efforts to feed, clothe 
and nurture their families are the actions that sustain their communities. 
This reality, ‘social reproduction’, derives from the gender-based 
division of labour, which in turn stems from the assumption that 
reproductive responsibilities constitute a natural extension of female 
biology...In the world’s most diverse cultures, the same set of 
assumptions underlies women’s lack of autonomy to make decisions 
about their bodies, their sexuality and fertility”
However, if power relations and the gendered subject are implicitly fixed as is
implied by the radical feminist discourse, it is difficult to see how any real
social transformation can occur (Weedon 1987). In its apolitical and
ahistorical conceptualisation of social change, radical feminism sits quite
comfortably within a neo-Malthusian fertility paradigm and a neo-liberal
economics. Indeed, Hodgson and Cotts Watkins (1997:471) have noted that a
political synergy between neo-Malthusianism and the antecedents of radical
feminism dates back to the early days of the birth control movement, in which
factions of the women’s movement called for the recasting of women’s
reproductive role as a way of redressing social inequity.
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The birth control movement grew out of an initial socialist feminist neo- 
Malthusian position which called upon working class women to increase their 
power through reducing their fertility, thereby restricting the production of new 
workers, i.e. the fodder for the capitalist system. However, fundamental 
divisions occurred between the liberal women’s suffrage movement 
(concerned with gaining civil and political rights for women) and the birth 
control movement which increasingly identified women’s rights with control 
over biological reproduction. In latter years Margaret Sanger, a founder of the 
birth control movement, combined a pure neo-Malthusian line with a 
eugenicist ideology, in which birth control was considered as the means of 
reducing poverty as well as limiting defective offspring among the working 
classes (Hodgson and Cotts Watkins 1997:475). The continuing historical 
alliance between neo-Malthusians and the family planning movement has 
been discussed in previous sections.
A dominant perception is that the ICPD POA represents a radical break from 
neo-Malthusian population policy, in its assertion that programmes that are 
demographically driven and intended to act directly on fertility are inherently 
coercive and abusive of a woman’s right to chose the number and spacing of 
her children (McIntosh and Finkle 1985:227). The International Women’s 
Health Coalition (IWHC) took the lead in formulating this feminist position in 
the lead up to ICPD. However, far from being anti-Malthusian, the policy 
position which seeks to provide a common ground for “multiple women’s 
voices”, effortlessly melds a quasi liberal-radical feminist agenda with the neo-
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Malthusian population orthodoxy. There are three central propositions to the 
feminist population policy paradigm outlined by women’s health activists and 
the IWHC in the lead up to Cairo (Dixon-Mueller 1993a; Germain, Nowrojee 
and Pyne 1994; Germain 1997). First, that population stabilisation is a 
desirable goal. Second, that national family planning programmes which 
promote and protect women right’s to access to contraception are justifiable 
on grounds of individual human rights. Third, that women’s empowerment is a 
pre-requisite for fertility decline and economic development (Hodgson and 
Cotts Watkins 1997:501). The new feminist policy ethic asserts:
“not only that women must be free from abuse and violation of their 
bodies but also that they must be treated as principal actors and 
decision makers over their fertility and sexuality; as the ends and not 
the means of health, population and development programmes” 
(Petchesky and Judd 1998:4).
Hence, the proposed solution is that family planning programmes should be 
restructured to offer a broader range of sexual and reproductive health 
services, with women’s participation in design and implementation (McIntosh 
and Finkle 1995). Within the ICPD discourse issues of fertility and sexual and 
reproductive health remain entirely separate from the issues of poverty and 
the equitable distribution of resources (Thomas and Price 1999). The 
underlying political agenda is that gender equity and the empowerment of 
women are the indivisible and fundamental determinants of equitable 
development. The position proposed is highly individualistic with the rights 
and interests of the individual consumer (the user of reproductive health
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services) emphasised over and above fundamental transformations in 
structural and economic conditions. Advocates suggest that:
“a reproductive health approach will be more cost-effective in meeting 
demographic goals in at least two ways: first by reducing contraceptive 
drop-out and failure rates, and second by appealing to the younger 
individuals and couples who, in demographic terms, need to delay 
sexual initiation and marriage, and contracept earlier and longer” 
(Germain 1997:33).
This radical/neo-liberal feminist perspective, places the notions of the 
freedoms, rights and choices of the individual within a free market (which were 
equally forcefully advocated by the new right at Mexico City) at the centre of 
population and development policy discourse. Critics such as Smyth (1994) 
recognise the problematic nature of these concepts in their failure to take 
account of the importance of social structures within which reproduction and 
reproductive choice are embedded (Smyth 1994:13). However, Smyth (1994) 
suggests that it is through the notions of self-hood and self-determination, that 
the reproductive health and rights discourse is able to overcome the 
problematic nature of this individualistic perspective. According to Smyth, 
through placing the notion of self-determination at the centre of the 
reproductive rights discourse, the individual is placed in relation to others, 
thus implying that self-determination in reproduction cannot be achieved 
without reference to other social transformations. Similarly Correa (1994:77) 
argues that while the “reproductive se lf should remain a core concept of 
reproductive rights, the conceptualisation of selfhood and choice must reach 
beyond the notion of bodily integrity and be understood in the context of all
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significant family, cultural and social and economic relations. Citing research 
from the Women’s Global Network on Reproductive Rights, Correa (1994) 
argues that the concept of choice, without attention to context has no value. 
Hence, reproductive rights campaigns should focus on conditions that enable 
self-determination. As Jenkins (1996:20) points out
“if identity is a necessary prerequisite for social life, the reverse is also 
true. Individual identity - embodied in selfhood - is not meaningful in 
isolation from the social world of other people. Individuals are unique 
and variable, but selfhood is thoroughly socially constructed”
Hence, notions of selfhood and self-determination are socially and historically 
constructed and cannot be isolated from the larger social conditions that 
determine choice, freedom and access to resources. The validity of the 
concept of universal reproductive rights is now tentatively being questioned in 
some of the post-ICPD literature. Harcourt (1997:8) asks whether the policy 
milestones set out at ICPD bear any relation to the reality of many of the 
world’s poor. Correa (1994) suggests that a reproductive rights approach 
should focus on contextual analysis which considers how political, cultural, 
and ethnic factors interact with fertility. The notion of individual rights is 
dependent upon a series of enabling conditions being in place, and hence 
men and women are unable to exercise these rights when their livelihood is 
endangered, public health and education systems are inadequate and cultural 
diversity is not respected (Correa 1994: 85). However, within the global rights 
frameworks (such as the Universal Declaration on Rights) including the ICPD 
POA, these social and economic rights receive little attention.
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The subsequent chapters of this thesis seek to demonstrate through a review 
of the literature and analysis of ethnographic data, that reproduction, health, 
sexuality and gender relations are deeply embedded in historically and locally 
specific social conditions of inequity and conditions of poverty and 
exploitation. In these contexts, the notions of individual rights as embodied in 
the policy rhetoric of ICPD and the FWCW bear little relation to the reality in 
which a privileged and prosperous minority survive alongside an impoverished 
and excluded majority, with great differences in wealth, income, political 
participation and access to resources (Chomsky 1994:61).
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Chapter 2
Culture and Context:
The Foundations For A Critical Social Analysis of 
of Reproductive Health
(A Discussion on Theory)
“At the very centre of a major area of modern thought and practice, which it is 
habitually used to describe, is a concept, ‘culture’, which in itself, through 
variation and complication, embodies not only the issues but the 
contradictions through which it has developed” (Williams 1977: 11).
1. Introduction
Chapter 1 has suggested that the development and implementation of 
population policy in the latter part of the twentieth century, has been 
inextricably linked to the development of demography as a “specialised 
technical field” (to borrow Foucault’s terminology) within the social sciences. 
However, recent critiques have suggested that demography has become a 
social science discipline of “all methods and no theory” (Greenhalgh 1996). 
Whilst developing ever more sophisticated mathematical techniques as the 
basis for demographic analysis, demographic inquiry appears to remain 
divorced from conceptual and theoretical developments which have occurred 
over the past three decades in other social sciences (Greenhalgh 1996; 
Hammel 1990).
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This chapter argues that the representation of demography as focusing on 
method whilst remaining “under-theorised” is misleading. Methodology cannot 
be separated from specific theoretical understandings of the social world, and 
all explanatory and methodological frameworks, no matter how simple or 
complex, are predicated upon some theory of society and human action 
(Lockwood 1995; Warwick 1982).The important issue is not whether 
demography (and hence population policy) is informed by theory. Rather, it is 
to lay bare the range of theory relied upon, and to critically assess the 
underlying assumptions about the nature of society, culture and human action 
upon which theory and method are based (Lockwood 1995).
Critiques concerning the relationship between theory and method have not 
been limited to demography. With the public role of sociology increasingly 
being defined in terms of its contribution to public policy, applied sociology in 
general has been criticised for its one sided focus on empirical research and 
its application to providing statistical support to policy, at the expense of more 
critical and theoretically informed versions of sociology (Calhoun 2000:505). 
Calhoun (2000:505) suggests that applied sociology can have a role to play 
beyond that of the “technical activities of experts”, to inform democratic public 
discourse through the application of a critical social theory which subjects:
“the concepts, received understandings, and cultural categories 
constitutive of everyday life and public discourse to critical theoretical 
consideration. This is not a matter of purely abstract critique, to be 
pursued at the expense of empirical research. Rather it is an agenda 
for theory that can be deeply interwoven with empirical scholarship 
and new research without rendering social knowledge mere affirmation 
of existing conditions and understandings”.
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Calhoun (2000:537) defines critical social theory as “the interpenetrating 
body of work which demands and produces critique” through: a process of 
critical engagement with the social world; the production of a critical account 
of historical and cultural conditions upon which theoretical and intellectual 
activity depends; a continuous critical re-examination of conceptual 
frameworks (including the historical construction of those frameworks); and a 
critical confrontation with other works of explanation which “shows the 
reasons behind their blind spots and misunderstandings and demonstrates 
the capacity to incorporate their insights on stronger foundations”. While the 
term “critical social theory” is often applied with reference to the work of the 
Frankfurt School of Marxist social theorists, the approach outlined above can 
be found in a wide and eclectic range of theoretical approaches such as 
feminist theory, post-structuralism and practice theory (Calhoun 2000).
The aim of this chapter is to consider the extent to which the application of a 
critical social analysis, can contribute to rendering new social knowledge 
regarding fertility, sexuality, reproductive and health related behaviour, and to 
informing a methodological approach to the analysis of sexual and 
reproductive health. The chapter initially provides a critical consideration of 
some of the core concepts and received understandings of demographic 
discourse concerning the nature of culture and human action. Through a 
consideration of the literature, it is concluded that, informed by functionalist 
sociology and a positivist research method, mainstream demographic inquiry
79
and applied family planning research have failed to engage critically with the 
political and social realities in which fertility, sexuality and reproduction are 
experienced, in particular by poor and socially marginalized groups. Drawing 
eclectically upon developments in social theory, in particular practice theory, 
the chapter suggests a theoretical and methodological approach for 
understanding the lived reality and meaning given to sexual and reproductive 
health by specific social groups, in specific political, economic and cultural 
contexts. In other words, the chapter aims to set out a framework for a critical 
social analysis of sexual and reproductive health.
2 Culture and Context in Demographic Inquiry
2.1 The Demand-Supply Paradigm
The demand-supply paradigm, as I have argued in Chapter 1, has under­
pinned much of the understanding of fertility-related behaviour in mainstream 
demographic inquiry and family planning research. The economic model of 
human action encapsulated in the demand-supply paradigm, appropriates 
from functionalist sociology a means-end rationality in which fertility-related 
behaviour is seen to be largely accounted for through calculations of the 
costs and benefits of children to their parents. Within this paradigm the 
individual or the reproductive couple is understood as the fulcrum of the 
reproductive decision-making process (Schneider and Schneider 1995a).
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Recent anthropological analyses have suggested that the demand-supply 
paradigm is flawed both in its understanding of human action and in its 
assumptions regarding the central units of fertility decision-making. This 
section concentrates on critiques of the demographic understanding of the 
social units of fertility and reproduction, while the following sections will 
consider current theoretical debates concerning human action and their 
application to a critical social analysis of sexual and reproductive health.
A major critique of the economistic approach of the demand-supply paradigm 
has been the lack of consideration given to the influences of social 
institutions which operate between the macro level (ie of the state) and the 
micro-level of the individual or reproductive unit, and which place constraints 
on child bearing through structuring the environment in which fertility related 
decision-making occurs (Thomas and Price 1999). The demand-supply 
paradigm abstracts fertility decision-making from the socio-cultural, political 
and institutional contexts in which the reproductive unit is located (Simmons 
1988). Far from being an individual decision-making process, fertility related 
behaviour has been shown to be embedded within a complex web of social 
relations and institutions at the local level, contextualised within wider social, 
political, economic and historical processes (Greenhalgh 1990; Hammel 
1990; Lockwood 1995; McNicoll 1980, 1994; Price 1996, 1998; Price and 
Thomas 1999). A range of local level political and social institutions may be 
central in influencing the reproductive decision-making process, including
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ethnic groups, kinship groups; neighbourhoods and peer networks 
(Greenhalgh 1990; Thomas and Price 1999).
In recent years, mainstream demographic and family planning research has 
begun to draw upon anthropological concepts and methods for the analysis of 
the cultural contexts of fertility, sexuality and reproduction (Lockwood 1995).
In particular, in an apparent recognition of the limitations of the 
decontextualised, economistic and utilitarian framework for explaining 
differences in fertility related behaviour, the concept of culture has assumed a 
central place in recent demographic explanatory frameworks (Hammel 1990). 
Nonetheless, anthropological critiques have begun to highlight the 
inadequacy of the treatment of “culture” in mainstream demographic inquiry 
(Greenhalgh 1990, 1995; Hammel 1990; Lockwood 1995). Kertzer (1995) 
suggests that demographic inquiry has approached the concept of culture as 
a “grab-bag” into which all that is considered as non-demographic and non­
economic characteristics that influence behaviour is placed. In the move 
away from economistic theories of fertility behaviour, cultural demography 
has largely employed a highly reductionist and uncritical notion of culture, 
informed by structural functionalism, in which culture is conceptualised as a 
set of prescriptive norms and values guiding social behaviour (Greenhalgh 
1995; Hammel 1990).
Cultural demographers such as Cleland and Wilson (1987), and Lesthaeghe
(1989) have placed a good deal of emphasis on identifying elements of
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traditional culture and belief systems which support high fertility (Kertzer
1995). For example, in recognition of the inadequacy of statistical data in 
explaining differences in fertility behaviour across regions, Lesthaeghe 
(1989:1) suggests that “there must be numerous other factors of social 
complexity mediating the process”. Much of the focus of cultural demography, 
has been on identifying key cultural variables such as language, ethnicity, 
and religion, which may explain differences in fertility behaviour at the macro 
and individual level.
2.2 Cultural Diffusion ism
The notion of cultural diffusion has gained increasing prominence in recent 
discussions relating to fertility behaviour and underpins much of the literature 
concerning family planning programme effectiveness (Cleland and Wilson 
1987; Freedman 1987; Mita and Simmons 1995). A major shift has occurred 
in demographic inquiry over the past twenty years which has involved a move 
away from concerns with the social and economic conditions of 
modernisation, to diffusion theory’s “narrow focus on attitudes toward birth 
control, divorced from their social and economic context” (Greenhalgh 
1995:7). Greenhalgh (1995:7) suggests that diffusion theory is “arguably the 
trendiest approach in fertility research today”. However, it is within the 
diffusionist model that perhaps the most simplistic treatment of the concept of 
culture in demographic inquiry can be found. As illustrated by the following 
quote, diffusion theory, informed by the modernisation paradigm, places
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tremendous explanatory power upon the impact of communication about 
contraception upon fertility behaviour, reproducing what Greenhalgh (1995:9) 
refers to as “the functionalist myth” that culture can be taken out of context to 
social, economic and political organisation:
“In the most general sense, diffusion refers to a process whereby new 
ideas, information, practices, or technology are disseminated through 
a variety of mechanisms that affect attitudes and behaviours at local, 
national, and international levels. One of the central arguments of the 
diffusion literature has been to emphasize the possible independent 
role of changing ideas and aspirations in enhancing the fertility 
transition...Similarly, the process of modernization or Westernisation 
can act as the source of ideational change affecting fertility behaviour 
through complex but undirected interactions. By contrast, the advent of 
official family planning programs has added a strong element of social 
engineering to the process of diffusing contraceptive technology and 
new ideas about contraception and family size. Programs consciously 
direct contraceptive information, motivation, and services at specific 
populations through personal and impersonal communication. New 
ideas, knowledge, and practices are spread further through informal 
social networks that include family members and peers” (Mita and 
Simmons 1995:1)
Greenhalgh (1995:9) notes that :
“[W]hile the turn to cultural theories after forty years of domination by 
economic theories would appear to be promising, this particular 
approach to culture is worryingly reductionistic. It places tremendous 
analytical weight on communication about contraception, neglecting 
the distinct possibility that when women get together they chat not only 
about bedtime inconveniences, but also about their children’s 
schooling, work and other matters bearing on the socioeconomics of 
reproduction.”
Within the diffusionist paradigm, culture is understood as distinct sets of 
attitudes and values which act as both facilitators of and inhibitors to the 
spread of knowledge, which is seen as a precursor to behaviour change
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(Greenhalgh 1995:20). Fertility decline is understood as a “sociotechnical 
process spreading contraceptive technology” initiated through communication 
about contraception (Greenhalgh 1996:59). Hence, a good deal of family 
planning related research has focused on identifying key cultural variables 
affecting contraceptive use and fertility-related behaviour. While the diffusion 
of new (or western) ideas is seen to bring about fertility related behaviour 
change, other “deeply rooted and persistent elements” of “traditional” culture 
are perceived to inhibit family planning programme effectiveness, particularly 
in respect to the impact of traditional culture on demand for children 
(Freedman 1987:59). This approach to cultural analysis is firmly predicated 
upon the application of a positivist, empiricist research method, concerned 
with the “objective” analysis of key variables of social life:
“Social research has made major contributions to the development and 
implementation of population policies and family planning 
programs...Thus, the potential for application of ideas and methods 
already developed is considerable, particularly in such new and 
challenging situations as those in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, 
social research has a great potential for developing new ideas and 
methods to improve family planning programs...[T]he social science 
approach derives its power from the assumption that systematic 
observations in specific social and cultural situations are the ultimate 
test of theories about social life. The accumulation of good, systematic 
evidence during recent years has enabled us to set aside some 
plausible but incorrect ideas and to provide a more scientific factual 
basis for other ideas...
One important characteristic of the social science approach is 
its systematic empiricism, with methods for collecting facts about 
problematic situations and for testing the validity of ideas” (Freedman 
1987:57).
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Examples of such empirical studies include: survey analysis of socio­
economic differentials in contraceptive use and the desire for children (Amin 
et al 1992); analysis of the impact of variables such as women’s socio­
economic position on contraceptive behaviour (Gage 1995); identification of 
socio-cultural barriers to family planning (Ward et al 1992 ); the impact of 
diffusion of ideas through social networks (Valente et al 1997); and the 
identification of cultural beliefs and practices which act as barriers to 
contraceptive access and use (Stanbeck et al 1997). A similar emphasis on 
“culture” as a barrier to behaviour change is evident in the literature on 
maternal health. Lack of education and the perpetuation of ‘false beliefs’ 
reinforced by traditional birth attendants (TBAs) is often cited as a major 
obstacle to improved maternal health (see, for example, Okafar and Rizzuto,
1994). Other approaches have sought to incorporate indigenous belief 
systems into the training of bio-medical health care providers in order to 
make health care provision more “culturally aware” (Goodburn eta l, 1995).
A major focus of “cultural analysis1 within the diffusionist family planning 
literature, has been the identification of obstacles to contraceptive innovation. 
The identification of elements of traditional culture which act as barriers to 
uptake of contraception are taken as a basis for the design of “culturally 
appropriate” service delivery systems, which attempt to introduce innovations 
within the context of traditional cultural systems (Warwick 1982). An often 
cited example of such attention to cultural context in family planning 
programme design is the Navrongo experiment, aimed at developing a
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“culturally appropriate” family planning programme for a “traditional 
community” in northern Ghana (Nazzar et al 1995). The approach taken by 
the Navrongo project is described as a systems approach in which:
“[Ejffective family planning programs are adapted to the social 
environment, because fostering reproductive change involves 
interaction with individuals and groups about matters that are strongly 
influenced by social norms and institutions. (Nazzar et al 1995:308- 
309).
The association of culture with a set of traditional norms and social 
institutions which support high fertility is drawn upon to support the neo- 
Malthusian proposition that fertility decline can be brought about through the 
design and delivery of “culturally appropriate” family planning programmes.
As a result of the analysis of cultural factors determining contraceptive usage 
and demand for children, the Navrongo study proposes that strategies be 
developed to spread contraceptive innovation through existing social 
institutions and peer networks. In particular, as a result of the recognition of 
the embeddedness of fertility decision-making within kinship and descent 
systems, the study suggests utilising the lineage system and male and female 
peer networks as a “catalyst to innovation”, spreading information about 
contraceptives and distributing contraceptive technology through an effective 
volunteer programme (Nazzar et al 1995). However, Bawah et al (1999:64) 
suggest that despite attempts of the Navrongo project to anchor the 
introduction of family planning services to existing social and cultural 
institutions, the introduction of modern contraceptive technologies has also
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activated gender tensions, in a cultural context in which gender relations are 
grounded in complex marriage and kinship systems.
2.3 Social Demography
Over the past two decades social demographers have begun to criticise the 
continual emphasis placed on supply side factors (such as contraceptive 
delivery systems) in explaining the persistence of high fertility, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Price 1996). Many cultural or social demographers have 
concluded that without greater focus on the social and cultural context of 
childbearing and family formation patterns, family planning programmes will 
continue to have limited impact (Price 1996). The work of Caldwell and 
Caldwell has been particularly influential in advocating the need to look 
beyond the level of family planning programming and programme failure to 
explain high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa (Price 1996:412).
Drawing on micro-ethnographic empirical research, the Caldwells (1987,
1992) have sought to demonstrate that demand for children is embedded 
within local kinship and belief systems. In particular, the Caldwells (1987) 
have highlighted the importance of intra-familial relations and descent 
systems within indigenous African kinship structures which continue to imbue 
fertility with a high symbolic and moral value, for the maintenance of high 
fertility (Price 1996). Within this variant of cultural diffusionism, the process of 
nuclearisation of the family and improvements in the status of women
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(resulting from diffusion of western ideas and values) is given central 
importance in the analysis of fertility decline (Greenhalgh 1995). Caldwell 
(1982) explicitly identifies the process of Westernisation as the force behind 
the transformation of extended family forms to nuclear conjugal units:
“An emphasis must be placed here on the export of the European 
social system as well as its economic system...From the demographic 
viewpoint, the most important social exports have been the concept of 
the predominance of the nuclear family with its strong conjugal tie, and 
the concept of concentrating concern and expenditure on one’s own 
children” (Caldwell 1982:153).
Despite its emphasis on locating fertility behaviour within its local cultural 
context (in particular its embeddedness within kinship and familial structures) 
the linkage of fertility decline with nuclearisation assumes an essentially 
utilitarian model of human action. Under the nuclearisation theory, the 
economic value of children is seen to be reduced as the economic 
relationship between parents and children are reversed in favour of children 
(Thomas and Price 1999). For example, Caldwell’s wealth flow theories 
(developed in the 1970s) tied fertility decline to the reversal of 
intergenerational flow of goods and services from parents to children, as a 
result of the adoption of western ideas concerning the benefits of the nuclear 
family (Greenhalgh 1995). Latterly, the Caldwells (1992) suggest a more 
materialist conception of fertility-related behaviour based upon the notion of 
intra-familial relations of production (Thomas and Price 1999). This 
framework stresses a basic dichotomy between traditional and modern family 
forms based upon two distinct modes of production; the “familial mode of
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production” which typifies pre-capitalist society and the “labour-market mode 
of production” of capitalist society (Caldwell and Caldwell 1992). According to 
this model, familial production is characterised by high and relatively 
uncontrolled fertility and high mortality, whereas advanced labour-market 
production is characterised by low fertility and low mortality. However, 
according to the Caldwells, in the complex process of demographic transition, 
both modes of production may coexist in many societies. Whilst borrowing 
from the Marxist notion of modes of production, the Caldwells maintain an 
essentially idealist explanation for the process of transformation of familial 
forms, based on the notion that social change emerges out of initial ideational 
change:
“Much of the history of modernization of the family has been that of 
dismantling the superstructure of familial production, with resistances 
provided not so much by the economic system as by deeply 
entrenched beliefs and attitudes. Furthermore, this dismantling does 
not proceed at a steady pace directed by economic change but has 
been accelerated and decelerated in the West by the generation of 
new ideologies or new interpretations of ideologies, often not 
specifically focused on engendering family change...In the Third 
World, imported cultural elements can produce family change, and it is 
even possible that social and political ideologies can move familial and 
demographic change ahead of the economic transition” (Caldwell and 
Caldwell 1992:47).
Within the Westernisation paradigm, ideational change (brought about, in 
particular, through access to education and the spread of Christianity) is 
understood to erode the influence of extended family and kinship networks, 
bringing about fertility decline (Price 1996). The link between fertility and the 
position of women is similarly built into demographic theories predicated upon
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the notion of diffusion and Westernisation (Bradley 1995). While it is 
generally recognised that women’s status does not necessarily change 
uniformly along a single dimension, theoretical models of the relationship 
between women’s status or empowerment and fertility, generally posit a 
strong negative relationship between the two (Bradley 1995:160). 
Greenhalgh (1995:7) cites the work of Karen Mason (1986, 1987) as one of 
the most influential within this body of work which proposes a set of 
hypotheses connecting women’s status with fertility:
“Among the most important aspects of women’s position for fertility, in 
her [Mason’s] view, are women’s education and their position in the 
family and household. These affect women’s autonomy from male 
control, economic dependency, and social status, which in turn 
influence child supply, child demand, and child costs” (Greenhalgh 
1995:7).
These theories share the basic economistic notion that increased status and 
empowerment of women, will lead to reduced demand for children and 
increased demand for contraceptives. Caldwell (1982) hypothesises that 
improved status or empowerment of women results from increased access to 
education, leading to increased use of modern contraceptives and hence 
fertility decline (Bradley 1995:160). According to Caldwell’s thesis, the 
patriarchal family form of pre-transition societies creates a system of social 
relationships in which high fertility rewards both men and women. Low 
fertility, on the other hand is seen to be related to a more egalitarian family 
structure in which women exert greater control over economic resources, 
ensuring the educational and economic interests of their children (Bradley
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1995:160). According to Caldwell eta l (1992) changes in statutory law in 
Kenya which have supported the rights of widows to inherit land has reduced 
economic dependence upon high fertility, thereby contributing to the process 
of fertility decline (Price 1996). Nonetheless, Greenhalgh (1995:7) suggests 
that while there may be some merit to these family-level approaches to 
demographic inquiry they have so far “produced little empirical research and 
less cumulative theory”.
2.4 Institutional Demography
A different strand of theorising about the relationship between culture, social 
structure and fertility behaviour has been advanced in the body of work which 
comes under the heading of “institutional demography”, typified by the work 
of McNicoll (Greenhalgh 1995). Institutional approaches have served to 
highlight that fertility behaviour is embedded within relations of power and 
inequity at different levels of social organisation, and that far from being a 
consensus decision-making process, reproduction is a highly political process 
(Greenhalgh 1995). McNicoll (1980, 1994) makes a break from universalising 
and utilitarian theories of fertility behaviour, emphasising the historical and 
social specificity of local level fertility regimes (Greenhalgh 1995). McNicoll’s 
institutional demography aims to address the lack of adequate explanatory 
models provided by transition and diffusion theory for understanding the 
relationship between individual reproductive decision-making and structural 
conditions (or institutional factors), and hence how fertility adapts to changing
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economic and institutional settings. McNicoll (1980:449) critiques utilitarian or 
“consumer choice” theories of fertility on the grounds that they are not well 
suited:
“to explore influences on individual decision-making beyond the most 
tangible and easily costed. Much of the power of consumer choice 
theory, in fact, comes precisely from the short shrift it accords to 
institutional and cultural constraints”
Drawing on notions of “bounded rationality”, McNicoll (1980) considers a 
framework within which individual decision-making is understood as 
embedded within a range of locally specific social institutions and political 
structures. Within this institutional framework fertility-related decision-making 
is understood as being determined by how institutional settings and cultural 
patterns present certain issues from the standpoint of the actor (McNicoll 
1980). In other words, how individuals placed within different social or 
economic groups perceive their decision-making environment differently 
(McNicoll 1980). Utilising ethnographic material McNicoll (1980:453) argues 
that changes in fertility in Guandong Province, China were directly linked to 
changes in macro political and economic conditions. Political transformations 
impacted at the local level through shifting the unit of social organisation 
away from kinship ties towards local level administrative structures. As a 
result, McNicoll argues, fertility decision-making became linked to broader 
social and economic concerns of local level political organisation, ultimately 
weakening fertility as an economic strategy of the family. McNicoll’s (1980) 
analysis suggests that in contrast to the political-economic conditions in
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China, structural conditions in Bangladesh were such that an economic 
rationale for large families existed. Among the land-owning classes children 
continued to represent the opportunity for the family’s occupational 
diversification as a means of consolidating local power. Among the poor, the 
economic value of children also remained high. Children became producers 
at an early age, while the costs of children were absorbed within the 
patrilineal kinship structure (McNicoll 1980:448). Hence, McNicoll (1980:448) 
argues “the pattern of social organization in rural Bangladesh militates 
against the emergence of social pressures at the local level...able to oppose 
high fertility”. This pattern of organisation was based around kinship 
structures as the source of local level authority and power. Differences in 
fertility regimes were shown to be embedded within local level social 
organisation and political and economic conditions. Hence, McNicoll’s 
institutional demography:
“recognizes historical contingency and societal specificity, and 
embraces narrative modes of explanation that can accommodate such 
forces as gender and power that are difficult to incorporate into 
standard empirical models of demographic behavior” (Greenhalgh 
1995:12).
The Westernisation hypothesis which forms the lynch-pin of the 
nuclearisation and women’s empowerment argument has been challenged in 
a number of recent anthropological studies of fertility. These anthropological 
critiques of demographic theory suggest that there is not one unilinear form of 
demographic transition but rather many variable forms, driven by locally, 
culturally and historically specific forces (Greenhalgh 1990:88). For example,
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studies of institutional determinants of fertility have demonstrated that 
children often continue to have an essential symbolic value as an important 
source of social as well as economic capital, despite processes of 
modernisation and cultural transformation.
A study in Central Province Kenya, indicates that local variation in fertility 
related behaviour exists within relatively ethnically homogenous communities 
(Price 1996). Drawing on ethnographic data from two Kikuyu communities in 
Central Province, Kenya, Price (1996) demonstrates that attitudes to and 
utilisation of modern contraceptives are embedded in highly localised 
structural and economic conditions. In Kiambu District resistance to use of 
contraceptives has declined in the context of women’s increasing rights to 
land, which has impacted on the economic value of children. However, 
resistance to modern contraception remains widespread in the rural 
community in Muranga’a District, despite its ethnic homogeneity with Kiambu. 
Counter to Caldwell’s nuclearisation thesis, Price (1996) suggests that the 
potentially negative impact on fertility of the partial erosion of local level 
kinship structures and cultural beliefs and practices, has been constrained in 
Muranga’a District by the decline in traditional fertility-regulating practices. 
Changes in marriage patterns, household structure and beliefs systems have 
occurred alongside the persistence of extreme economic insecurity and 
women’s lack of access to land, leading to the maintenance of a high value 
placed on children (Price 1996:426). Price (1996) concludes that the 
differentials in the demand for children in the two communities stems “directly
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from differentials in the nature and extent of cultural and economic 
transformations” (Price 1996:427). Such differentials are evident in the 
strategies women employ to challenge male hegemony. Whereas in Kiambu 
District women have successful recourse to the legal system to register land 
under a freehold title, in Muranga’a District women continue to utilise 
customary practices such as polygyny and women-women marriages to 
secure access to land (Price 1996:427). Similarly, Price (1998) demonstrates 
that among the Gwembe Tonga of Zambia, high fertility continues to be an 
economically rational strategy for women, in a social context where women’s 
economic security and capacity to cultivate (particularly in widowhood) 
depends upon access to labour in the form of children.
2.5 Political Economy
The most sustained critique of the Westernisation paradigm, which underpins 
diffusion theory, has come from the political-economic approach to fertility. 
Political-economic demography has been described as a variant of the 
institutional approach, directing attention to the embeddedness of community 
institutions in political and economic structures and processes, operating at 
national, regional and global levels (Greenhalgh 1990:87). Greenhalgh
(1990) suggests that the main difference between institutional demography 
and political economy lies in the starting point for the analysis. Whereas 
institutional demography works from “the bottom up”, first outlining “the 
cognitive environment of individual demographic decisions” and later
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sketching in local institutional and cultural configurations and macro forces 
shaping demographic change; political economic demography begins with an 
understanding of historically developed global forces that shape local 
demographic regimes and behaviour (Greenhalgh 1990:87).
Political-economic demographers such as Schneider and Schneider (1995a 
and 1995b) and Fricke (1995) have sought to demonstrate the linkages 
between broad macro-economic processes, social inequalities and local level 
fertility behaviour. Fricke’s (1995) analysis of marriage patterns in rural north 
central Nepal suggests that kinship and marriage relations are inherently 
political constructs, in which marriage is a mechanism by which social status 
is reproduced at the local level. State intervention in local level political 
relationships is shown to have created social and political capital for key 
groups in the community, which is translated into culturally meaningful 
marriage strategies (Fricke 1995). Demographic events such as first marriage 
and first birth-timing are structured around these locally relevant social 
hierarchies which are reproduced through the politics of marriage.
Similarly, through a detailed historical and ethnographic analysis Schneider 
and Schneider (1995a, 1995b) demonstrate the embeddedness of fertility- 
related behaviour in locally-specific political, economic and cultural 
processes. The analysis challenges the diffusionist notion of fertility related 
behaviour in which people are understood to be led by their culture to either 
embrace or reject fertility regulation as part of a conscious individual
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decision-making process (Schneider and Schneider 1995a). Instead, 
Schneider and Schneider (1995a, 1995b) demonstrate the class-specific 
nature of fertility related behaviour in the rural town of Villamaura in Sicily, 
and the differential impact of capitalism on family size. During the nineteenth 
century, family size in Villamaura was seen to correspond to levels of family 
wealth and income, with the gentry enjoying large families, while high fertility 
among the peasantry was offset by high infant and child mortality. With the 
onset of capitalism, class-specific fertility patterns reversed in response to 
transformations in structural and economic conditions. Vital records show a 
marked decline in family size among the gentry around the turn of the 
century, when a crisis in agriculture threatened the standard of living that had 
been based upon revenues from their vast estates (Schneider and Schneider 
1995b: 183). Ethnographic data suggests that the gentry were the first to 
experiment with family limitation. However, the concomitant increase in 
incidence of illegitimacy among domestic servants and the peasant class also 
suggests that sexual exploitation of the lower classes was a fertility control 
strategy exercised by men from the landed gentry.
By the inter-war years large family size had taken on a new class specific 
connotation, directly associated with poverty, the reverse of the nineteenth 
century situation where large families indicated wealth (Schneider and 
Schneider 1995b: 184). The peasantry were the last to adopt birth control 
methods (especially the land-poor). The adoption of family limitation methods 
among the peasantry was associated with substantial structural changes
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affecting their economic circumstances. In contrast to the experience of the 
gentry, the economic context for fertility transition among the peasantry was 
one of increased opportunities rather than of declining resources (Schneider 
and Schneider 1995b: 186). Changes in technology (or modes of production) 
which increased access to affordable mass-produced consumer goods, 
combined with changing relations of production are shown to be key factors 
behind the fertility transition among the peasant class (Schneider and 
Schneider 1995b). The use of coitus interruptus (which was the most 
commonly practiced method of fertility control) was also imbued with class 
and gender specific moral values. While viewed with some disdain by the 
gentry, whose way of life rewarded immoderate indulgence, among the 
artisan and peasant classes coitus interruptus was valued as a learned skill 
that promoted co-operation and communication between spouses. At the 
same time, while men expressed a pride in their role in coitus interruptus, 
women’s discourses refer to their sacrifice of pleasure in order to limit family 
size in accordance with ideas relating to family and class respectability 
(Schneider and Schneider 1995b). Hence, the analysis suggests that the 
adoption of specific birth-control techniques by different social groups is 
articulated within the context of broad social, political, and economic 
concerns (Schneider and Schneider 1995b).
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2.6 Anthropological Critiques of Demography
Gender analysis has also made a significant contribution to demonstrating 
that, counter to the understanding of the reproductive couple as performing a 
single “utility function” or as generating a set of unified economic desires, 
fertility decision-making is highly negotiated within gender-based power 
relations (Greenhalgh 1995). Anthropological studies have shown that 
reproduction is a “deeply gendered process”, embedded within relations of 
difference and inequalities in access to power and resources (Greenhalgh 
1995:14). Nonetheless, Greenhalgh (1995:24) asserts that demographic 
inquiry has failed to adequately deal with the concept of gender as “cultural 
construction”, maintaining a focus on universalistic notions of women’s roles 
and status as indicators of modernisation:
“Women’s social and economic characteristics appear increasingly 
often as variables in demographic models, suggesting the emergence 
of a demography of women...The demographic literature on fertility 
relies on two concepts about women that have been widely critiqued 
and have increasingly fallen into disuse in feminist studies at large: 
women’s roles...and, more commonly women’s status...During the 
1970s and 1980s these concepts were called sharply into question by 
feminist scholars in many disciplines...Both notions treat sex-linked 
differences as individual -  or family-level attributes, ignoring 
inequalities in larger societal institutions. They assume that ‘women’ or 
‘sex roles’ are universal constructs, neglecting differences across, 
culture, class, ethnic group, and nationality. Both terms are profoundly 
ethnocentric, based on Western values that may have little meaning in 
other contexts” (Greenhalgh 1995: 23-24)
The majority of gender based studies in the family planning literature 
concerned with the relationship between gender, sexuality, and fertility have
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focused narrowly on identifying factors that promote contraceptive 
acceptance and use-effectiveness in order to achieve more rapid fertility 
decline (Dixon-Mueller 1993b:270).Typically these studies have relied upon 
evidence from survey research on the relationship between method choice, 
sexual experience and satisfaction.
Anthropological studies have highlighted the need to understand fertility- 
related behaviour within the context of the social construction of gender and 
sexuality (Angin and Shorter 1998; Dixon-Mueller 1993b; Oppong 1995; 
Renne 1993; Rylko-Bauer 1996). Drawing upon ethnographic research in 
Kenya, Bradley (1995) like Price (1996) challenges the Westernisation 
hypothesis, by considering the linkages between women’s empowerment and 
fertility decline. Bradley (1995) suggests that women’s increased access to 
education in the context of generally declining economic conditions, far from 
leading to a more egalitarian family form, has resulted in conflict and 
competition between men and women, leading to increased domestic 
violence against women. Bradley (1995) argues that gender power relations 
are embedded in broad structural and economic conditions, and that the 
empowerment of women must therefore be predicated upon improvements 
which impact upon both men and women. Similarly Angin and Shorter (1998) 
challenge the Westernisation paradigm questioning the proposition that 
indicators of modernisation such as improvement in women’s status and 
education were a pre-requisite for Turkey’s fertility decline.
Reproductive decision-making has also been shown to be embedded within 
local knowledge and health systems, in which different cultural meanings are 
attached to fertility and different methods of fertility regulation (Greenhalgh
1995). Rylko-Bauer (1996) and Carter (1995) cite the importance given in 
certain cultural contexts to inducing menstruation to ensure the regular flow of 
bodily substances for the maintenance of health, and demonstrate that 
decisions and practices related to abortion are made in the context of 
economic, kinship and gender relations (Rylko-Bauer 1996). An analysis of 
contraceptive behaviour in rural Gambia suggests that fertility-related 
behaviour and decision-making based upon indigenous understandings of 
bodily processes “...fly in the face of every major demographic theory that 
has been advanced to explain fertility behaviours in Africa” (Bledsloe et al 
1998:16). The analysis suggests that the use of contraceptives following 
reproductive mishaps such as miscarriage, in a society that places a high 
value on fertility, does not correspond with conventional understandings of 
demand and supply, but rather that:
“rural Gambians see fertility as limited by a woman’s eroding bodily 
capacity to bear a child safely over successive pregnancy outcomes. 
This capacity wears out less with the passage of time than with the 
cumulative effects of wear and tear on the body, particularly in the 
wake of obstetric traumas. Since the pace of this decline can be 
slowed with ‘rest’ between pregnancies (that is, the creation of 
recuperative space), and since time spent in ‘resting’ is considered 
largely irrelevant to ultimate child numbers, it is not surprising that the 
most traumatic health assaults, such as those that reproductive 
mishaps reflect or intensify, produce the strongest reproductive 
responses” (Bledsloe et al 1998:16).
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In the context of high levels of reproductive morbidity and mortality, it is a 
health model as opposed to a demographic one which dominates people’s 
thinking and decision-making about contraception and contraceptive use 
(Bledsloe et a/1998). Contraceptive use and utilisation of health services has 
also been shown to be mediated by power differentials between health 
providers and the community they serve, based on gender, ethnicity and 
class relations (Schuler et al 1994; Rutenberg and Cotts Watkins 1997). Even 
where indigenous fertility regimes apparently support fertility regulation, 
utilisation of family planning and reproductive health services may remain 
extremely low. Indigenous healers or advisors, may continue to be used over 
and above biomedical services, as a consequence of the social significance 
placed on relations implicit in the provider-client encounter. A study among 
rural women in Kenya illustrates the point:
“The women in the study area are ambivalent about family planning 
providers. They see them as crucial sources of the complicated 
technical information they need to use these methods correctly. Yet 
the providers are socially distant from these rural women, who are 
unsure how to trust them. As a result women go back and forth 
between family planning providers and women whose bodies and 
circumstances are more like their own - such as cleaners in the clinic 
...[]. We suspect that an important source of the provider’s attitudes is 
their identification with the modern health sector. An aspect of the 
general view of modernity in the Western world is that its development 
is explained, at least partly, by ‘coming to see’ the value of scientific 
rationality and thus by the shedding of harmful myths...Those engaged 
in the national family planning program see themselves as modern, by 
virtue of their education, medical training, and location in a modern 
institution. That they are dismissive of the information women have 
gleaned from their untrained friends and of what they regard as ‘myths 
and rumours’ is not surprising” (Rutenberg and Cotts Watkins 
1997:302-304).
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3. A Critique of the Demographic Treatment of Human Action
3.1 Structural-Functionalism and Utilitarian Theories
Despite the above critiques emanating from anthropology and political 
economy which have shown that fertility-related behaviour and decision­
making is contextualised within broad social and economic process, the 
demographic treatment of fertility-related behaviour has remained highly 
individualistic, based upon two basic models of human action. First a 
utilitarian notion of action as motivated by an individualistic means-end 
rationality, and second an understanding of action as guided by rules and 
social norms. Both these understandings of human conduct converge within 
the structural-functionalist paradigm (following Durkheim and Parsons) in 
which action, defined in terms of the interests of the actor, is understood as 
constrained within sets of cultural norms and shared values which influence 
chains of rational or means-end action (Cohen 2000).
The economistic model of human action proposed by the demand-supply 
equation, is based upon an understanding of human conduct derivative of 
nineteenth century utilitarian philosophy (Cohen 2000:73). Utilitarian 
philosophy, which in the twentieth century social sciences has become known 
as rational choice theory or rational action theory, aims to provide a causal
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and empirically verifiable explanation of human conduct (Cohen 2000; 
Jenkins 1992). Rational choice theory has been defined as understanding 
individuals as acting (or interacting) “in a manner such that they can be 
deemed to be doing the best that they can for themselves, given their 
objectives, resources, and circumstances, as they see them” (Abell 
2000:223). Such utilitarian theories are based upon a means-ends rationality, 
which understands social action in terms of social actors self-interest in 
maximising resources (Cohen 2000:79). Utilitarian notions of human action 
have been criticised as being content to leave the subjective meanings that 
actors give to their world wholly unexplored (Calhoun 2000:506). In so doing, 
Abell (2000:223) suggests that rational choice theory “invites us to adopt the 
least complex conception of social action that we can analytically get away 
with”. However, Cohen (2000:74) suggests that:
“Even dyed-in-the-wool utilitarians, who now call themselves rational- 
choice theorists..., concede that their accounts of social behaviour are 
simplifications designed to facilitate studies of social organization, 
while bracketing the complications that dedicated theorists of action 
must address”.
In elaborating his theory of practice (which will be considered later) Bourdieu 
critiques rational choice or rational action theory (RAT as Bourdieu refers to 
it), on several major counts (Jenkins 1992). The first is that rational action 
theory does not account for difference in cultural constructions of rationality, 
but rather replaces a culturally and historically specific understanding of 
rationality (embedded in social life), with an arbitrary and universalising 
model constructed by the social scientist. Second, in locating the dynamic of
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social life in individual and conscious decision-making it ignores “the 
individual and collective histories which unconsciously generate the ongoing 
reality of that social life” (Jenkins 1992:73). Third, the theoretical 
individualism of rational action theory is linked to a methodological 
individualism which prevents theoretical understanding of the relationship 
between individuals, and between individuals and their environment as the 
object of social analysis (Jenkins 1992:73). Hence Bourdieu suggests that:
“[individual finalism, which conceives action as determined by the 
conscious aiming at explicitly posed goals, is a well-founded illusion” 
(cited in Jenkins 1992:73).
A major theoretical dilemma raised by the economistic notion that social 
behaviour is driven by individual goal oriented action, concerns the nature of 
the relationship between individual action and social organisation. Or as 
Cohen (200:81) puts it, if the pursuit of ends by any given individual involves 
economic and political orientations towards scare resources, how does the 
pursuit of these ends provide a basis for social order? Structural- 
functionalism (as exemplified in the work of Durkheim and Parsons) 
addresses this issue through the concept of “culture” as a constraining force 
on social action, which provides the ultimate values that guide individual 
behaviour (Cohen 2000). Structural-functionalism appears to offer a way to 
overcome the limitations of an “economic” theory of action, through the 
introduction of a “normative element” to the model of rational action in which 
social structure ultimately provides actors with a set of normative rules for 
concrete action. Within the functionalist model, social actors are seen to
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select ends (and means) within the parameters of normative standards, whilst 
also maintaining some flexibility to interpret norms to suit their specific 
situations (Lechner 2000:117). Actors are deemed to face a number of basic 
choices in any concrete situation, in which a limited set o f ‘pattern variables’ 
provide the basic direction for their decision-making (Lechner 2000). Building 
upon Durkheim’s functionalism, Parsons suggests that individual interaction 
achieves social order and stability through the integration of interaction into a 
common cultural system with a shared basis of normative order (Lechner 
2000:119). Parsons defines a social system as:
“a plurality of actors interacting with each other in a situation which has 
at least a physical or environmental aspect, actors who are motivated 
in terms of a tendency to the ‘optimization of gratification’ and whose 
relation to their situations, including each other, is defined and 
mediated in terms of a system of culturally structured and shared 
symbols” (Parson 1951:5-6, cited in Lechner 2000:117).
Within the functionalist paradigm social norms are further seen to be imbued 
with a moral force, or a sacred quality of “values” which justify common 
societal ends (Cohen 2000:82). Associated with this conceptualisation of 
normative values guiding behaviour is the notion of sanctions which are 
enforceable if members of society deviate from prescribed social guidelines. 
Cohen (2000:82) describes the functionalist concept of sacred values as 
follows:
“For example, a father who values the well-being of his children (a 
sacred value) beyond all else will realize this value in specific acts by 
adhering to norms of child rearing that members of his culture (morally) 
accept as in the best interests of the child. Similarly a doctor’s 
commitment to the health of her patients (a sacred value) will be
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realized by her adherence to norms that stipulate the (morally) right 
and wrong ways to treat patients in specific situations”
Nonetheless, the functionalist faith in “the empirical efficacy of ultimate values 
and behaviourally defined moral norms” raises a further fundamental question 
for social theory, which has been summed up as the “difficult relationship 
between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ in social action” (Cohen 2000:82). While the 
functionalist notion of “norms” may go some way to solving the utilitarian 
dilemma of how social order is maintained, it offers little account of deviance, 
ie why actors fail to adhere more closely to moral norms in their everyday 
actions. In other words, it fails to adequately address the relationship 
between socially and ethically prescribed principles for behaviour and the 
concrete reality of every day actions which deviate from these norms and 
values (Cohen 2000:82). Drawing on Weber, Bourdieu states the dilemma 
thus:
“By pointing out that rational action, ‘judiciously’ oriented according to 
what is ‘objectively valid’ (1922), is what ‘would have happened if the 
actors had had knowledge of all the circumstances and all the 
participants’ intentions’ (1968:2), that is, of what is ‘valid in the eyes of 
the scientist’, who alone is able to calculate the system of objective 
chances to which perfectly informed action would have to be adjusted, 
Weber shows clearly that the pure model of rational action cannot be 
regarded as an anthropological description of practice” (Bourdieu 
1990a:63).
3.2 The Distinction Between Norms and Action
The importance of making the conceptual distinction between social norms 
and concrete action has been raised in a number of recent anthropological
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critiques of functionalist social demography (Carter 1995; Greenhalgh 1995; 
Hammel 1990; Lockwood 1995). These analyses suggests that an empirical 
and methodological distinction needs to be made between what people say 
they will do or should do, and what they actually do. Drawing on the work of 
Holy and Stuchlik (1983), Lockwood (1995) argues that not only should 
norms and action be regarded as empirically different, but also as two 
different kinds of data belonging to different domains of reality. Ideology is 
not reality, and hence norms and actions may often be empirically at odds 
with each other (Lockwood 1995 4-5). In an analysis of post-partum sexual 
abstinence in West Africa, Lockwood suggests that “...there is no hegemonic 
postpartum norm, and men and women of different statuses and ages draw 
on a variety of normative statements to evade, promote, or undermine 
abstinence” (1995:2). Most analyses of post-partum abstinence focus on the 
taboos and social norms which seemingly govern sexual behaviour. However, 
Lockwood’s analysis indicates that reproductive behaviour is negotiated 
within competing norms and taboos, such as between gender norms of 
sexuality which pressure women to resume early sexual contact following 
childbirth, and taboos on sex during lactation. Lockwood (1995:2) suggests 
that:
“instead of singular, overriding norms, each society has a range of 
normative notions that can be deployed selectively and strategically, 
either to support change in behavior or to justify persistence. 
Additionally, behavior depends systematically not only on social 
norms, but on other notions, often of more practical relevance”.
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A further problematic of the structural-functionalist notion of normative social 
behaviour lies in its conceptualisation of social change (as has already been 
discussed in Chapter 1). Social demography (rooted in structural- 
functionalism) largely takes social change to be induced by external forces 
(such as religion and education), as is apparent in the diffusionist model of 
demographic change (Lockwood 1995:7). Hence, the determinants of fertility 
change, whether proximate or remote are seen to remain external to human 
agency (Carter 1995:82). Agency is given little or no account in functionalist 
notions of fertility-change, with fertility-related behaviour being reduced to an 
abstract universal rationality, the mechanical implementation of cultural 
prescriptions (Carter 1995:82). In highlighting the limitations of the 
explanatory power of structural-functionalism, particularly as regards its 
tendency to conflate norms and preferences with the reality of social action, 
Lockwood (1995) raises a number of methodological concerns relating to 
researching sexual and reproductive behaviour. In particular, he suggests 
that a fundamental distinction needs to be made between:
“(1) data that consists of the reporting of social norms; (2) data that 
consists of reports of behavior (reports that are also likely to be 
influenced by such norms); and (3) data that consist of observed 
actions” (Lockwood 1995:9).
Because of the implicit assumptions made by structural-functionalism 
regarding the normative nature of social action, this distinction is largely 
overlooked in the main body of demographic research, including social 
demography (Lockwood 1995). Rather, the descriptions of social life used to
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support the application of a particular model of demographic behaviour are 
often based on reports of practices or statements of social norms, as 
opposed to empirical observation of social action. As a result particular sets 
of actors are often absent from demographic accounts of attitudes and 
practice. Lockwood’s (1995:11) main argument is that while such accounts of 
behaviour are not necessarily wrong:
“such ethnographic material does not tell us much about how, when, 
and why people use norms to legitimize behaviour, or use other 
notions to escape norms”
In other words, the data provided by normative accounts of cultural practice 
tells us little about the strategies employed by different actors in different 
contexts, during everyday social action. Such critiques allude to the need for 
a more complex theoretical understanding of the relationship between 
structure and agency than functionalism allows, and which enables a more 
rigorous engagement with the cultural realities of social actors and an 
appreciation of the mechanisms and circumstances of social change (Thomas 
and Price 1999). Greenhalgh (1990:90) suggests that an anthropological 
political economy would provide such a framework through being attentive to 
the impact of structures of power on individuals and groups, while also being 
mindful of the “concrete actions that people take within the constraints and 
opportunities imposed by their environments” (Greenhalgh 1990:90). 
Greenhalgh (1990) suggests that a multileveled analytical framework based 
on an “anthropological political economy” should be employed in 
demographic analysis. The ultimate objective being to understand local
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(national or sub-national) behaviour, with the sources of that behavior being 
sought at community, regional, national, international, and global levels 
(Greenhalgh 1990:94).
While identifying the need for the application of a more complex theoretical 
understanding of the relationship between structure and agency, Greenhalgh 
(1990, 1995, 1996) fails to offer a detailed conceptual framework by which 
this fundamental sociological problem may be addressed in demographic 
inquiry. Indeed, as Lockwood (1995:12) points out, “[t]he search for 
complementary alternatives to structural explanations in social demography 
does not immediately provide us with an alternative theory” (Lockwood 
1995:12). Rather a number of alternative theories of social action are 
available to us.
4. Structure and Agency in Social Theory: A Brief Overview
4.1 Actor-Centred Theories
A range of theories of action and practice have been drawn upon somewhat 
eclectically in recent anthropological critiques of the demographic treatment 
of fertility and reproductive behaviour. For example, Lockwood suggests that 
the starting point for a social analysis of sexual and reproductive behaviour is 
an “actor-centred” view which investigates:
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“how actors, whether conceived of as rational, strategizing, or 
unintending, maintain or change parts of the social system...
[I]f we see norms not as cognitive extensions of a fixed social 
structure, but rather as notions for transmitting meaning about 
behavior, then we should recognize that they are deployed in different 
ways in concrete situations, and that their deployment is a political 
process, always potentially open to competitions and counter-claim” 
(1995: 12-13).
It has been claimed that the anthropologists’ gift to the world is the idea that 
human beings create different kinds of culture, which in turn create different 
kinds of human beings (Anderson 1995:16). Nonetheless, the separation of 
culture and human action remains one of the central problematics of modern 
social thought (Ortner 1984). A persistent theme running throughout modern 
social theory (from Marx to Weber to Parsons to Giddens) is the attempt to 
bridge the gap between the individual and society, or between structure and 
agency (Jenkins 1996: 25). Central to this problematic, is the notion that in 
order to provide any generalised theory of human action, action must be 
assumed to be not entirely random. As Cohen (2000: 74) suggests, the 
“theoretical trick is to locate the source of the patterns that we want to find”. 
Within modern social thought human action has been understood through two 
main theoretical perspectives. The first (emanating from existentialism or 
phenomenology) understands human action in terms of the subjective 
meaning given by the actors involved, the second understands human 
conduct in as a product of the structural relations and conditions in which it is 
located (Cohen 2000).
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The notion that human conduct should ultimately be understood through 
reference to the meanings attributed to social action by the actors 
themselves, is found in the work of Weber and before him Dilthey (Cohen 
2000:75). For Weber human action is defined in terms of the subjective 
meanings that the individual attaches to his or her behaviour (Weber 1968). 
For Weber, all aspects of the human condition and their material environment 
are defined from the actor’s point of view, the symbolic significance that 
actors attribute to their material conditions and resources (Weber 1968).
A major critique of Weber’s theory of action is that through focusing on action 
that actors can understand, it fails to account for acts of unconscious 
motivation, including unreflective habit. While elaborating a theory of action 
as “meaningful conduct”, Weber’s theory of action has been criticised for 
lacking an adequate definition of the nature of social relationships (Cohen 
2000). Cohen (2000:77) suggests that for Weber:
“[a] relationship exists when several actors mutually orient the meaning 
of their actions so that each, to some extent, takes account of the 
behaviour of others”
Hence, Weber ultimately falls back on the notion of sets of maxims, rules or 
norms which are mutually understood by actors in a social relationship to 
orient their conduct. Two central problems have been identified with the 
Weberian account of social action as meaningful conduct. The first lies in the 
ad hoc status given to power, in which power is seen as lying in the 
subjective realm of the individual and his or her ability to assert his/her will 
over that of another. The second and related problem lies in the
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consideration of relations of inequality. As Cohen (2000:78) puts it “inequality 
is simply too prevalent in society to be meaningful only in the eyes of the 
actor”.
4.2 Interactionism and Social Constructivism
While Weber defines human action purely in terms of the “subjective 
meanings” attributed by actors themselves, pragmatic theories of human 
conduct (such as that proposed by Mead) are concerned with consciousness 
or the mind as an intrinsically social phenomenon (Jenkins 1996:21). For 
pragmatists, the subjective theories of human action which privilege individual 
consciousness, disregard that self-consciousness can only be achieved by 
also assuming the position of the other (Cohen 2000; Jenkins 1996:21). Or as 
Jenkins puts it “[i]n everyday terms...we cannot see ourselves at all without 
also seeing ourselves as other people see us” (Jenkins 1996:21). For Mead, 
(1934) society is constructed through social relationships formed between 
individuals, and individuals cannot exist outside social relationships. Without 
social relations, human agency and culture would not exist. Thus for Mead 
the notion of selfhood only exists in relation to the “generalised other”:
“only in so far as he takes the attitudes of the organized social group 
to which he belongs toward the organized, co-operative social activity 
or set of such activities in which that group is engaged, does he 
develop a complete se lf (Mead 1934: 155).
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Central to the pragmatic conceptualisation of human conduct is the notion
that all social actors are embodied:
“[MJind and selfhood are attributes of embodied individuals...That 
human beings have bodies is among the most obvious things about us, 
as are the extensive communicative and non-utilitarian uses to which 
we put them. The human body is simultaneously a referent of 
individual continuity, an index of collective similarity and differentiation, 
and a canvas upon which identification can play. Social identification 
in isolation from embodiment is unimaginable” (Jenkins 1996:21).
For pragmatists, there are multiple possibilities for action arising out of 
concrete social situations, which are experienced through our bodies and 
minds. Hence, a multiplicity of realities are possible, depending upon whose 
standpoint is taken. The pragmatist’s insistence on the plurality of social 
truths, grounded in concrete, embodied experiences, provides the intellectual 
foundation for symbolic interactionism (Plummer 2000:197). A key concern of 
interactionist social theory has been described as the “semiotic world of 
discourse”:
“the manner through which human beings go about the task of 
assembling meaning: how we define ourselves, our bodies and 
impulses, our feelings and emotions, our behaviours and acts; how we 
define situations we are in, develop perspectives on the wider social 
order, produce narratives and stories to explain our actions and lives; 
how such meanings are constantly being built up through interaction 
with others, and how these meanings are handled, modified, 
transformed, and hence evolve through encounters” (Plummer 
2000:194).
The most basic concept of interactionism is the self, as it is constituted in 
relation to the other. Societies are conceived of a “vast matrix of ‘social 
worlds’ constituted through the symbolic interaction of the ‘self with ‘others’”
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(Plummer 2000:195). Symbolic interactionism as developed through the 
Chicago school of sociology (such as in the work of Blumer and Becker) is 
grounded in a commitment to empirical research and the application of direct 
fieldwork methods, in particular the use of participant observation and case 
study. Symbolic interactionism advocates a move away from grand and 
universalising theory. Rather, theory is grounded in a methodology which 
explores the richness and complexity of the social world as it is experienced 
in everyday life. Theory is based on concepts built up from experience 
grounded in the lived reality of the empirical world. Blumer (1969:2) suggests 
that social theory should be based on three basic premises:
“The first premise is that human beings act towards things on the basis 
of the meanings that things have for them...The second premise is that 
meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social 
interaction that one has with one’s fellows. The third premise is that 
the meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative 
process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters”.
Clifford Geertz’s “symbolic anthropology” which emanates from the Chicago 
school of symbolic interactionism, has been highly influential in the 
development of post-modern thinking within anthropology (Anderson 1995: 
16). Primarily influenced by Weber, the focus of Geertz’s interpretive 
anthropology is on symbols as vehicles of cultural meaning, and a 
methodological focus on studying culture “from the actor’s point of view” 
(Ortner 1984). Geertz defines culture as a system of symbols through which 
members of society communicate their world view (Ortner 1984), proposing 
that cultural phenomena should be treated as “significant systems” (Geertz
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1983:3). For Geertz (1993) the concept of culture is a “semiotic one”, that is 
culture is a system of significant meanings:
“Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs 
of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, 
and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in 
search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning” (Geertz 
1993:5).
For Geertz (1983, 1993), the logic of cultural systems is not seen to be 
located within hidden structural conditions, but rather to derive from the logic 
of organisation of everyday action, from people operating within local level 
institutional orders, and interpreting their actions so that they may act 
coherently within them (Ortner 1984:130). Culture is “a product of acting 
social beings trying to make sense of the world in which they find themselves” 
(Ortner 1984:130). Hence, methodologically, the approach suggests that “if 
we are to make sense of a culture, we must situate ourselves in the position 
from which it was constructed” (Ortner 1984:130). Geertz (1983) insists that 
cultural analysis should be inserted into the study of the sociology of 
knowledge, challenging the view that science is “non-ideological” and based 
upon objectively verifiable facts (Treichler 1992). For Geertz (1983), the 
proposition that cultural phenomena should be treated as symbolic systems is 
in part:
“[A] result of the growing recognition that the established 
approach to treating such phenomena, laws-and-causes social 
physics, was not producing the triumphs of prediction, control and 
testability that had for so long been promised in its name...the broader 
currents of modern thought have finally begun to impinge upon what 
has been, in some quarters still is, a smug and insular enterprise.
Of these developments, it is perhaps that last that is most 
important. The penetration of the social sciences by the views of such
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philosophers as Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, or Ricoeur, such 
critics as Burke, Frye, Jameson, or Fish, and such all-purpose 
subversives as Foucault, Habermas, Barthes, or Kuhn makes any 
simple return to a technological conception of those sciences highly 
problematic” (Geertz 1983:3-4)
Associated with Geertz’s symbolic anthropology is the notion of cultural 
constructivism which derives less from the field of social anthropology than 
from the sociology of knowledge (Treichler 1992). The notion of the “cultural 
construction of reality”, is initially associated with the work of 
phenomenologists such as Berger and Luckmann (1966). Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1966) social constructionist account of social life argues that 
social phenomena are created and sustained through social practices, and 
that humans routinely experience the world in the form of multiple realities 
(Burr 1995; Treichler 1992). In particular, Berger and Luckmann’s account 
argues that while the world is socially constructed through social practice, 
actors experience the social world as if it is a pre-given natural order (Burr 
1995).
A number of studies emanating from both family planning and HIV/AIDS 
research have drawn upon interactionism and cultural constructionism, in an 
effort to elaborate alternative theories of culture and human action to those 
encapsulated within the structural-functionalist paradigm. Warwick (1988), for 
example, in examining the interplay between local culture and family planning 
programmes adopts Geertz’s definition of culture as:
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“an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, 
a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by 
means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their 
knowledge” (cited in Warwick 1988:1)
In recent years, the social constructivist approach has had a particular appeal 
in research studies relating to HIV/AIDS. The preoccupation of the 
epidemiological research of the 1980s with its focus on individual risk 
behaviours, has increasingly given way to an effort to identify the social, 
cultural, economic and political contexts in which high risk sexual behaviour 
takes place (Eyre 1997; Gillies e ta l 1996; Setel et a/1997). Anthropological 
studies have increasingly focused on the complex social and cultural systems 
that shape and structure the contexts in which sexual activity takes place, and 
in which sexuality acquires meaning from the perspective of social actors 
(Parker 1994).
“Many researchers have recognized the importance of the individual 
and society as two poles of description and analysis, and new 
attention has focused on meaning systems in understanding both 
individual and social patterns of sexuality. Sex is no longer perceived 
as merely a biological fact, but rather as a culturally informed 
experience, shaped by the inner world and the material world in which 
humans live...
“A basic tool in this work is the concept of sexual culture: the 
systems of meaning, of knowledge, beliefs and practices, that structure 
sexuality in different social contexts” (Parker et al 1991:79).
Much of this later body of work has drawn upon social constructivism through 
the elaboration of the concept of sexual cultures, which explores the social 
representations, symbols and meanings that shape and structure sexual 
experience in different social contexts (Parker 1994, 1996).The view that
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sexuality and sexual activity is socially constructed has focused attention on 
the “intersubjective nature of sexual meaning”, and the notion that these 
meanings are shared within the context of distinct and diverse sexual cultures 
(Parker 1994: 309-310). Central to the notion of sexual culture is that of 
sexual identity. Much of the early work on sexual identity focused on men who 
| have sex with men, highlighting that in many cultural settings the act of male 
to male sex is not necessarily synonymous with a homosexual identity. The 
notion that sexual identity is both diverse and socially constructed, has been 
used to challenge the functionalist notion of normative behaviour, 
demonstrating that while societal norms ideally require one mode of 
behaviour, in reality a wide range of practice actually exists in any one 
community (Parker et al 1991). The emphasis of analysis is on sexual 
meanings and:
“their shared, collective quality, not as the property of atomized or 
isolated individuals, but the property of social people integrated within 
the context of distinct, and diverse, sexual cultures” (Parker 1994:309- 
310).
Calhoun (1995) suggests that the appeal of social constructivism, the 
application of which has reached beyond the conventional boundaries of 
sociology (as for example in sexual behaviour research), centres on the 
notion that identity is neither a natural given, nor purely the act of individual 
will. Rather identity (such as sexual identity) is understood as constructed 
within social and cultural systems. Calhoun (1995:198) suggests that as 
such, constructivist arguments are able to challenge the essentialist notion
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that individuals have singular, integral, and unproblematic identities. At the 
same time, more sophisticated constructivist arguments also challenge 
accounts of collective identity as based on some core essence or set of 
features shared by all members of a social group. Nonetheless, Calhoun 
(1995) warns that many constructivist approaches are in danger of falling into 
the same determinist trap as biological essentialism. Through an over­
emphasis placed on social pressure as a determinant of behaviour, 
constructivism often overlooks issues of personal and political agency 
(Calhoun 1995).
On the other hand, many social constructivist approaches have followed a 
line of argument derivative of phenomenology, which understands the social 
world only as constructed through the subjective experience of social actors. 
In other words, the social world is understood as comprised of multiple 
realities, of which there is no one objective truth (Treichler 1992). At their 
most radical, these constructivist arguments insist that neither sex roles and 
statuses, nor sex itself is naturally given, but are always and everywhere 
socially and culturally constructed (Faubion 2000:257). Hence, Plummer 
(2000) suggests that both interactionism and social constructionism offer a 
broad church of approaches and interpretations:
“interactionism’s long concern with such matters as the morality, 
reflexivity, dialog, culture, communications, identity, bodies, drama, 
semiotics and everyday life can serve to re-connect the theory to many 
fashionable concerns. There are then, many strands to contemporary 
interactionist thought, and no single position” (Plummer 2000:203-204
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Interactionism and social constructivism have provided the cultural and 
intellectual backcloth to many of the core concepts of post-modern social 
theory (Burr 1995). In particular, interactionism and social constructivism 
have rejected the modernist assumption that there is one social reality and 
objective truth. The essence of post-modern thinking has been said to be 
characterised by a loss of belief in an objective world and the assertion that 
there is no foundation to secure a universal and objective reality (Kvale 
1996:19). Rather for post-modernists, knowledge becomes the ability to 
perform effective actions, with the focus on the social and linguistic 
construction of reality, and on the interpretation and negotiation of the 
meaning of the lived world (Kvale 1996:19).
The limitations of much symbolic interactionism and social constructivism 
have been seen to lie in the privilege given to the individualistic and 
subjective nature of cultural production, and its lack of concern for the 
objective or structural conditions within which symbolic systems are produced 
and maintained (Ortner 1984; Plummer 2000). In particular, symbolic 
interactionism and symbolic anthropology have been deemed to be incapable 
of dealing with structural conditions of power, economics and history in their 
analysis of cultural systems (Plummer 2000:203). The extreme form of 
relativism, also contained within much post-modern thought, has been 
criticised for failing to make sense of the real cultural and historical specificity 
(or structural conditions) within which social action takes place. Calhoun 
(1995:98) suggests that the broad postmodernist discourse obscures the
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crucial question of how social change has shifted the conditions for human 
actions. By rendering subjectivity universally problematic, postmodernism 
fails to address the ways in which agency and subjectivity are constructed in 
specific historical and cultural situations.
4.3 Structuralism
Within social anthropology a major paradigmatic challenge to the subjectivism 
of phenomenology and interactionism, has come from the structuralism of 
Levi-Strauss. For Levi-Strauss, phenomenology and interactionism have led 
to the construction of a myth that the meaning of human action and culture 
derive ultimately from individual choice (Faubion 2000). Counter to the claims 
of semiotics of symbolic anthropology, structuralism argues that the global 
variety of social and cultural phenomena can be made intelligible by 
demonstrating the shared relationships of those phenomena to a few basic 
underlying principles (Ortner 1984:135). For structuralists, the analysis of 
social processes is based upon the analogy between society and language, 
in which language is understood to lay the foundations for culture (Coward 
and Ellis 1977). Cultures are understood primarily as systems of 
classification, constructed upon relations of binary opposition (Ortner 1984). 
Counter to the privilege given to human agency in phenomenology and 
interactionism, within structuralism the notion of the human subject all but 
disappears. The human subject is no longer considered as homogenous and 
in control of his or herself, rather the subject is constructed through structure,
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the existence of which escapes consciousness (Coward and Ellis 1977). The 
human mind becomes the repository of structures which constitute the 
unconscious of each individual (Coward and Ellis 1977).
Critiques of Levi-Strauss’s structuralism have emanated from the apparently 
diverse fields of psychoanalysis and Marxism, which point to the limitations 
caused by structuralism’s denial of the intentional subject in social and 
cultural processes on the one hand, and the ahistorical, apolitical and 
universalistic notion of structures of the human mind on the other. In 
particular, the critical social theory of the Frankfurt School of theorists (such 
as Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse) sought to develop a general 
explanatory model of the socio-psychological dimensions of the relations 
between the individual and culture through an integration of Freudian theory 
and Marxism. Within this model, psychoanalysis provides the frameworks for 
an exploration of how social structures influence and shape the inner 
dimensions of human experience (Elliott 2000:137 -138).
4.4 Practice Theory and the Structure-Agency Dichotomy
Perhaps the most sustained critique of the limitations of structuralism on the 
one hand and interactionism and phenomenology on the other, (ie the 
structure-agency dichotomy in social theory) has emanated from the work of 
“practice theory”, in particular that of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s practice 
theory argues that there is more to social life than the subjective
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consciousness of actors. Counter to claims of interactionists, and 
phenomenologists, Bourdieu posits that there is an objective social reality 
which exists beyond the immediate interactional sphere and individual 
consciousness. Bourdieu further rejects structuralism as limited in its power to 
explain or predict behaviour and practice of people which is at variance with 
structural models of rules of conduct (Jenkins 1992:17). Bourdieu expresses 
his theoretical “project” as an attempt to overcome the dichotomy between the 
individual and society, and between objectivism and subjectivism. Gidden’s 
theory of structuration (as with Bourdieu’s theory of practice) also offers a
I
I
potential resolution to the problem of the relation between action and social 
structure (Thompson 1989: 56). Structuration theory considers:
“how action is structured in everyday contexts and how the structured 
features of action are, by the very performance of an action, thereby 
reproduced' (Thompson 1989:56-author’s emphasis)
In other words, Giddens (similar to Bourdieu) sees social structure and 
human agency as a duality in which “social structures are both constituted by 
human agency and at the same time are the very medium of this constitution” 
(cited in Thompson 1989: 58, original emphasis). Within this framework 
action is conceived as a continuous “flow of conduct” or interventions in the 
social world, of which agents are only able to give partial accounts, being 
unable to acknowledged all the conditions in which action is generated 
(Thompson 1989).
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A number of recent studies of fertility behaviour have drawn upon practice 
theory (derivative of Bourdieu) and structuration theory (derivative of 
Giddens), in an attempt to offer an alternative analytical framework for the 
understanding of reproductive behaviour to that provided by structural- 
functionalism (Angin and Shorter 1998; Carter 1995; Greenhalgh 1995; 
Rutenberg and Cotts Watkins 1997). According to Carter (1995), Giddens* 
structuration theory offers a way out of the separation between culture and 
agency, which is deeply embedded in modern social thought. Carter 
(1995:61) suggests that two features of Gidden’s structuration theory are of 
importance for demographic inquiry. First, through the notion of “flow of 
conduct” Giddens* conceptualises human agency as a process in which there 
is a continual “reflexive monitoring” of concrete situations, as opposed to 
behaviour being seen as a sequence of discrete acts of choice and planning. 
Second that cultural rules and social institutions only take shape through 
concrete social activity.
Carter (1995:62) draw’s upon Lave’s (1998) notion of “activity in setting” as a 
tool for understanding decision-making processes as they take place in 
concrete everyday situations. Lave’s notion suggests that activity and 
decision-making must always be understood as taking place in concrete 
social settings, which are the product of broader social structures and which 
shape activity. However, within these social settings actors negotiate 
decision-making in many different ways depending on social factors such as 
age, gender, ethnicity and class. According to Carter (1995:66), the cultural
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construction of the body is one of the important elements of activity in setting, 
shaping decision-making related to fertility and reproduction.
Drawing on Luker’s (1975) work on contraceptive risk taking in Northern 
California, Carter (1995:72) suggests that decision making of sexually active 
women to use or not to use contraception results from a series of decision­
making points (which may shift over time) at which women assign specific 
values to certain variables, and plan their behaviour according to these 
values. Similarly, Rutenberg and Cotts Watkins (1997) draw upon the notion 
of “flows of conduct” in considering women’s discourses relating to 
contraceptive practices in Nyanza Province, Kenya. Similar to Carter, the 
authors suggest that decisions to use or not to use family planning are not 
one-off events, but represent a continual process of negotiation and 
strategising within peer group networks:
“Decisions appear to be preceded by a period during which women 
overhear or participate in conversations with others, and then by more 
strategic conversations when women seek out those whom they 
believe are using contraceptives. Once a woman begins to practice 
contraception, she continues with these conversations and she 
monitors her body’s reaction, ready to discontinue use should she 
learn something disturbing about the experience of others or if the 
method does not ‘rhyme’ with her body” (Rutenberg and Cotts Watkins 
1997:297).
Angin and Shorter (1998:555) also draw upon the notion of “negotiated flows 
of conduct” to interpret the dynamics of reproductive decision-making among 
migrant populations in Istanbul, Turkey. They define their approach as a 
“form of practice theory”, which gives a central place to the role of “human
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agency” in the structures of society. Angin and Shorter (1998:557) define
negotiation as:
“a process of using one’s own power and knowledge to modify or 
create meanings for oneself and to influence the meanings significant 
others hold. Negotiation as a process of power is not limited to 
speaking and discussing between two people...The process of 
constructing meanings takes place among individuals, couples, older 
and younger generations of the family, and friends. The meanings 
interact on each other, since they are not wholly private, but are 
revealed to others through actions and practice” (1998:557).
The term “conduct” is used to replace the notion of behaviour, conduct being 
understood as negotiated ways of behaving within fields of possibilities 
(Angin and Shorter 1998:557). In order to demonstrate that conduct is 
monitored reflexively by and in everyday life, “with revisions as life is lived 
and as contexts change” (1998:557), Angin and Shorter adopt an 
ethnographic method based on the collection of narrative life histories. The 
authors conclude that:
“Regulating ones reproduction, giving meaning to ones gender, 
protecting ones health, and engaging in sexual activity, are flows of 
conduct that can be studied by an ethnographic approach. We find, 
through the ethnographies, that people make their own evaluations of 
what their goals with regard to reproduction should be, what signifies 
good and bad behaviour, how men and women should relate to each 
other and negotiate, and how they should understand the having or not 
having of children. Thus, by their activities they establish a cultural 
setting, revising it during their lives and times, that accounts in a 
fundamental way for the statistics that describe the macro changes in 
reproduction, gender roles, and family structure” (Angin and Shorter 
1998:562).
While both Carter (1995) and Angin and Shorter (1998) provide interesting 
insights into the process of negotiation of reproductive behaviour, both
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studies nevertheless seem to ultimately fail in being able to relate micro-level 
negotiated conduct to the macro social, economic and political context in 
which it is embedded. In the end, both approaches appear to privilege agency 
over structure, moving closer to the territory of interactionism than that of 
political-economy.
In the following section I suggest that a new theoretical understanding of the 
relationship between agency and culture is required to develop an analysis of 
fertility, reproductive and health-related behaviour which can account for 
diversity and difference in concrete social contexts. I outline an approach 
which I call critical social analysis, which aims to place political economy as 
central rather than external to an understanding of action.
5. Identity, Difference and Power: Towards the Application of A 
Critical Social Analysis
5.1 Critical Social Analysis
The tension between ‘universality’ and ‘difference’ has taken centre stage in 
current concerns of social and cultural theory. While social anthropology has 
emerged as the paradigmatic discipline of “otherness” and “difference”, much 
mainstream sociology and economics remains underpinned by ethnocentrism 
and universalism (Calhoun 1995:xv). The question of the relationship 
between the universal and the local, the objective and the subjective, culture
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and the individual, the general and the particular, are all restatements of the 
same fundamental dilemma in social theory. As Jenkins (1996:26) suggests, 
throughout modern social thought the same question is being asked, in 
different words and tones, which is:
“How can we fruitfully bring into the same analytical space the active 
lives and consciousnesses of individuals, the abstract impersonality of 
the institutional order, and the ebb and flow of historical time? How to 
bring public issues and personal troubles into the same frame”.
The application of a critical social analysis may go some way to finding a way 
out of this theoretical impasse. Critical social theory associated with the 
Frankfurt School of Marxist theory, has come under widespread criticism for 
its universalist tendencies and failure to consider the cultural diversity of the 
human condition. However, Calhoun (1995; 2000) offers a definition of critical 
social theory or social analysis which is both broad based and eclectic. 
According to Calhoun’s definition (1995:8), the aim of a critical theoretical or 
analytical approach is to make the apparent “givenness” of the world the 
object of inquiry. Critique, then, stems from an analysis which is both able to 
‘denaturalise’ the human world, recognising it as the product of action within a 
larger range of possibilities, and able to locate human action within its 
specific historical, political and social context. A critical theory is one that is 
aware of its own historical conditions of production, whilst also being able to 
see the world from the standpoint of others. While the idea of critique is 
difficult to pin down, it encompasses a unity of theory with method and a
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historically grounded awareness of social, political and cultural context 
(Calhoun 1995, 2000).
In elaborating his notion of critical social theory Calhoun (1995) makes a 
strong case for eclecticism. One of the most important roles of social theory is 
to enable us to ask new and different questions, about social phenomena, 
different theories enable us to ask different questions. Marxist theory, for 
example, enables us to ask about the extent to which interests rooted in 
material relations shape people’s identities and actions, a question that would 
not arise within the theoretical frameworks of Weber or Durkheim (Calhoun 
1995:7-8). Nonetheless, the fact that different theories enable us to ask new 
questions, does not signify that our knowledge accumulates through a linear 
progression towards a timeless and objective truth, as is assumed by much 
“mainstream” positivist social theory. Rather, Calhoun (1995:8) suggests it is 
not possible to ask all the interesting questions about the social world, within 
the framework of one theory, or even within the framework of a set of logically 
integrated theories. There are many different perspectives from which it is 
possible to consider a social phenomenon:
“Theories remain multiple not because we are confused or have not 
yet reached correct scientific understanding of the problems before us, 
but because all problems - like all people - can be seen in different 
ways” (Calhoun 1995:7).
The focus of a critical analysis is not only on the historical and structural 
conditions of social change, but also on the diversity of cultural and subject
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positions, or the multiplicity of voices that exist in different social contexts. 
Addressing the issues of plurality, multiplicity and difference between 
individuals and cultures is a central challenge to critical theory and social 
analysis. In particular, Calhoun (1995) suggests that developing ways to take 
seriously such fundamental classificatory differences as gender and race is a 
basic and urgent task for critical social theory.
5.2 Identity and Difference
I
Two analytical concepts are central to critical social analysis, these are the 
interlinked concepts of difference and identity. According to Jenkins (1996:90) 
social identity is the constitution in social practice of the inseparable themes 
of similarity and difference. Jenkins (1996) suggests that social identity is a 
strategically important analytical concept in attempting to overcome the 
fundamental dichotomies of the individual and society, structure and agency, 
difference and universalism. First, if identities are understood as attributes of 
embodied individuals, which are also socially constituted, the concept of 
social identity bridges the divide between the individual and the collective. 
Further, if social identity is conceptualised as a process, that is in a continual 
state of negotiation, as opposed to being fixed and essential, the distinction 
between action and structure can be avoided. Finally, if the process of 
construction of identity is conceptualised in terms of a dialectic relationship 
between the internal and the external world, the opposition between the 
subjective and the objective may also be overcome (Jenkins 1996:26).
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Exploring the notions of difference and identity calls for an analysis which 
reaches below the surface of social phenomena, to grasp the complexity of 
how constructions of difference and identity affect actor’s understandings of 
the social world and shape social and political practice:
“ ‘Difference’ appears as importantly in the forms of violent ethnic 
nationalism, racism, and religious fundamentalism as in movements 
and personal choices about gender, sexual orientation, and ethnic 
pluralism. Some lines of difference, like national boundaries, are used 
not only to distinguish one human group from others but to demand 
internal conformity. The very rhetoric of difference, in other words, can 
be turned to the repression of differences. Recognition of difference 
can be the basis for mutual engagement, or for failure to appreciate 
and respect common humanity. And not all differences are equally 
valuable” (Calhoun 1995:xviii).
Nonetheless, the concepts of difference and identity have not received 
adequate treatment within classical social theory (Calhoun 1995). For 
example, in considering the fundamental category difference of gender, 
Calhoun (1995:xxii) argues that the contributions of Marx, Weber and 
Durkheim are extremely limited in their ability to speak to modern concerns. 
Critical Marxist theory, with its universalist tendencies, has failed to consider 
the full impact of diversity and the multiplicity of human possibilities and 
cultural contexts. Part of the problem has been that a good deal of modern 
social thought has been based on the assumption that individuals live in one 
bounded social world:
“People on borders, children of mixed marriages, those rising through 
social mobility, and those migrating from one society to another were 
all constituted for social theory as people with problems by contrast to 
the presumed ideal of people who inhabit a single social world and
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could therefore unambiguously place themselves in their social 
environment” (Calhoun 1995:44)
“...it is now, and throughout human history often has been, common to 
inhabit multiple worlds simultaneously and even to grow as a person 
by the ability to maintain oneself in connection to all of them”
(Calhoun 1995:xix).
In recent years, postmodernists and poststructuralists have played a central 
role in bringing the theme of difference to the forefront of social analysis. 
Post-modernism, has been characterised by a rejection of meta-narratives 
and grand universal theories (such as Marxism), giving prominence to local 
knowledge as constructed in discourse or narratives (Kvale 1995). With the 
emphasis on the local and the individual located in their social and cultural 
context, some post-modernists have claimed that the polarity of the universal 
and the individual, the objective and the subjective, is surpassed (Kvale 
1995). Nonetheless, postmodernism also often takes on an extreme form of 
relativism. In understanding knowledge as discursive, action or practice 
becomes abstracted from its embeddedness in concrete social relations and 
historical conditions. In other words, postmodernism fails to consider how 
concrete social relations are constructed, organised and reproduced 
(Calhoun 1995).
In order to avoid the dichotomy between “essentialism” on the one had and 
the extreme “relativism” of postmodernism on the other, Calhoun (1995) 
suggests that we need to also understand the practical activity by which 
ordinary people manage cultural complexity and their engagement with
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different social worlds in their everyday lives. Understanding culture and 
human action is neither just a matter of interpreting action nor of defining the 
structural conditions of action, it is also about understanding that the ways in 
which people interpret their activities also ultimately shapes their actions. 
This is what Giddens refers to as the “double hermeneutic” (Giddens 1997). 
Nonetheless, we will always face difficulties in the interpretation of social life
i|
that is constituted differently from our own:
“We are especially apt to become aware of difficulties and 
uncertainties in the interpretation of meaning...when we attempt to 
understand social actions whose meaning is embedded in contexts 
very different from our own. The relevant differences of context may 
stem from either material conditions or differences in the symbolic 
production of meaning...Differences of context may also stem from the 
internal cultural construction of meaning. Such differences arise in 
language, in schemes of identification and valuation, and in 
orientations to social practice” (Calhoun 1995:49)
Our resources for making sense of the world derive from our own history, 
culture and experience. Applying these resources necessarily runs the risk of 
failing to grasp meanings operating in other contexts. Even within a single 
cultural context, the interpretation of practical activity and social action faces 
inherent problems (Calhoun 1995). Practical activity is not easily explained in 
discourse: while each of us develops practical skills and strategies by which 
to manage our everyday lives, it is difficult to put into words all the tacit 
understandings and practical skills by which these everyday activities are 
made possible (Calhoun 1995:51). A social analysis, which attempts to grasp 
the complexity of social life, needs to be able to take of account of both 
cultural difference and historical specificity. Hence, universal and generalist
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theories of behaviour, such as rational choice theory, are applied at the 
expense of rendering new knowledge on cultural context and difference.
5.3 Cultural Capital and Symbolic Power
Post-structuralists such as Pierre Bourdieu offer potential theoretical 
frameworks for finding a way out of the impasse between the universalism of 
structuralism and the relativism of much post-modernism (Calhoun 1995; 
Jenkins 1982, 1992). Jenkins (1992) suggests that the work of Bourdieu has 
tremendous strategic value in the evolution of sociological thinking on the 
relationship between structure and agency. Whilst criticising Bourdieu as 
ultimately failing in his “project” to overcome the objectivist-subjectivist 
dichotomy, by privileging a form of determinism “in the last instance” (Jenkins 
1982), Jenkins (1992) suggests that above all Bourdieu is “good to think 
with”. In the spirit of Jenkins’ sentiment, this section outlines some of the core 
concepts of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, which may be useful 
conceptual tools for thinking through a critical social analysis of sexual and 
reproductive health.
The importance of Bourdieu’s work lies in his attempt to construct a 
theoretical model, which neither takes what people do in their daily lives for 
granted, not loses sight of wider patterns of social life (Jenkins 1992:68). 
Bourdieu’s approach can be summarised as a general theory of practice 
(Jenkins 1982, 1992; Thompson 1991). Implicit in Bourdieu’s theoretical
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framework is the recognition that the distinction between conscious thought 
and the unconscious mind is not clear-cut. Rather, for Bourdieu, conscious 
and unconscious mental processes lie at opposite ends of a continuum, the 
area in between being occupied by “habit” or habitual practice (Jenkins 
1992:178). Habit provides the space in which much decision-making takes
i
! place:
i
“if we had to make a decision about everything, we’d never be able to 
make a decision about anything” (Jenkins 1996:70-71).
Bourdieu suggests that, in many everyday situations, behaviour or practice is 
neither an outcome of habit nor of rules or calculation, it is more akin to a 
performance, or an act of strategic improvisation. Sometimes improvisation 
may resemble rational calculation and at other times it may appear as 
spontaneous and unreflexive (Jenkins 1996:71). However, improvisatory 
performance or strategising is always carried out within specific sets of 
constraints opportunities and social conditions (referred to by Bourdieu as 
habitus). In other words, practice is always firmly located within its specific 
social context (Jenkins 1992:179). The notions of strategy and habitus are 
employed by Bourdieu to make a theoretical break from the structuralist 
conceptualisation of behaviour as governed by norms and rules, whilst 
avoiding the problem of relapsing into subjectivism:
“Notions like that of habitus (or systems of dispositions), practical 
sense, and strategy, are linked to my effort to escape from structuralist 
objectivism without relapsing into subjectivism...
The notion of strategy is the instrument I use to break away 
from the objectivist point of view and from the action without an agent 
that structuralism presupposes. But one can refuse to see in strategy
138
the product of an unconscious program without making it the product of 
a conscious, rational calculation. It is the product of the practical sense 
as the feel for the game, for a particular, historically determined game” 
(Bourdieu 1990b:61-62)
Fundamental to Bourdieu’s notion of behaviour as improvisatory and 
strategising, and the product of processes which are neither entirely 
conscious nor unconscious, is the concept of embodiment. The idea of 
human embodiment, is a concept recovered from phenomenology and 
interactionism (Calhoun 1995:xx). Bourdieu’s central argument is that culture 
is encoded in or on the body. The power of habit or habitual practice derives 
from the role of the body as a vehicle of less than conscious communication 
or expression of cultural codes (Jenkins 1992:179). The concept of 
embodiment is also fundamental to notions of self-hood and social identity. 
While collective identity focuses on the notion of the world with “society” or 
“humanity” at its centre, individual identity centres on the body (Jenkins 
1996:113). Where selfhood is entangled with identities that are “definitively” 
embodied such as sex/gender and ethnicity/race it becomes clear that the 
external (or social) attributes of identity are not equally available to all:
“The world is not really everyone’s oyster: a range of factors 
systematically influences access to the resources that are required to 
play this game. In any given context, some social identities 
systematically influence an individual’s opportunities in this respect. 
The materiality of identity, and its stratification with respect to 
deprivation and affluence, cannot be underestimated” (Jenkins 
1996:51).
The notion of the embodiment in individuals of the unequal social and 
material conditions of the external world is encapsulated in Bourdieu’s
139
notions of the “habitus” and the “hexis”. For Bourdieu (1991), the habitus is 
the organising cultural framework which both generates and constrains 
practice. The habitus is comprised of a set of “dispositions”, acquired from 
childhood through a process of “inculcation” (not dissimilar to socialisation), 
which incline agents to act or react in certain ways (Jenkins 1992; Thompson 
1991). Through a multitude of messages and experiences the individual 
acquires a set of culturally defined attitudes and ways of being, which 
become embodied as “second nature”, and endure throughout life. However, 
dispositions are definitively the products of specific social and material
!
conditions, for example, people situated in different social classes will acquire 
different sets of dispositions. These embodied dispositions generate practice. 
However, the practices produced may be other than those through which 
dispositions were acquired. Hence, there is a dialectic relationship between 
the acquisition of dispositions and the generation of practice and new 
dispositions (Jenkins 1992; Thompson 1991). Hence, Bourdieu refers to 
dispositions as “inculcated, structured, durable, generative and transposable” 
(Thompson 1991:12).
“The habitus as the feel for the game is the social game embodied and 
turned into a second nature...The habitus, as society written into the 
body, into the biological individual, enables the infinite number of acts 
of the game ...to be produced” (Bourdieu 1990b:63).
The habitus gives individuals a “practical sense” of how to act and respond in 
the course of their daily lives (Thompson 1991:13). Habitus is not an 
ideological construct, but an integral part of practical activity and vice versa
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(Thompson 1991). Bourdieu (1991) also uses the term “hexis” to refer to the 
embodiment of habitus. Bodily hexis is used to signify deportment, the 
manner and style in which men and women “carry themselves in the world”, 
stance, gait and gesture (Thompson 1991:13). The term indicates the 
centrality of the body in the conceptualisation of habitus. It is in bodily hexis 
that the individual (the idiosyncratic) combines with the social (the structural) 
as:
“the mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the 
cultural world into which they are born and which they share with 
others” (Jenkins 1992:75).
Bourdieu’s theory of practice has been variously interpreted as being 
underpinned by a Weberian idealism and a Marxist materialism. Jenkins 
(1992) suggests that Bourdieu’s notion of improvisation and strategising 
draws heavily upon interactionism. While Bourdieu rejects classical Marxism 
as treating the social-world as if it were a one-dimensional manifestation of 
socio-economic processes, or relations between classes, his theory of 
practice has also been interpreted as being historical and materialist, 
addressing the:
“central and defining problem of historical materialism, that is how 
inequality is legitimised in such a way that social reproduction takes 
place relatively free from conflicts (Garnham and Williams 1986:118).
The body is the site of “incorporated history”, and embodied practical
schemes are both the product of history and the mechanism through which
history is reproduced (Thompson 1991:13). In other words, Bourdieu’s theory
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of practice is also a theory of social or cultural reproduction, central to which 
are the notions of cultural capital and symbolic power. For Bourdieu the 
social world is multi-dimensional. Social formation is conceptualised as a 
hierarchically organised series of fields (or contexts) within which different 
kinds of resources or capital are unequally distributed (Thompson 1991). A 
field is a system of social positions occupied by individuals and institutions, 
which are internally structured in terms of power relations:
“Positions stand in relations of “dominance, subordination or 
equivalence, by virtue of the access they afford to the resources 
(capital) which are at stake in the field” (Jenkins 1992:85).
A field is always a site of struggles in which individuals, groups and 
institutions, seek to maintain or alter the distribution of the forms of capital 
specific to it (Thompson 1991:14). Bourdieu’s key insight is that there are 
immaterial forms of capital -  cultural, symbolic and social -  as well as a 
material or economic one, and that it is possible through varying strategies to 
convert one of these forms of capital into the other (Calhoun 1995:140). 
Economic capital is that which is directly convertible into money, unlike 
educational attainments (cultural capital), social connections (social capital) 
and prestige (symbolic capital). Bourdieu’s (1986) account of capital is 
therefore an account of the resources and strategies that people use in the 
pursuit of distinction, profit, wealth and power (Calhoun 1995). However, 
Bourdieu is most interested in examining the strategies or concrete ways in 
which those who are most deprived in terms of capital are able to express 
themselves in the diverse settings of everyday life (Thompson 1991:22).
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Although by referring to “capital” and “markets” (another term used for fields) 
Bourdieu borrows from the language of economics, his theory is 
fundamentally social in a sense in which rational choice theory is not:
“His conception of strategy in the idea of an intersubjective habitus 
conditioned by ‘objective’ situations gives a much less reductionistic 
and more useful sense of human action. Bourdieu’s sociology provides 
for effective accounts of the influences which objective circumstances, 
historical patterns of distribution of various resources, and the 
trajectories of different actors through social fields all have on power 
relations” (Calhoun 1995:142).
Central to Bourdieu’s analytical framework is a theory of power, encapsulated 
in the notion of symbolic violence. Symbolic violence provides the key to the 
ongoing and successful reproduction of relations of domination and the 
unequal distribution of capital. Symbolic violence is the process by which a 
dominant system of meanings (or culture) is imposed upon groups and social 
classes in such a manner that it is experienced as “legitimate” (Jenkins 
1992:104). The experiencing of a dominant culture as legitimate obscures the 
power relations upon which it is predicated, and contributes to its systematic 
reproduction. Bourdieu suggests that the reproduction of relations of 
inequality is achieved through “misrecognition”, a concept which is not 
dissimilar to the Marxist notion of false consciousness:
“the process whereby power relations are perceived not for what they 
objectively are but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eyes 
of the beholder” (cited in Jenkins 1992:104)
The actual content of the dominant culture is “arbitrary” in the sense that what 
is presented as “legitimate” culture is the result of an empirically traceable
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history rather than a relative value or “appropriateness”. All cultures are 
equally arbitrary and behind all culture lies the arbitrary sanction of power 
(Jenkins 1992:105). Bourdieu argues that the mainstay of symbolic violence 
is “pedagogic power”, which imposes an apparently legitimate dominant 
culture through the operations of informal “pedagogic agencies”, such as the 
peer group and the family, and formal agencies such as the education 
system. The action of pedagogic institutions reflects the interests of dominant 
groups and classes, reproducing the uneven distribution of cultural capital 
among those groups (Jenkins 1992:105).
I The symbolic violence exercised by institutions creates an illusion that it is
I unrelated to the overall structure of power relations. Bourdieu suggests that a 
key way this illusion is produced is by facilitating the limited social mobility of 
a small number of the dominated or oppressed social class (Jenkins 
1992:109). The illusion of mobility obscures the material reality that 
competitors in the system all begin with different handicaps and advantages 
based on cultural endowment or cultural capital (Jenkins 1992:111). 
Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction is therefore both a theory of 
socialisation and a theory of ideology, which seeks to address the 
fundamental question: “how does a social system in which a substantial 
section of the population are obviously exploited survive without its rulers 
having to depend on physical coercion for the maintenance of order”? 
(Jenkins 1992:119).
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While Bourdieu does not directly address difference and identity, he provides 
useful analytical tools for approaching these issues (Calhoun 1995). For 
Bourdieu, culture is both a means of struggle and a marker of social identity 
(Jenkins 1992).There is a direct relationship between social identity and the 
distribution of power and resources in society (Jenkins 1996).Through 
understanding social practice as emanating out of a dialectic relationship
i
between the internal and external world, a necessary connection is made 
between relations of domination, strategies of resistance and processes of 
social identification.
“Social identities exist and are acquired, claimed and allocated within 
power relations. Identity is something over which struggles take place 
and with which stratagems are advanced: it is means and ends in 
politics. Not only is the classification of individuals at issue but also the 
classification of populations” (Jenkins 1996:25).
Above all, Bourdieu’s conceptual tools provide a basis for linking social 
structure and social relations with the negotiation of individual identities, and 
for seeing both as produced and reproduced in practical action (Calhoun 
1995:156).
The importance of a critical social analysis lies in making a systematic 
examination of the relationship between social identification as elaborated in 
the narratives or discourse of individuals, and the relations of power and 
domination constitutive of the institutional order in which certain groups and 
populations are identified or classified as marginal. That is, to ground 
accounts of difference and identity within their political and historical context.
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The following two chapters set out to apply the tools and concepts which this 
chapter has suggested are constitutive of a critical social analysis, to 
historical and ethnographic data from Bolivia, as a basis for understanding 
reproductive and health related behaviour and strategies among poor and 
marginalized groups.
146
Chapter 3
Iden tity , Power and Policy
(The Historical and Political Context to 
an Ethnographic Study from Bolivia)
1. Introduction
In Chapter 1, I considered the historical and political context in which 
international population policy has evolved. In so doing I raised questions over 
the extent to which the ICPD discourse, based upon notions of individual 
rights, freedoms and choice, bears a relationship to the social, political and 
economic realities within which poor and socially marginalized people 
experience their sexual and reproductive health. Chapter 1 suggested that in 
placing the notion of individual freedoms, rights and choice at the centre of 
policy discourse, the ICPD agenda sits comfortably and without contradiction 
within a neo-liberal policy framework. Neo-liberalism, which took a hold in the 
1980s and 1990s places the free-market at the centre of public and 
international development policy and continues to pave the course of 
development into the 21st Century. As I will argue in this chapter, reproductive 
health policy in Bolivia has been assimilated within a neo-liberal agenda, 
which has determined the government’s development policy over the past two 
decades.
In Chapter 2 ,1 argued (through a critical analysis of the literature) that 
reproduction, health, sexuality and gender relations are deeply embedded in 
historically and locally specific social conditions of inequality, poverty and
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exploitation. I suggested that an application of what I have termed a “critical 
social analysis” can contribute to rendering new social knowledge regarding 
fertility, sexuality, reproduction and health; which moving beyond the 
positivist/functionalist paradigm of mainstream demographic and family 
planning research, enables a more critical engagement with the political and 
social realities in which poor and marginalized people experience their health, 
fertility and reproduction.
I suggested that a critical social analysis is based upon a historically grounded 
understanding of social, political and cultural context. Central to such an 
analysis is an exploration of how constructions of identity and difference 
shape social and political practices at the national and local level. Drawing on 
a range of conceptual tools, Chapter 2 suggested that a key aspect of such a 
critical social analysis is the analysis of how historical and structural 
conditions of power and domination become encoded in and reproduced 
through everyday practices in specific concrete social situations. Fundamental 
to such an analysis is a consideration of how relations of domination are 
reinforced through “symbolic violence” or symbolic power exercised through 
institutions of the state and global institutions.
However, I argue, everyday practices do not simply reproduce existing 
relations of power and domination. As the following chapters will seek to 
demonstrate, those who are most deprived of power continue to struggle to 
express themselves and gain access to social, political and economic
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resources (or capital) through strategies of resistance in which social identity 
is continually re-asserted and redefined.
Chapters 3 and 4 are based upon fieldwork carried out in the Bolivian city of 
El Alto, over a period of two months in 1997 and four months in 1998. These 
two periods of fieldwork were complemented by a series of consultancies on 
sexual and reproductive health in Bolivia, undertaken for the U.K Department 
of International Development in 1997, 1998 and 2000. These chapters apply 
the critical theoretical frameworks developed in Chapters 1 and 2 to a specific 
case study analysis of the relationship between reproductive health policies 
and programmes, and the practices of poor migrant Aymaran women in urban 
Bolivia.
In this chapter I outline how historical constructions of identity and difference 
are embedded in structural conditions of domination, inequality and 
exploitation. Chapter 4 takes up the analysis outlined in Chapter 2 to 
demonstrate how these structural conditions are embodied in and reproduced 
through constructions of self and identity which ultimately shape the 
experience of health and well-being among migrant urban Aymaran women 
(see Greenway 1998a). While the field of practice explored by this case study 
is that of health, I suggest that the framework of “critical social analysis” 
developed in these chapters can be applied to any social sector.
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2. El Alto: A City of Hope
“It can be stated without too much exaggeration that wealth and power in La 
Paz are inversely proportional to altitude” (Gill 2000:2).
El Alto is the sprawling ‘migrant’ city, which perched precariously at 13,500 
feet above sea level, unprotected from the scorching midday sun, plummeting 
night-time temperatures, and harsh winds of the altiplano, overlooks the valley 
in which the city of La Paz nestles. El Alto is home to those whom Gill 
(2000:2) has described as the “many victims of Bolivia’s ongoing experiment 
with free-market reform”; land-poor rural migrants, dispossessed mine 
workers, and impoverished former residents of La Paz (Pacenos). El Alto, is a 
creation of the past two decades, and is being constructed and expanded on 
a daily basis. Officially separated from La Paz (becoming a city in its own 
right in 1988) El Alto is one of the fastest growing cities in Latin America and 
has the largest concentration of urban Aymara speakers in Bolivia (Luykx
1999). In the late 1980s and early 1990s the city expanded at a rate of 9% 
contrasting with a 4% rate in population growth at the time (Gill: 2000).
The journey from the outer zones of El Alto to the lowest regions of La Paz is 
marked by profound contrasts. The peripheral zones of El Alto, in the 
Southern part of the city (where the fieldwork took place) are the poorest and 
most under-served, home to ex-miners and many recent migrants from the 
altiplano. These zones are typified by adobe (mud-brick) built houses, muddy 
or dusty streets (depending on the season), through the centre of which run 
open sewage and marauding dogs who fiercely guard their small patches of 
territory. Nonetheless, El Alto also boasts its affluent residential areas. Ciudad
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Satelite, with its paved streets, brick built houses and well kept squares is 
home to the middle-classes, the professionals of El Alto (teachers, doctors 
who run the local government clinics, and administrators) who are unable to 
afford a home in the lower regions of La Paz. Running through the heart of El 
Alto is a major highway, which links the city to the desolate regions of the 
altiplano and Lake Titicaca. At the point at which the road becomes known as 
the 16 de Julio is the thriving commercial centre of the city, teaming with 
street vendors and market traders (cholas). After passing from the 16 de Julio 
to the vibrant market area known as La Ceja (literally translated as the 
eyebrow) on the brink of El Alto, the road begins its descent into La Paz. An 
important source of income for children and young people, many of whom are 
trying to earn money to pay for school and college fees, is collecting fares on 
the micros (mini-buses) which gather on the edge of the Ceja, enticing 
passengers to take the journey down the precarious autopista (motorway) to 
the centre of La Paz.
As the autopista descends into the city of La Paz, it passes squatter 
settlements perched on the slopes of the valley, before entering the heart of 
old city, in which the streets throng with chola street vendors sitting by the 
side of the modern high-rise office blocks, shops, hotels and restaurants, 
running the length of the main street (the Prado). The further the road 
descends into the southern most zones of La Paz, the more affluent and the 
less ‘indigenous’ the neighbourhoods become. Obrajes, Calacoto, San 
Miguel, and Achumani in the lowest climes of the city are home to government 
officials and other affluent professionals, whose main connection with the
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inhabitants of El Alto is to employ them as domestic servants and nannies. 
Residents from these neighbourhoods only pass through El Alto by necessity 
on their journey to their weekend retreats on the shores of Lake Titicaca.
The increasing influx of migrants to El Alto represents a search for secure 
livelihoods and the potential upward mobility for the children of those who 
have few other options (Gill 2000). However, El Alto offers little relief from the 
devastating effects upon the poor of the economic restructuring programmes 
which have been implemented by a succession of governments over the past 
three decades (see section 4). As Gill (2000:2) describes the reality of life in 
El Alto:
“Unemployment, non-functioning schools and health clinics, and the 
dearth of adequate infrastructure attest to the massive and deepening 
impoverishment. One consequence is the expansion of a vast reserve 
army of unemployed or marginally employed people, also 
conceptualised as an ‘informal economy,’ from which a few emerge as 
incipient entrepreneurs but in which the vast majority experience new 
and old forms of oppression”.
The following section considers the old forms of oppression, upon which the 
new forms of inequality experienced by the residents of El Alto are based.
3. Post-Colonial Constructions of Identity and Difference
“Spanish colonisation of the indigenous people of the Andes produced 
profound cleavages in existing stmctures at every level of human 
experience: in systems of communication, knowledge, religious belief, 
and social and political organisation, to name but a few. The strength of 
those who resist oppression and try to maintain integrity against all the 
odds is a factor in explaining how five centuries of colonialist 
domination have not completely eradicated linguistic and cultural 
diversity and creativity among Latin American people of indigenous 
origin. The very cleavages mentioned here have been moulded into
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spaces in which innovative forms of cultural expression are produced, 
acting as tools in the fight against total assimilation" (Howard-Malverde 
1997:14)
3.1 Modernism and National Identity
The modernizing policy rhetoric of successive Bolivian governments during 
the 1980s, 1990s and the early 2000s has promoted the concept of a racially 
neutral nation-state based upon the principles of citizens “participation”, 
private ownership and individual rights. Despite the policy discourse of equity, 
participation and racial homogenisation, Bolivian society continues to be riven 
with inequality based upon cultural, racial, gender and class distinctions 
(Stephenson 1999). As has been argued in Chapter 2, an appreciation of 
historical context is essential for understanding how politically salient forms of 
identification, in particular, ethnicity, gender and class emerge and become 
re-defined, shaping power relations and everyday practices in different ways 
in different social contexts (see Gill 2000:6).
Bolivia has been described as the most ‘indigenous’ country in South America 
(Luykx 1999:1). While ethnic boundaries are increasingly difficult to define, 
nearly two-thirds of the population are speakers of indigenous languages, with 
one-third being Quechua speakers (mainly from the central valley regions) 
and one-third Aymara (from the highlands or altiplano). The lowland regions 
contain over thirty other indigenous groups, but the Aymara and Quechua 
cultures have endured more successfully in the face of modernity than the 
lowland tribal groups (Luykx 1999).
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The 1998 Demographic and Health Survey (Government of Bolivia 1998) 
estimates that as a result of rural to urban migration 62% of the population of 
Bolivia (which is estimated at 7.9 million) now live in urban areas, with 43% of 
the population concentrated in the altiplano. According to the Government of 
Bolivia (1992) Poverty Map of Bolivia, poverty continues to affect more than 
half of the urban population and 80% of the rural population. Incidence of 
poverty is highest among Aymara and Quechua speaking households, 
resulting from processes of discrimination in the labour market and exclusion 
from access to social resources (including education and health). While 
Bolivia’s indigenous peoples predominate in the population and the cultural 
landscape of both rural and urban areas, they are far from being the politically 
dominant group. The policy rhetoric of the government promotes the notion of 
cultural pluralism, thereby legitimising political, social, and economic practices 
that endorse racial homogenisation (Stephenson 1999: 1). However, Luykx 
(1999:2) observes that:
“[questions of indigenous identity and cultural legitimacy arise in 
debates over virtually every aspect of national policy. Furthermore, the 
discourse of indigenous rights is inevitably, if uneasily, yoked to the 
discourse of class conflict, which seethes constantly ...[in Bolivia] the 
poorest of all Latin American countries”
Since the 1952 revolution, which brought about major reforms and
dramatically changed the political, social and economic life of the country (Gill
2000), a major pre-occupation of all governments has been the attempt to
forge a unified national identity from among the diverse and frequently
conflicting social groups. In order to comprehend fully the political motivation
to create a coherent and unified Bolivian identity, Stephenson (1999)
suggests that it is essential to understand how the process of “modernisation”
154
has tried to locate subjects in terms of their cultural, racial, gendered, and 
spatial identities. For many urban and rural dwellers the notion of a unified 
Bolivian society remains an elusive concept, the history of the nation-state 
being understood and experienced as one of progressive marginalization and 
social exclusion of its indigenous inhabitants. For example, Don Francisco1 an 
ex-miner, once explained his cultural and historical heritage to me thus:
Since the new reforms, we have used the language of 
Spanish. But we have our own language -  our parents were 
primitive and did not speak Spanish -  they were Aymaras 
and Quechuas. But when they discovered South America 
the Spanish and the English came -  they travelled and 
discovered a new land -  but here - before they discovered 
us here -  were people of another language Quechua and 
Aymara -  this is what happened -  there were not people 
here who spoke pure Spanish and English -  nobody 
discriminated on race -  because we are of the moreno 
[black- ie Indian] race -  but you in England and America are 
of the mestizo race. So there was a separation of race.
When they came they treated us badly -  sometimes they 
clubbed us -  that is what our grandparents told us- and they 
passed on to us that they were bad and not to talk to them -  
this is what makes us afraid of them - the race is a little 
unequal. Our children continue to be afraid -  because
1 All names o f individuals referred to in this chapter have been changed.
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nationally it is the mestizo who continue to have money -  but 
I am of the moreno race and so are my neighbours -  they do 
not have money -  so they continue to be afraid -  the justice 
here in Bolivia is not a legal justice -  here who has money is 
saved -  those who do not are castigated. That is how it is.
That is how I see it.
3.2 Chollos, Indios and Mestizos
As Don Francisco’s narrative suggests, racism is ubiquitous in Bolivian 
society, operating in both the public and the private domains. The frequent 
use of the terms criollo/blanco (white), mestizo/cholo (mixed race) 
indio/moreno (Indian) by all social classes to indicate identity in twentieth 
century Bolivia, highlights the fundamental tripartite ethnic division that runs 
through Bolivian society (Luykx 1999:20). As well as indicating ethnicity, these 
categories also carry socio-spatial and class implications. While the term indio 
is associated with the notion of “traditionalism” and a rural agrarian collective 
identity, criollos, mestizos and cholos are associated with urban living, 
individualism and a place in the market economy (Seligmann 1989, 
Stephenson 1999). However, identity based on ethnicity is also fluid and 
negotiable (as Don Francisco’s use of the term mestizo illustrates). While in 
the days of colonial rule (which began with the Spanish conquest of the Inca 
state in 1532) the terms indio, mestizo and cholo were used to denote racial 
descent, they now carry crosscutting ethnic, class and gendered implications.
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The term criollo was originally used by the colonial powers to denote a person 
of direct Spanish descent who was born in the Americas. Latterly in the 
Andean region it has come to signify a member of the powerful, ruling elite, 
who control economic, legislative and judicial power:
“Often referred to by Indians as “/os blancos” (whites), criollos speak 
Spanish and identify generally with western notions of civilization, 
progress, (neo) liberal market relations, and citizens’ rights” 
(Stephenson 1999:2).
While members of elite Bolivian society frequently romanticise their 
connection to an indigenous past and the Inca and pre-lnca cultures, the term 
indio is now often used in a pejorative sense by the white elite to refer to the 
Aymara and Quechua peoples, the living descendents of these ancient 
civilizations. The term Indian as applied today, connotes subsistence living, 
poverty and “under-development”. One Aymara speaking residents of El Alto 
explained her perception of use of the term indio to me:
In the valley [La Paz] - that is where rich people live - here 
we are poor. The people in La Paz speak Spanish - they call 
us indios - they speak to us with contempt -  because they 
speak pure Spanish and we speak Aymara -  they do not say 
good day to us -  because we are poor-we are poor but we 
are not ignorant
Historically the term Indian has undergone a series of redefinitions. According 
to Harris (1995:354) the term was initially adopted as a “fiscal category” by the 
colonial powers, used to define the economic obligations of the native
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population to the colonial state. The obvious racial and cultural contrasts 
between the conquering Spanish and native Indian population became 
grounded in an essentially economic distinction, in which those classified as 
Indians were liable to pay tribute to the state and church in the form of taxes 
and enforced labour (mita) (Harris 1995:34).
The terms mestizo and cholo originated in the sixteenth-century Spanish 
colonial legal tenets, designed to classify the population within a distinct caste 
system based upon their relative Indian and Hispanic pedigree (Seligman 
1999), as the following quote reproduced from a colonial text illustrates:
“From the male Spaniard and female Indian results a royal mestizo;
from the royal mestizo and female Indian, a cholo is born; from a cholo
and female Indian, a common mestizo” (cited in Seligman 1989: 696)
During the colonial period, the mestizos while occupying an ambivalent social 
status vis a vis the colonial powers, nonetheless enjoyed economic privileges 
over the Indian, in particular in being exempt from paying tribute or performing 
mita sen/ice to the Crown (Harris 1995:358). During the Republican period 
following the 1825 revolution in which Bolivia gained independence from 
Spain, the Indian and mestizo and cholo identities became further 
consolidated as an economic and class relation (Harris 1995). The 1825 
revolution did little to improve the lot of the indigenous Indian majority, many 
of whom entered into serfdom working on large rural estates (haciendas) 
owned by a feudal oligarchy comprised of families of Spanish descent.
During the early part the 19th Century the continuing existence of Indian 
communities (Ayllus) whose socio-economic practices were based on
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principles of exchange, reciprocity and communal ownership of land, 
represented a major obstacle to the expansion of the hacienda system (Gill 
1994). In 1860 a series of laws labelled “liberal reforms” were passed which 
denied Indian communities the right to collective ownership of land, 
establishing a precedent for individual rights to private property (Gill 1994:18). 
By 1930, Indian communities were in possession of only one-third of the land 
they had had held in 1880 (Gill 1994:18).
The late 19th and early 20th Centuries were marked by a shift in economic 
relations, in which feudalism began to give way to modernising capitalism.
The period between 1880 and 1930 saw the rise of tin as Bolivia’s primary 
export and the second great expansion of the hacienda system. During this 
epoch the designation “Indian” underwent significant social and economic 
transformation (Stephenson 1999:2). The liberal project to build a nation-state 
based on capitalist relations of production, sought to mobilise the Indian 
population as a labour force for the expanding hacienda estates and the 
revitalized tin mining centres (following the decline of silver). There was a 
sustained onslaught on indigenous land as the opening of commercial 
markets created opportunities for investment and social mobility (Harris 
2000:3). Those Indians who were not incorporated into wage labour or the 
hacienda system were marginalized onto the most unproductive land. In the 
process, ethnic-caste categories based upon ascriptions of rights, obligations 
and jurisdictions, were transformed and consolidated into class relations 
(Larson 1995:29). The indio became redefined by the white elite as situated
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on the periphery of the new social and economic order constituting the 
“underclass” of the developing nation-state (Larson 1995).
“In the emerging liberal-positivist discourses, the ‘Indian’ was 
reconfigured into an impoverished, hapless, illiterate, and uncivilized 
subject (a far cry from their illustrious Inca ancestors), who remained 
on the margins of the market economy, neither interested in nor 
capable of mercantile initiative or productive enterprise. Of course, the 
naturalisation of the Indian as an immiserated creature living beyond 
the pale of civilization both reflected, and legitimated, erosive 
economic changes unleashed around the turn of the century...In the 
various schemes of nation-builders, Indians were to be converted from 
landholding tributaries into low-cost labourers for the nations mines 
and plantations, or into precarious rural laborers on modernizing 
haciendas” (Larson 1995: 29-30)
During this epoch the mestizo and cholo identities also underwent a 
significant transformation (Stephenson 1999). During the Republican era the 
superior social status of mestizos had continued to be enforced over Indians 
through their position as “intermediaries” acting on behalf of the government 
and hacienda owners, often using coercive force to control the Indian 
communities. During the latter half of the nineteenth century mestizos were 
able to exploit these existing social relations to capitalise on the expanding 
markets. Through entrepreneurial activities such as money lending, renting 
land and buying Indian produce to resell in commercial centres, the mestizos 
were able to appropriate surplus and profit from the Indian’s land and labour 
(Harris 1995).
By the late nineteenth century the mestizo and cholo identities had largely 
taken on an economic and political significance, defining economic activity 
and market position as opposed to racial heritage. The transition from Indian 
to mestizo identity became connected with increased participation in
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commercial markets and a shift from subsistence production to incorporation 
into forms of trade or wage labour, such as mining or domestic service (Harris 
1995:364). The shift in identity from Indian to mestizo could therefore be 
achieved in a person’s lifetime, largely as a result of migration from rural to 
urban areas and often resulted in:
“denial of... one’s past, and one’s origins. This denial frequently 
involved -  and still does -  changing one’s family name...and thereby 
distancing one-self from one’s kinsfolk. Changing one’s clothing, one’s 
diet, and one’s language were crucial indicators, and remain so today. 
We can hypothesise that the coercive control over Indian populations 
wielded by mestizos was certainly facilitated by their radical denial of 
similarity, even when this was contradicted by the ambiguous realities 
of everyday life” (Harris1995: 365).
One of the defining features of twentieth century mestizo identity is that it 
asserts all that is not Indian and a denial of shared cultural roots (Harris 
2000:4). The term mestizo is now often applied to those of Aymara and 
Quechua descent who have shed their ethnic identity in the quest to forge a 
new class position in the national economy (Crandon-Malamud 1991). Internal 
migration and the expansion of urban markets makes them the fastest 
growing social class in Bolivia, and hence fundamental to the nationalist 
project and the cultivation of a unified national identity (Luykx 1999).
3.3 The Chola: at the Intersection of Modem Constructions of Ethnicity, 
Gender and Class
A cartoon from the journal Mujer y Sociedad shows a picture of a woman in 
conversation with a man:
“With her fist raised high, the woman sternly declares: ‘Women have the right 
to demand equality and justice.” At that moment, a maid who has been 
listening behind the door bursts in, crying out: ‘Bravo!’ Surprised, the first
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woman turns to the maid and admonishes her: 7 said women, I did not say 
domestic employees”’ (Stephenson 1999:9)
The transition from mestizo as a racial category to an ethnic and class based 
distinction also gave new meaning to the term cholo, which was often used as 
a slur by the Bolivian elite to signify Indians who attempted to pass 
themselves off as mestizos and hence gain upward social mobility (Luykx 
1999). The use of the term cholo varies throughout the Andes (Crandon- 
Malamud 1991). In La Paz, the most straightforward definition of cholo is an 
urban Aymara operating in the cash economy, but whose ethnic ties identify 
him more closely with indigenous Indian culture than with western values. 
Nonetheless, the chola identity (female cholo) often referred to by the 
diminutive form cholita by the white elite of La Paz, embodies the complex 
intersection of modern constructions of gender, class and ethnicity.
Predominating in the market places of La Paz and El Alto, cholas are largely 
defined by their economic activity, in particular street vending and petty 
trading as well as employment in the informal service sector (e.g. in domestic 
service). The chola has been described as inhabiting a world distinct from 
both rural campesinos (peasants) and the urban westernised mestizo, whilst 
easily interacting with both (Seligman 1989: 694, Stephenson 1999). 
Structurally, cholas occupy a social position at the intersection of the rural and 
urban economies and the indigenous and non-indigenous social worlds. In the 
market place, the cholas are intermediaries between the national-economy 
and local social organisation, brokering not only economic goods but also
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cultural values and political power between the Indian Aymara and the non- 
Indian dominant classes (see Seligman 1989).
The chola cultural identity is marked out most distinctively in their clothing. 
While the mestizo women of La Paz and El Alto assert their assimilation into a 
modern class based society by wearing western clothing (de vestido), the 
chola’s affinity with traditionalism is expressed through their distinctive attire of 
the multi-layered skirt (pollera), shawl (manta), embroidered blouse and 
bowler hat (or derby). While the pollera is seen by all social classes as being 
uniquely Aymara, in many respects it is an “invented tradition” originating in 
the clothing worn by sixteenth century Spanish women (Gill 1994:105). By 
the late eighteenth century urban Aymara women who had become involved 
with commerce, began to adopt these styles to distinguish themselves from 
the rural campesinos or lindios\ The bowler hat (derby) was only introduced 
following the second world war, replacing the panama hat that was worn by 
cholas in the early part of the twentieth century. The most fashionable and 
expensive derby -  the Bosalino -  was initially made in Italy exclusively for the 
Bolivian market (Gill 1994:105). Factory-made pollera are favoured by the 
cholas (as opposed to the home-spun clothing of the campesino) and good 
pollera are very expensive, much more expensive than the western clothing 
worn by mestizo women (de vestidos). The importance placed by chola 
women upon the quality of pollera as a symbol of ethnic and gender pride, is 
evident in the explanation Doha Maria (a resident of El Alto) once gave to me 
for why she married her first husband:
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I got married so I could buy clothes - when I was at home 
and working my parents used to shout at me if I bought 
things - 1 worked from 15-1 used to see my friends at the 
age of 18 dressed well in good pollera and I used to say why 
can’t I dress like that - 1 can have better clothes if I get 
married - so I got married - 1 always wore pollera I never 
wore de vestidos - there are many beautiful pollera - when I 
got married I could afford to buy pollera - 1 felt very happy - 
my husband bought me lots of pollera - 1 had a beautiful 
pollera for my wedding.
During the twentieth century the term chololchola emerged as a social 
category identifying those Aymara who mediate socially and economically 
between the Indian and criolla classes. The turn of the twentieth century, with 
the expansion of the hacienda system, the boom in tin exports and the growth 
of urban markets, saw the consolidation of a Bolivian urban upper class 
consisting mainly of mining entrepreneurs, rural landlords (hacienda owners 
who lived in the city) and a small but growing group of professionals (Gill 
1994). During this period the cholo population in the city of La Paz expanded 
significantly. Those Indians who became part of the hacienda system were 
often obliged to reside for periods of time in La Paz to complete personal- 
service for the hacienda owner. Rural campesinos also began a process of 
semi-permanent migration to the city in search of wage labour to supplement 
the declining returns of subsistence agriculture from their diminished plots of
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land in the altiplano. These rural migrants eventually became absorbed into 
the informal urban labour market (Gill 1994; Stephenson 1999).
Many migrant women entered domestic service working as cooks for upper 
class households (Gill 1994). Domestic service in La Paz was not only crucial 
for the economic survival of migrant Aymara women, but also for the class 
identity of women of high La Paz society, the “senora”. The social position of 
the senora, depended upon the presence of the chola to perform the labour 
traditionally assigned to women by the patriarchal order of Bolivian society 
(GilH 994). However, Gill (1994) asserts that despite their differing class and 
ethnic positions, the senora and her chola servant occupied a similar 
structural position as gendered subjects in the criolla household, both 
answering to the male head. Within the dominant construction of ideal 
womanhood among the upper classes, the expectation was that the senora 
should be meek, submissive, religiously devout and fertile. Female sexuality, 
as conceived by the upper classes was closely tied to notions of purity, 
chastity and family honour, which were fiercely guarded by men (Gill 
1994:21). Stephenson (1999:20) asserts that throughout the first decades of 
the twentieth century these idealised notions of gender, ethnicity and class 
converged in the image of the “healthy mother” as an emblem of the 
developing modern nation:
“nationalist discourses invested the maternal body of the upper-class 
woman with a sense of national, public duty; the healthy future of the 
nation depended on her” (Stephenson 1999:20).
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Nonetheless, these idealised notions of womanhood and motherhood were 
also riven with contradiction (Gill 1994). Women of the upper classes rarely 
challenged patriarchal social relations in the household. Nonetheless the 
desire to gain access to an education and a profession gave rise to increasing 
efforts on the part of the senoras to obtain full political and social rights 
(Stephenson 1999:21). Whilst the 1920s saw the rise of numerous women’s 
organisations, the senoras effectively blocked any participation of the working 
class cholas from debates concerning the political and social rights of women 
(Stephenson 1999).
Although the cholas did not enjoy the social privileges bestowed upon their 
criolla mistresses by virtue of their class position, they exercised a good deal 
more autonomy over their economic activity. Historically, cholas had 
exercised a much greater economic independence than had their upper-class 
mistresses. The relative economic autonomy of the female chola is rooted in 
colonial times. Under colonial legislation, intermarriage between an Indian 
woman and a Spanish male gave both the female spouse and her daughters 
access to resources which were unavailable to Indian men and their sons 
(Seligman 1989:704). Illicit unions with Spanish men, although often 
associated with ‘immoral’ behaviour (ie prostitution and promiscuity), also 
gave Indian women the opportunity to develop economic survival techniques 
which supported their autonomy and independence as matriarchal units 
(Seligman 1989:704). In late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
diminishing access to land and skewed traditional inheritance patterns
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(favouring land being passed from father to son) served to increase Aymara 
women’s participation in the newly expanding commercial markets.
Within the traditional Aymara household, women’s economic activity was not 
bound by the same patriarchal relations which determined women’s position 
in the cholla household. Much has been written in the anthropological 
literature about the concept of gender complimentarity in traditional Andean 
cultural and economic systems, which is understood as fundamental to 
Andean socio-economic organisation, cosmology and kinship (Isbell 1976, 
Lambert 1977, Allen 1988, Larme 1998, Harris 2000). According to Harris 
(2000:164) the Aymara terms for man or husband (chacha) and woman or 
wife (wanmi) can be combined into a single concept - cachawarmi -  which 
refers to the conjugal pair as a unit, symbolically representing many of the 
fundamental relationships of traditional Andean society. The linking of male 
and female in a complementary relationship is explicit throughout Andean 
cosmology. For example, the sun and moon are conceptualised as a male 
and female duality, as are the Pachamama (mother-earth) and her male 
counterpart, the mountaintops (Harris 2000:166). Cachawarmi -  the man- 
woman duality -is  also the principle for the organisation of the peasant 
household, the basic unit of the traditional Andean economy (Harris 
2000:165). In rural Aymaran communities, women play an essential role both 
in carrying out political and religious duties, and economically as primary 
producers. The traditional division of labour in rural Aymara communities in 
which women handle, process and serve food and control the outflow of cash, 
also prepared women for market trading. Market women usually exercised
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direct control over their income, often earning more than their spouses and 
sometimes economically maintaining the household (Stephenson 1999).
In this urban context the cholas occupied an ambivalent ethnic, gender and 
class position. While the upper classes derided them as being indios, the 
Indians tended to view cholas as more like whites as a result of their urban 
living. The cholas also sought to distinguish themselves from their rural kin 
whom urban society castigated as uncivilized and un-modernised. In the 
class-ridden urban society, Aymara women encountered new concepts of 
“appropriate female behaviour” which came into conflict with traditional 
Aymara constructions of gender in which women participated with men in 
many aspects of production and reproduction, and were not relegated to the 
“private” sphere (Gill 1994). Historical accounts suggest that cholas entering 
domestic labour often suffered sexual abuse by male employers, and verbal 
and sometimes physical abuse from female employers who treated their chola 
domestics as “clumsy, misshapen beasts of burden who did not have the 
same physical and emotional needs as themselves” (Gill 1994:25). These 
oppressions were extremely powerful in the way that Aymara women began 
to construct their identity in relation to La Paz society (Gill 1994)
Cholas often refused to abide by many of the constraining gender norms 
which ran through upper-class criollo society (Gill 1994). Survival in the 
competitive market place of the modernising Bolivia required skills of 
individualism and entrepreneurship. The modern day image of the chola as 
engaging in “wheeling-and-dealing”, throwing insults at rivals and standing
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their ground in the market (see Seligman 1989), also appears in historical 
accounts of how cholas negotiated their identity and position in Bolivian 
society. Gill (1994:24) notes that cholas were not averse to filing complaints 
with police about alleged instances of slander by other cholas demonstrating 
a sense of autonomy that was not evident in their criolla mistresses:
“In 1933, for example, Clixta Zambrana accused two other cholas of 
repeatedly insulting her in public. According to Zambrana, they called 
her a ‘rotten bitch’ screamed that ‘she slept with all the drivers, 
lieutenants and other bastards from the police’ and sneered that ‘during 
the absence of your lover, you got pregnant by another man and then 
aborted to escape the beating that (the lover) was going to give you’. 
She told the court that the purpose of these insults was to ‘make me 
hated by the society in which I live,...and I cannot permit this because 
it results in damage of my honor which is the most important’” (Gill 
1994:24)
By the 1930s the white urban elite had constructed and reinforced through 
legislation the foundations for a highly unequal social order based upon 
classification of class, ethnicity and gender (Gill 1994:20). The upper classes 
subscribed to a social Darwinist view, which asserted their “natural” 
superiority over the Indian population based on their racial descent. Within 
this social paradigm the Aymara were deemed to be biologically inferior to the 
white elite, thereby conferring the right on the upper classes to rule the 
country and the Indian masses. Indians were excluded from the major 
institutions of national life, with entry to the education system being restricted 
to the upper classes (Gill 1994).
Attempts were made by the upper classes to establish legal boundaries to 
separate the cholas from full participation in La Paz society. In 1935, a group 
of sehoras organised a campaign to prevent the cholas from using the
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streetcars. Supported by public health paradigms relating to hygiene and 
infection, the pollera, became imbued with notions of the ‘unclean’ and 
‘diseased’ body of the native (Stephenson 1999). The ban on cholas using 
public transport was announced as a public health measure to prevent 
disease and contagion, as the following announcement made by City officials 
demonstrates:
“It is categorically forbidden to allow any large bundles or packages on 
the cars that might come into contact with other passengers; the same 
goes for people who are visibly dirty or whose clothing smells or might 
contaminate passengers. Any passenger has the right to demand that 
the conductor get these people off the streetcar” (cited in Stephenson 
1999:142)
However, the 1930s also saw the rise of new left-wing political parties which 
began to challenge the status-quo, raising public debate on a range of social 
issues and organising peasants and workers into militant unions (Gill 1994). 
During this era working class women’s organisations began to emerge, in 
which cholas began to identify themselves as Bolivian citizens with the same 
rights to privileges guaranteed to the upper classes (Stephenson 1999). The 
demands of chola women for citizens rights were based on the notion of their 
sacrifice to the nation-state as widows, mothers, sisters and daughters of men 
killed during the Chaco war (1932-1935) in which Bolivia was defeated by 
Paraguay (Stephenson 1999:24).
Those women most affected by the ban on using streetcars were the cholas 
who worked as cooks and domestics. In retaliation to the legislation, a group 
of cholas formed a militant cooks union (the Union Sindical de Culinarias) and 
marched to the offices of the city officials to demand the ruling be revoked
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(Gill 1994). The cooks union was one of the founding members of the 
umbrella organisation of women’s labour unions, the Federation Obrera 
Feminina (FOF) which was responsible for organising large-scale street 
demonstrations of cholas during the 1930s. For example in 1938 two 
thousand street vendors took to the streets in a demonstration calling for the 
construction of market places by the authorities, having been displaced from 
the streets where they had conducted their trade (Stephenson 1999:24). One 
of the founding members of the cooks union described events thus:
“All of a sudden we couldn’t ride the street cars, The senoras said to 
us, These cholas, these women with their baskets. They tear our 
stockings’...the word went around the market that we would meet at 
the door of the municipality...The municipality was filled with cooks and 
cholas. When I arrived we went into Senor Burgaletas office and 
asked, ‘Why can’t we get on the streetcars? The streetcars are for 
cholas, the maids, not for the senoras. The senoras use automobiles. 
The streetcars are for the people who work” (cited in Gill 1994:32).
Efforts were also made by the city’s ‘hygiene police’ to impose routine health 
examinations on domestic employees of the senoras. Chola domestics were 
made to stand naked in front of the police who looked at their bodies for signs 
of infection (Stephenson 1999:143). The cooks union raised an immediate 
protest to the examinations, objecting that they took place in the same 
location where prostitutes were examined for venereal disease and issuing a 
statement that its members were “healthy clean people who lead an 
honorable life” (Gill 1994:34). In spite of the efforts of the women’s labour 
unions to resist discriminatory legislation, a range of measures were imposed, 
including medical and health reforms which regulated the activities of the 
chola, including where she could give birth (Gill 1994).
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Drawing on Mary Douglas’s notions of purity and pollution, Stephenson (1999) 
suggests that the chola occupied an ambivalent cultural and class position, 
crossing the boundaries between Indian culture and the urban mestizo and 
criolla society. In this context, the pollera, which visibly depicted cultural and 
racial difference, came to be seen by the upper classes as the embodiment of 
social disorder and the symbol of an ignorant, disorderly and polluted body. 
This view is supported by the following description given to me by a mestizo 
woman in El Alto of the difference between women de poliera and woman de 
vestido:
Women from the campo [countryside] are dirty -  sometimes 
their smell is unsupportable -  when the doctor asks why do 
we get illnesses women do not talk -  the doctor says 
because we do not use soap. Women in pollera smell of 
urine. The women of pollera are more ignorant than women 
de vestido -  those in vestido have an education -  those in 
pollera do n o t-  this is the difference -  the ignorance of the 
people. My grandmother; my mother-in-law and my mother 
were de pollera - 1 do not want people to say to my son hijo 
de chola [son of a chola/ -  his education is the most 
important thing -  women in pollera are shouted at more than 
women de vestido
A woman of pollera also expressed her perception of the difference between 
women de vestido and those de pollera:
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“Up to five years ago women in pollera were not allowed into 
restaurants or hotels. That has changed -  now they can 
study- before they weren’t allowed to study. Things are not 
equal between vestidos and pollera but are becoming more 
equal...l have heard people say that when women in pollera 
stand up you can smell a bad smell...Life for women of 
pollera is more difficult than for those de vestido most of 
those in pollera do not know how to study -  they do not have 
education -  for this some that grew up here [El Alto] they 
wear trousers -  but those of the campo and the provinces -  
those with no education they still wear pollera.
For many urban cholas the pollera has also become a visible symbol of 
resistance to racial, gender and class-based oppression. In the early 21st 
Century the pollera continues to signify racial and class difference, whilst 
remaining a potent symbol of cultural pride and resistance (Stephenson 
1999).
3.4 The Miners and a Class Identity
The cholas experiment with unionisation did not survive the Bolivian national 
revolution of 1952. The national revolution effectively destroyed the economic 
and power base of the La Paz oligarchy, instituting a new government led by 
the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolutionario (MNR) which was a broad based 
coalition of miners, peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie. The 1952
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revolution, in which the miners played a major part, led to the nationalisation 
of the mines, producing important health, education and welfare benefits for 
workers and their families (Gill 2000; Nash 1979).
In 1964 a military coup led by General Rene Barrientos began eighteen years 
of rule by dictatorship, which was characterised by heightened peasant and 
labour repression. A law of internal security gave almost unlimited rights to the 
armed forces to arrest and interrogate citizens (Nash 1979). The Banzer 
dictatorship (1971-1978), which was supported by economic assistance from 
the US, deepened Bolivia’s pro-foreign capitalist internal policy aimed at 
strengthening Bolivia’s export industry. However, the economic growth which 
occurred during this period, was not synonymous with improvements in living 
conditions for the majority of Bolivians. In order to promote economic growth, 
peasants’ subsistence crops were kept at artificially low prices, while the price 
of imported goods such as sugar, rice and oil escalated. In 1974 there was an 
uprising of peasants supported by factory workers and miners, which resulted 
in the massacring of many unarmed Indian and cholo demonstrators. Militant 
miners’ unions continued to organise strikes and demonstrations demanding 
increases in wages, and during the Banzer era arrests in mine centres were a 
daily occurrence (Nash 1979).
Throughout the twentieth century the miners formed the most militant and 
revolutionary segment of the Bolivian working class, and produced some of 
the leading figures in the national labour movement. Nash (1979:2) suggests 
that in seventy years of exploitation, the miners transformed themselves from
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a peasant population with a ‘localised world view’ to a working class with a 
strong class solidarity and collective identity. The relocation and migration of 
rural people to the mining centres resulted in a gradual transformation of 
cultural practices and social organisation in mining communities, creating a 
cultural break and rupture from miner’s indigenous roots (Stephenson 1999). 
By the 1960s and 1970s many mining communities consisted of two to three 
generations who had been born in the mining centres and had few if any ties 
to the rural peasant communities of their grandparents generation. Dislocation 
from the life of the rural peasantry resulted in a gradual undoing of the 
campesino identity, which was fundamental to the formation of the miners 
identity and sense of class solidarity (Stephenson 1999: 87-88). Miners born 
in the mining centres often referred to rural campesinos derogatorily as indios, 
whom they perceived as being less educated and less civilized than 
themselves, despite sharing the same cultural roots (Gill 2000:70).
However, Nash (1979) draws attention to a major contradiction underpinning 
the miner’s class identity. While miners’ class solidarity was grounded in an 
awareness of their exploitation by the state, miners were also locked into a 
relationship of dependency on the mining authorities to guarantee them a 
livelihood. The mining authorities were in turn able to exploit the miners’ 
sense of economic dependency and separation from the land of the rural 
peasantry, by cultivating a paternalistic relationship towards the workforce in 
which the mining corporation provided for their basic needs. Indeed Nash 
(1979) observes that the social benefits secured by the miners following the 
1952 revolution tied workers to the mines more effectively than wages.
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Housing was one of the major benefits provided to miners by the nationalised 
mining corporation, COMIBOL. During the 1960s and 1970s corporate 
housing was provided to miners according to a point system based on the 
longevity of the miner’s employment with the corporation, the difficulty of his 
work, and the size of his family, a miner usually had to work five to ten years 
with the corporation before being provided with a home (Stephenson 
1999:89). Nash (1979) in her study of a mining community in Oruro describes 
how the mining settlements consisted of rows of tightly packed houses in 
which the corporation controlled individual use of communal facilities such as 
water and electricity.
One of the most effective forms of control of the mining authorities over their 
work force was the control of access to foodstuffs and other domestic goods 
purchased by women for their families (Stephenson 1999:95). The pulperia or 
company store was the main supply centre for basic necessities such as rice, 
sugar, milk and flour. With few other options to access these goods, women 
were dependent on the pulperia as a primary source of food. It was to the 
advantage of the mining corporation to create this form of dependency as at 
the first sign of militancy by the unions the store could be closed down 
(Stephenson 1999:95). Despite the very poor and extremely dangerous 
working conditions in the mining centres, Doha Katrina an ex-miners wife now 
living in El Alto once reminisced to me about the benefits of living in the 
mining centres:
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We had good houses in the mines -  they were not our own 
houses -  they were the company’s -  they looked after the 
health of the workers - i f  a miner had an accident they would 
take care of him- we had meat every month- 33 kilos -  and 
every week we had 6 kilos of rice, chocolate, coffee -  and 
we had cigarettes. When we left for the city [El Alto] it was 
very different -  we had to look for bread everyday -  much 
has changed -  here things are worse -  it was free in the 
mine -  discounted from my husband’s wages- here if we do 
not have money we cannot buy food. In the mine -  you must 
understand there was secure work -  we did not lack 
anything if the husband worked. Women did not need money 
they would get food from the store and it would be taken out 
of her husband’s wages -  we could get eggs, milk, bread 
and we did not buy them with money -  here it is not like that 
-  here everything is money.
According to Nash (1979) the organisation of the mining family changed more 
radically during the twentieth century than any other institution in Bolivian 
society. The transition from extended kin to conjugal family units in the mining 
communities was also underwritten and supported by the interests of the 
mining administration. Following nationalisation, the mines administration 
recognised the beneficial effects on industrial relations of promoting a stable 
family life and providing miners dependents with benefits such as pension 
rights, education and health care. The mining authorities supported a pro-
177
natalist policy, which extolled the virtues of the large conjugal unit. Large 
families were promoted through a wage policy which provided a subsidy for 
each child and provided support for their education, and social workers were 
sent into homes to teach women improved home-making practices (Nash 
1979:59).
Complementarity of gender relations was (and continues to be) central to the 
construction of male and female identity within the mining communities. The 
mineshaft was identified as a masculine space into which women were 
prohibited from entering. The forging of ones identity as a miner was 
synonymous to becoming a man (Stephenson 1999). Women from the poorer 
families worked in the border areas above the shaft, sorting through the slag 
heaps for ore. These women were poorly paid and received no attention from 
the unions (Stephenson 1999:100). According to the dominant ideology of 
womanhood in the mining centres, a woman’s identity could only be realized 
as a wife and mother. Doha Katrina recalled:
The mine was good for women -  they did not work -  they 
stayed in the house looking after children -  there only men 
entered the mine -  children did not work -  here [in El Alto] 
everyone has to work -  the mine paid subsidies for children- 
a family subsidy and they paid if they were ill.
Despite the prescribed role of women in the mining centres as “housewives” 
women did engage in the political arena at times of crisis. In the early 1960s
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prolonged food shortages at the pulperias culminated in the mobilisation of 
groups of miners’ wives to lobby COMIBOL executives in La Paz, which was 
followed by a twenty-day hunger strike supported by the labour unions 
(Stephenson 1999).
The strength of the miners unions during the 1960s and 1970s lay in the 
strategic position that the miners occupied in the relations of production. Until 
the mid-1980s tin was Bolivia’s primary export and mineral sales accounted 
for the majority of Bolivia’s foreign exchange earning. The miners’ strategic 
position in the national economy and their class solidarity explained some of 
the victories they gained in the face of successive repressive dictatorships 
during this era (Gill 2000:70). However, by the mid-1980s the decline in the 
international market for tin and the relative inefficiency and diminished 
reserves of the state-operated mines made the miners a key focus for the 
government’s neo-liberal restructuring programme (Gill 2000).
4. Restructuring and Reform: The Nationalist Policy Agenda
“According to popular memory neoliberalism arrived in Bolivia on August 29, 
1985” (Gill 2000:12).
4.1 The New Economic Policy
August 29, 1985 was the day that the New Economic Policy (NEP) was 
launched. The NEP was part of the “Structural Adjustment Programme” led by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and was an attempt by the Bolivian 
government to reconfigure the Bolivian economy and bring down
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hyperinflation through instituting a series of austerity measures. The NEP was 
a severe adjustment programme, aimed at reducing the role of the state, 
encouraging private capital and forging cooperation with international financial 
organisations on debt and the cocaine trade (Dunkerley 1990). The irony of 
the NEP was that it was implemented by the same political party (MNR) under 
the leadership of the same president (Victor Paz Estensorro) who had been 
instrumental in nationalising the mines following the 1952 revolution 
(Dunkerley 1990).
The NEP curtailed state subsidies and public sector employment, introduced 
wage freezes, retrenched state agencies concerned with the social welfare of 
the poor, and privatised services particularly in the health and education 
sectors. According to Morales (1992:159) the fundamental problem of the 
NEP was that it was implemented to “staggering and unequal social cost”.
The austerity measures were imposed using martial law and extreme political 
repression of the labour unions. As one peasant union leader described the 
impact of the NEP:
“The government’s statistics don’t reflect the growing number of 
families forced to live in tents; the thousands of malnourished kids who 
get only a piece of bread and a cup of tea a day; the hundreds of 
campesinos who have come to the capital in search of work and end 
up begging on the streets” (Morales 1992:159).
The NEP effectively dismantled the power of labour unions through the 
massive layoff of factory workers and public employees, reshaping the urban 
class structure (Stephenson 1999). The Supreme Decree 21060, enabled the 
government to close the state-operated mines and over 30 thousand miners
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were laid off. In 1986 thousands of miners were dispersed from the mining 
centres. The term relocalizados (the relocated ones) arose from the 
government’s promise to provide ex-miners with new jobs and relocate them 
in other parts of the country. However, the promise to provide alternative 
employment to miners did not materialise for most (Gill 2000:73). Miners and 
their families adopted a variety of survival strategies, many departing to large 
urban centres such as El Alto in search of new employment opportunities. 
Doha Nicanora a health promoter in El Alto once described the impact of the 
NEP to me:
Things have changed here since the crisis in Bolivia -  the 
economic crisis -  after that there were many unemployed -  
they threw out the workers -  workers from all parts of the 
country were thrown out- MNR had won the election 
because they had said we are going to see a rise in jobs -  
they privatised the factories and threw out the miners - all we 
saw were thousands of relocalizados.
Those miners who settled in El Alto joined a diverse and competitive labour 
force. The ex-miners entered an informal economy based on individualism 
and consumerism, in which the old bonds that united them as a working class 
were broken. Establishing themselves in El Alto was not an easy process for 
miners and their families. Most families had to rent accommodation and with 
the loss of employment by COMIBOL, subsidies were no longer available to 
them for basic necessities (Gill 2000:74-75).
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One of the most profound consequences was the dislocation of gender 
relations in the organisation of the miners’ household. Women were pushed 
back into the informal market economy while men were often unable to obtain 
any employment in the new competitive individualism of El Alto (Gill 2000). 
The miners not only lost their source of labour and income but also their 
identity as an organised working class. Within this context of rising economic 
insecurity and social dislocation, women’s work became increasingly 
important for the maintenance and survival of the ex-miners households (Gill 
1994). However, competition was also rife in the competitive world of the 
chola street vendors and many of the mining housewives were unable to 
generate income through street trading. In El Alto many of the mining families 
are now the most impoverished, lacking access to the rural landholdings that 
their campesino neighbours maintain, their subsistence depending entirely 
upon selling their labour in the competitive cash economy of the city. Doha 
Petrona (the widow of an ex-miner) explained to me the different experience 
of miners and campesinos in El Alto:
The campesinos they have a chacra [plot of land] in the 
campo -  us we have to buy things -  if they have a chacra 
they can grow things and sell them -  the people from the 
campo here have more than the people from the mines -  
they have potatoes and they sell them -  we do not have 
chacras -  we have nothing we are very poor - 1 only have 
my work making jumpers and weaving -  with this I pay for
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my children to go to school - i f  I do not pay they will throw 
them out Much has changed -  things are worse here than in 
the mines -  there are many young people and drunks in the 
street because there is no work -  the state does not help 
poor people -  the president said he would support us -  but 
there is no help.
With the decline of state involvement in welfare provision, the church and non­
government organisations (NGOs) became crucial mediators between the 
state and the poor (Gill 2000). In El Alto, NGOs began to proliferate, 
becoming key providers of education, housing, economic development and 
health programmes. Many NGOs targeted women in particular, organising 
mother’s clubs and nutritional assistance to women and children, providing 
women who attended the clubs with staple foods such as oil, flour and milk 
(Stephenson 1999:197). Many women also began to turn to the rising number 
of new church-based groups for social support. In the past twenty years El 
Alto has seen a rapid growth in fundamentalist protestant sects, which 
specifically target the poor and unemployed as new recruits.
The NEP (which continues to inform economic policy) promotes citizens’ 
rights over and above communal indigenous identities, promoting 
consumerism in the face of widespread unemployment, homelessness, and 
hunger. As such, Stephenson (1999:195) suggests the NEP and neo­
liberalism continues to be a polarising force in Bolivian society, segregating 
the population into different social strata according to their ability to consume.
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4.2 Neo-Liberalism and Development Policy
Neo-liberalism, like its nineteenth century liberal variant, is “an economic, 
policy and moral doctrine that posits the individual as the fundamental basis of 
society” (Gill 2000:3), diminishing the role of the state and asserting the ability 
of the market to resolve social problems. Following the introduction of neo­
liberal economic policies in 1985, subsequent governments have set in place 
a series of institutional reforms which have deepened the neo-liberal policy 
agenda.
Some of the most important and far-reaching policy reforms were those 
devised and implemented by the government led by Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada, following the 1993 elections. Gill (2000:47) notes that the SSnchez de 
Lozada government, which headed a coalition of parties, passed a series of 
legal reforms that had two broad objectives: the further configuration of the 
state apparatus and the continuing transformation of the relationship between 
the state and Bolivian citizens. The most important reforms were the 
Capitalization Law, the Law of Decentralisation of Administration and the Law 
of Popular Participation, which had a significant impact on the role of the 
public sector.
Under the Capitalisation Law legal frameworks were set in place for the 
complete privatisation of state enterprises, permitting 50 percent of the stock 
of public enterprises to be sold to private investors, frequently at artificially low
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prices. Profits from Bolivia’s oils, natural gas and mineral reserves passed to 
private corporations, hence reducing the state’s revenue (Gill 2000). Under 
the Law of Decentralisation of Administration responsibility for implementation 
of public sector programmes was passed from central government to the 9 
departmental governments (prefectures). The prefectures became 
responsible for investment in social sector programmes; and administration, 
supervision and control of human resources in health and education. The Law 
of Popular Participation, which was promulgated in 1994, was conceived in 
tandem with the Law of Decentralisation of Administration.
The Law of Popular Participation aimed to decentralise government and 
entrust greater decision-making power to local grass-roots organisations 
(Organizaciones Territioriales de Base -  OTBs). Under the Law of Popular 
Participation a large degree of autonomy was awarded to local governments 
(municipalities) for investment in social sectors, especially health and 
education. Under this law, twenty percent of national tax revenues are 
distributed on a per capita basis to the 314 municipal governments (popular 
participation funds), for local investment. Community based control of social 
resources falls under the mandate of the “Vigilance Committees” (VCs) 
established under the Law of Popular Participation. The VCs are comprised of 
representatives from community based organisations (OTBs) or juntos de 
vecinos (neighbourhood committees). As the majority of the OTBs are largely 
male dominated organisations, especially in rural areas, women’s 
representation on the Vigilance Committees remains limited (Hawkins 2000).
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The Law of Popular Participation appeals to a populatist notion of national 
identity and multiculturalism through devolving decision-making power to the 
local level and promoting a discourse of participation, equity and autonomy of 
citizens. However the reforms set in place during the 1990s have remained 
notably silent on the deepening class divisions that characterise Bolivian 
Society (Gill 2000: 9). Gill (2000:49) notes that in emphasising municipal 
organisation the law effectively ignores the existence of national and regional 
entities that have historically been associated with the struggle of the poor 
against the state. As Don Francisco (an ex-miner living in El Alto) also 
explained:
In the mines the leaders were the workers representatives -  
there were federations of miners -  to make sure we were 
well looked after. Here it is the alcalde [mayor] who is most 
important Here the president of the junto de vecinos talks 
about everything with the alcalde. The alcalde is the 
maximum authority according to the political constitution of 
the state. Because of this there are differences. Here we 
have lost our authority -  we do not have the power to realise 
what we want -  the power is with the civic people -  the 
president of the junto de vecinos -  when we are well 
organised - we have the power to plan for our rights - to 
organise our houses -  but those who do not own houses do 
not have the right to speak -  they only have the right to listen 
-  the junto de vecinos is for the owners of houses. This is
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the civic law- in the mines it was the local law -  all the 
miners were in the syndicate -  we do not have a syndicate 
here -  this is the problem.
Following elections in 1997 a coalition government, led by Hugo Banzer 
Suarez (who 26 years earlier had led a bloody and repressive dictatorship) 
took office. Under Banzer the policy agenda set in place by the Sanchez de 
Lozada government has been consolidated through a further series of “liberal” 
reforms, influenced by the policy framework of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) initiative for Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC). In 1997 the Bolivian government instituted a consultation 
process with civil society (the first National Dialogue) aimed at identifying 
priorities for the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), the 
‘partnership framework’ devised by the World Bank for engagement with 
borrowing countries. As a result, the Government of Bolivia (GoB) produced a 
development strategy, which emphasised four pillars of its policy objective: 
equity (public sector reforms); institutional^ (decentralisation and popular 
participation); opportunity (economic growth), and dignity (eradication of drug 
trafficking). The final objective of the GoB’s development strategy refers to the 
US backed “war on drugs” which, in particular, targets the peasant coca leaf 
producers in the Chapare region. With the closure of the tin mines, cocaine 
has become Bolivia’s most important (although illegal) export. As a result 
many ex-miners and ruined cultivators from the altiplano have resettled in the 
Chapare region, turning to coca leaf production for sale to cocaine producers 
as a means of economic survival. The flourishing illegal trade in cocaine is
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viewed not only by the GoB as a threat to the legal economy, but also by the 
US as a growing danger, the US being the major market for Bolivia’s cocaine 
trade (Morales 1992: 161).
Bolivia was one of four Latin American countries who in 2000 were eligible to 
participate in the second HIPC initiative for debt reduction. As part of the 
strategy for assistance to heavily indebted countries, the World Bank and the 
IMF have devised a poverty reduction framework which obliges countries 
eligible for HIPC debt relief to prepare and implement poverty reductions 
strategy papers (PRSPs). According to the World Bank:
“[This] enhanced framework for poverty reduction [...] seeks to ensure 
a ‘robust link’ between debt relief and poverty reduction by making 
HIPC debt relief an integral part of broader efforts to implement 
outcome-oriented poverty reduction strategies using all available 
resources” (cited in McGee and Norton 2000:7)
The PRSP model although initially conceived of in the context of HIPC debt 
relief, now forms the overarching policy framework for countries receiving 
programme loans from the World Bank and the IMF. The PRSP largely 
replaces the CDF, outlining both policy direction and resource allocation 
criteria for concessional IMF and Bank loans.
According to the World Bank, civil society participation in implementation and 
monitoring of the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) is essential, both for 
sustainability and effectiveness and for building national ownership of the 
development programme (McGee and Norton 2000:8). However McGee and 
Norton (2000) point out a major paradox in the PRSP model. Although the
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intention is that borrowing countries have full ownership of the strategy, the 
PRSP approach was conceived of by the multilateral agencies and is in many 
respects a means of setting conditionalities on debt relief. In promoting 
enhanced donor coordination, the PRSP model also promotes the joint 
interests of the World Bank, IMF and World Trade Organisation (McGee and 
Norton 2000). McGee and Norton (2000:20) cite the concerns voiced by the 
NGO Working Group to the World Bank who in 1999 stated that:
“[...] it is not clear how borrowing countries will be able to stick to their 
national development plans if these differ from the priorities of the 
three heavy-weight institutions. The data on poverty and poverty 
reduction affirm that inclusive and context-specific strategies are 
necessary in order to combat poverty effectively. Thus, as the multi­
dimensional aspects of poverty are being better understood, poverty 
reduction strategies are under threat to fall prey to unidimensional [sic] 
macroeconomic prescriptions” (cited in McGee and Norton 2000)
In preparation for the PRSP the government of Bolivia launched a second 
National Dialogue in 2000, with the aim of mobilising civil society groups in a 
consultation process over the priorities of the poverty reduction strategy and 
the criteria for allocation of HIPC 2 resources. The consultation process 
involved a range of civil society groups including representatives from OTBs 
at municipal level, and representatives from NGOs, the Church and municipal 
and departmental governments. While the stated aim of the National Dialogue 
was to formulate a policy agenda based on municipal realities and demands, 
critics have suggested that the outcome was a PRSP, which was devised by 
central government with the World Bank taking a lead role in its formulation. 
Indeed an IMF/World Bank assessment of the PRSP points out that despite 
apparent efforts to involve poor and marginalized groups in the National 
Dialogue, NGOs and civil society groups have raised questions over the
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extent to which socially marginalized groups (in particular indigenous people 
and women) were represented in the consultation. Concerns were also raised 
over the extent to which consultations were influenced by local decision­
makers and over the highly structured approach taken, which did not allow for 
flexible discussions or promote real participation (IMF and IDA 2001). While 
at the municipal level the discussions focussed on the social dimensions of 
poverty and barriers to poor people accessing resources, at departmental and 
central level the focus of the National Dialogue was on economic productivity 
and criteria for allocation of HIPC funds.
Anthropological studies have highlighted the importance of understanding 
how poor and marginalized groups conceptualise their disadvantage, which 
often varies considerably from the perspective of outsiders and policy makers 
(McGee and Norton 2000:27). Participatory poverty assessments (PPAs) 
have shown how social factors such as gender, processes of social exclusion, 
and ethnicity shape people’s experiences of poverty and determine their 
priorities. Considerable value is often placed by the poor on factors such as 
mobility, autonomy, security and self-respect over and above income levels. 
These qualitative dimensions of poverty are poorly represented in 
conventional approaches to addressing poverty, but offer vital information on 
the most effective policy measures for poverty reduction (McGee and Norton 
2000:27).
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4.3 Health Sector Reform
The reforms to the health and education sectors also need to be understood 
in the context of privatisation and decentralisation implemented through the 
Laws of Capitalisation and Popular Participation. In 1994 the Education 
Reform was approved, transferring much of the responsibility for public 
education to local municipalities, including teacher recruitment and 
maintenance of schools. Similarly responsibility for maintenance of health 
facilities and the hiring and firing of health personnel passed to the municipal 
government. While proponents of the reforms assert that they were aimed at 
improving the quality of health and education services through increasing 
local level control, critics claim that the law represented the further 
privatisation of the public health and education system, forcing many public 
employees to seek employment in the private sector (Gill 2000). The Sanchez 
de Lozada administration also sought to engage NGOs in its vision of popular 
participation. In the health sector many NGOs began to fill the niche in 
providing services that the state sector was no longer able to offer, claiming to 
be doing so more efficiently and effectively and with better quality of care than 
public agencies (Gill 2000).
The central objective of the government’s health strategy is the reduction of 
infant, child and maternal mortality. Bolivia’s health indicators remain among 
the worst in the Latin America and Caribbean region (second to Haiti). In 
2000, Bolivia was rated 114 on the United Nations Development Programme
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(UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI for Bolivia in 2000 stood 
on aggregate at 0.640, a slight decline from 1997 and below the level 
expected in relation to per capita gross domestic product (GDP). The ENDSA 
1998 is the most recent source of health data. While data indicate that 
improvements have been made in health indicators in recent years, Bolivia 
has the worst health performance in the Latin America region as measured by 
infant, child and maternal mortality. The infant mortality rate in 1998 was 
estimated at 67 per 1,000 live births. There are also extreme regional 
disparities in these data, with the infant mortality rate for rural areas estimated 
at 90 per 1,000. Due to insufficient sample size, the 1998 ENDSA does not 
provide an updated estimate of the maternal mortality ratio (MMR). The 
official figure remains at 390 per 100,000 live births, as estimated in the 1994 
ENDSA. Again, this estimate masks great regional variation. In the altiplano 
the MMR rises to an average of 591 per 100,000 in urban areas and 929 per 
100,000 in rural areas.
In the current administration, the Ministry of Health is presided over by the 
political party MIR (the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolutionario), a left wing 
party in a predominantly right wing coalition government. Since 1997, a series 
of policies have been instituted under the health sector reform package aimed 
at increasing access of the poor to basic health services. While the public 
health system has the greatest reach to poor and rural communities, the 
continuing low level of coverage of health services, the low utilisation rates 
(especially among the poor) and the persistently poor health indicators have 
provided the impetus behind the health sector reform process. According to
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the World Bank, health sector issues can be grouped into two categories: low 
coverage of services due to problems of access, quality, supplies and lack of 
community involvement; and 2) low capacity of health personnel to respond to 
the health needs of the population (World Bank 1999).
Poor quality of care has been identified by the MoH and external cooperation 
agencies as a key factor preventing the poorest, indigenous populations and 
women from accessing health services. One of the most neglected aspects of 
quality of care has been understanding and respect by public health providers 
for the cultural values and health care systems of indigenous populations. A 
study on quality of care carried out by WHO/PAHO in 1996 suggests that 
many doctors are educated in a context that rejects indigenous culture as 
being the culture of the “poor and ignorant”, and that providers often 
communicate with clients in a context of cultural, social and gender 
discrimination. The study suggests that poor and indigenous groups are often 
treated as passive recipients of services with little respect for their rights to 
information and quality health care. Lack of ability of many health care 
providers to speak the appropriate indigenous language is also identified as a 
barrier to the poor accessing health services. Many small-scale NGO studies 
on quality of care have documented cultural distance between health 
personnel and service users, as a major barrier to access of the poor to 
health services. Poor communication on the part of service providers is 
identified by WHO/PAHO (1996) as a major contributing factor to low 
utilisation of services. There are now numerous NGO initiatives to improve 
quality of care through training providers to change attitudes and improve
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communication in order to bridge the cultural gap between providers and 
users.
In the context of the Comprehensive Development Framework, the Ministry of 
Health (MoH) has identified 4 strategic areas for the focus of reform to the 
health sector and to contribute to the overall goal of reducing maternal and 
child mortality: 1) control of communicable diseases; 2) reform to the health 
insurance system; 3) decentralisation of the health system; and 4) a basic 
health insurance package (seguro basico de salucf). In the context of the neo­
liberal agenda, which has informed the GoB’s development framework the 
seguro basico is perhaps the most controversial policy in the GoB’s health 
sector reform programme. The seguro basico has been identified by the MoH 
as the principle policy instrument of the health sector reforms, which in effect 
aims to reverse some of the privatisation measures that have been put in 
place since 1985. The seguro basico aims to eliminate the economic barrier 
to utilisation of health services through provision of a comprehensive package 
of services free at the point of delivery. The package includes services aimed 
at tackling the principle causes of mortality and morbidity in Bolivia and 
includes maternal, infant and child health services and some selected 
services for the general population (STI diagnosis and treatment, family 
planning, malaria, TB and cholera treatment).
Although the introduction of the seguro basico appears to have resulted in 
significant increases in utilisation of health services, especially in rural areas, 
a recent evaluation by the World Bank (2000) has pointed to a number of
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constraints in implementation. In particular, the evaluation points to: 
insufficient knowledge on the part of communities of their rights to services 
covered by the seguro basico\ perception among the poorest that they still 
have to pay for health care; lack of community participation in decentralised 
management of health services; lack of reach of services to rural areas, and 
lack of capacity of municipalities to manage health services efficiently and 
effectively.
The main source of funding to the seguro basico is from decentralised 
municipal funds, although the MoH is also now urging all donor agencies to 
coordinate their assistance to the health sector through support to the reform 
process, to which the seguro basico is central. While the health sector 
reforms have received support through the World Bank adjustable loan, donor 
coordination around support to the reforms remains poor. As yet, the seguro 
basico has received limited support, in particular from the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), which remains the major 
external assistance agency providing support to the national reproductive 
health programme.
4.4 Reproductive Health Policy and Programmes
The past decade in Bolivia has seen significant changes in official policies 
concerning population issues. Prior to 1989 Bolivian policy was decidedly pro- 
natalist. The images of the film Wawar Mallku (Blood of the Condor), which 
portrayed imperialist US agencies carrying out enforced sterilisations among
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rural Quechua women, and led to the subsequent expulsion of Peace Corps 
(and other foreign NGOs) from Bolivia in the 1960s, remain strongly imprinted 
in popular memory. However, in 1989 the first national reproductive health 
programme was launched, and since 1991 modern family planning methods 
have been available through government health services (Ranee 1997). 
Despite the integration of family planning services into the health system, 
utilisation of modern contraceptive methods remains low. The 1998 ENDSA 
estimates use of modern methods of contraception to have increased from 
18% of women of reproductive age in 1994 to 25% in 1998.
Throughout the 1990s significant strides were made in the development of a 
national population policy. In 1994, a major initiative entitled Plan Vida (1994- 
1997) was launched which had the specific objective of reducing maternal 
mortality. In the same year, the Bolivian delegation to the International 
Conference on Population and Development stated that central to the 
Government of Bolivia’s reproductive health approach was “respect for 
women’s decisions concerning sexuality, fertility and democratisation of 
women’s role in the family”. The official Bolivia country statement for ICPD 
was subsequently produced as the Declaration of Principles on Population 
and Sustainable Development The Declaration which constituted the first 
national population policy, emphasised access to reproductive health within 
the framework of primary health care as central to policy objectives of 
sustainable economic and human development.
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The rights discourse in Bolivia’s population policy was further strengthened in 
the Bolivian Declaration to the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) 
in Beijing 1995. The Bolivian Declaration to FWCW stressed “the fundamental 
right of couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number of 
children and the spacing of pregnancies within the context of equal rights of 
men and women”, providing official recognition of the reproductive rights 
discourse (Ranee 1997). In 1995, the national reproductive health strategy 
was reformulated as The Women’s Health Programme (1995-1997), which 
provided a broader interpretation of reproductive health than that incorporated 
within Plan Vida, based upon the ICPD and FWCW definitions of reproductive 
health and rights. A National Safe Motherhood Committee was convened in 
1996, which according to Ranee (1997:12) “... augured new advances in the 
prevention of maternal deaths”. However, Ranee (1997:12) suggests that the 
emphasis placed on safe motherhood in the Bolivian reproductive health 
programme is an essentially conservative discourse, emphasising a bio­
medical concept of maternal health whilst failing to consider the historically 
specific political and economic contexts of maternal mortality. Similarly Morsy 
(1995) suggests that the emphasis placed on addressing maternal mortality in 
reproductive health policy has the potential to co-opt uptake of family planning 
services at the expense of addressing the structural basis for maternal ill 
health.
The current reproductive health programme is described in a document 
entitled “Programa Nacional de Salud Sexual y Reproductiva”, produced by 
the Government of Bolivia/MoH (2000). The document describes a package
197
of interventions based upon the Cairo and Beijing commitments to sexual and 
reproductive health. The common perception among donors and NGOs is that 
the document describes a very broad based programme with no clearly 
defined priorities. As a consequence, activities in the sector continue to be 
fragmented and largely defined according to the specific interests and 
objectives of donors and NGOs active in the sector. Over 80% of finance for 
the national reproductive health programme comes from these external 
sources (Hawkins 2000).
In 1999 a National Forum on Sexual and Reproductive Health was convened 
with the aim of bringing together key actors in the reproductive health sector, 
including Government, external cooperation agencies, NGOs, technical 
assistance agencies and private sector providers, to share information and 
coordinate activities. USAID is by far the largest bilateral donor to the national 
reproductive health programme and as such USAID has also been the most 
influential in defining the profile of reproductive health activities implemented 
over the past decade. In addition, USAID supports the salary of the Director 
of the National Sexual and Reproductive Health Programme. However, the 
Director of the National Programme reports to the Director General of Health 
Services, whose salary is paid by the World Bank. This financing 
arrangement has created internal tensions within the MoH over the 
relationship between the national reproductive health programme and the 
policy direction of the health sector reforms. All services which come under 
the national sexual and reproductive programme are now included under the 
seguro basico de salud. Indeed the Director General of Health Services
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expressed the view to me that “one cannot now talk about reproductive health 
without talking about the ‘seguro basico’”. However, USAID is fundamentally 
ideologically opposed to the principle of supporting free provision of services 
through the public health sector, which is the principle on which the seguro 
basico is founded. One USAID representative once expressed the view to me 
that “it is not the place of USAID to be subsiding free health services in 
Bolivia”.
The vast majority of USAID funds to reproductive health activities bypass 
government, either being channelled through the USAID devised NGO 
network (PROCOSI) or through USAID cooperating agencies. Of the total 
fifty-nine organisations which participate in the National Reproductive Health 
Forum, 40 are NGOs which are either USAID cooperating agencies or 
members of PROCOSI. Over 80% of NGO activity in the reproductive health 
sector is supported by USAID. The NGOs supported by USAID form part of 
what Gill (2000) has termed the new group of neo-liberal NGOs, who have 
filled the niche in health service provision left by the retrenchment of the 
public sector. The USAID funding framework encourages NGO service 
providers to be self-sustaining through a policy of cost-recovery based on 
charging user fees. The NGO network active in the reproductive health sector 
embodies the neo-liberal principles of entrepreneurship, individualism and 
competition (see Gill 2000:138). As a result, the majority of NGO service 
providers in the reproductive health sector have not signed agreements with 
municipalities to provide services through the seguro basico .As Gill (2000: 
140-141) notes:
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“The sole purpose of the neo-liberal NGOs [...is] to implement the 
social policies mandated to Bolivia by powerful international 
organizations. To this end these organizations...[operate] as private 
sector alternatives, or replacements, for public sector service delivery 
and offer[...] ‘targeted’ programs especially designed for certain 
sectors of the population, such as poor mothers and young children”.
The Director of one of the leading NGOs concerned with maternal health and 
quality of care, once expressed to me her view of the problems of delivering 
the ICPD and FWCW agenda of sexual and reproductive health and rights to 
poor Aymaran communities:
In this country we do not know how to ask for our rights -  we in this 
country do not think we have rights to services or rights with our 
husbands. Cairo and Beijing has not got down to the communities 
because these issues of sexual and reproductive health and rights will 
have to move deep rooted beliefs. We need to know how to talk to 
communities about these issues. Aymara people have a different belief 
system, these concepts are foreign to them. How do you suddenly talk 
to people about sexuality when they have never talked about sexuality 
before.
The Aymara use a different belief system and they use a 
different timeframe- they will say I must get fitted with an IUD [intra­
uterine device] but they get pregnant again and then they want an 
abortion. I have a maid in my house - she is a cholita -and I explained 
to her all the options of family planning without trying to push her into 
using one- but then she got pregnant and wanted an abortion.
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The question is how to help -  when they also have the right to 
decide what they want to do -  but I also have the responsibility to help 
a person -  we need to know what way to talk to them about health 
sexuality and rights. We need to know culturally appropriate ways to 
talk to them about sexual and reproductive health and rights.
5. Conclusion
This chapter has begun with a historical account of the emergence of post­
colonial categories of identity and difference, and has suggested that the 
transformation of racial identities, in particular those of the indio, mestizo and 
cholo/chola, into class based categories was connected to the growth of 
global capitalism. The chapter has argued that by the mid twentieth century 
the white urban elite in La Paz had constructed a highly unequal social order 
based upon classifications of class, ethnicity and gender, in which (supported 
by a social Darwinist paradigm) the Aymara majority were deemed to be 
biologically and socially inferior to the criolla elite. This paradigm was 
supported by public health discourses relating to hygiene and infection, in 
which Indians and cholas became associated with notions of the unclean and 
diseased native body.
The chapter has also traced the emergence of a class identity among 
sections of the chola and mestizo population during the early part of the 
twentieth century, and in particular the emergence of the miners as a 
consolidated working class. By the mid-1980s, the power of the miners unions
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which lay in the strategic position that they occupied in the relations of 
production, began to be undermined as the mines became the focus for the 
state’s neo-liberal restructuring programme. The austerity measures 
implemented under the government’s Structural Adjustment Programme, 
resulted in the closure of many of the state owned mines and the relocation of 
mining families to newly developing urban centres such as El Alto.
Finally this chapter has charted how, following the introduction of neo-liberal 
economic policies in 1985, subsequent governments have set in place a 
series of institutional reforms which have deepened the neo-liberal policy 
agenda. Policy reforms to the education and health sectors, which 
emphasised privatisation and decentralisation, have been further 
consolidated under a series of liberal reforms, influenced by the policy 
frameworks of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the 
initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Countries. In the mid-1990s, following 
ICPD, Bolivia produced its first national population policy which was based on 
principles of sustainable development and reproductive health and rights.
This chapter has suggested that reproductive health policy has been 
assimilated within the neo-liberal policy agenda, central to which has been a 
discourse of decentralisation, privatisation, popular participation and citizens 
rights. In the following chapter, I consider how the historical and structural 
conditions of exploitation and inequality outlined in this chapter, ultimately 
shape how poor Aymaran women in El Alto experience their health and 
reproduction, and underpin their encounters with local institutions mandated 
to implement national policy frameworks.
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Chapter 4
Strategies of Domination, Resistance and Negotiation 
(Reproductive Health Strategies Among Migrant Aymaran Women)
“There is no social agent who does not aspire, as far as his circumstances 
permit, to have the power to name and to create the world through naming: 
gossip, slander, lies, insults, commendations, criticisms, arguments and praises 
are all daily and petty manifestations of the solemn and collective acts of naming” 
(Bourdieu 1991:105).
1. Background to the Fieldwork
Luykx (1999) has observed that the problems involved in setting up and carrying 
out fieldwork often tell us as much about the social and political context in which 
institutions and agencies operate as does the actual data produced. My 
experience supports this observation.
My intention at the start of my fieldwork was to carry out a form of “discourse 
analysis”, which considered the relationship between international agency 
discourses on sexual and reproductive health and the discourses of women in 
specific local social contexts. In order to carry out this research agenda, I initially 
made contact with an international (US based) NGO, which was supporting 
sexual and reproductive health programmes throughout Bolivia. I had decided to 
carry out my fieldwork among migrant communities in an urban context, as the 
majority of these populations would be bi-lingual or at least conversant in 
Spanish. I decided that El Alto, with its proliferation of NGO’s and proximity to La 
Paz, was an ideal location for my research. I was aware (through a previous visit
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to Bolivia) that the US based NGO (which I shall refer to here as HOPE1) was 
working in collaboration with a national NGO (which I shall refer to as Salud 
Sexual y Reproductiva or SSR) on a project in the city of El Alto, training local 
women in peripheral and under-served zones of the city to become community 
promoters. The promoters were being trained to provide reproductive health 
information to their neighbours as well as to sell socially marketed condoms. The 
project was operating from the SSR clinic in El Alto, utilising its existing 
community health team to train and supervise the promoters.
SSR is one of the most established sexual and reproductive health NGOs in 
Bolivia, and is also an affiliate of an international network of sexual and 
reproductive health NGOs. Having started life as a feminist collective promoting 
sexual and reproductive rights and women’s empowerment, SSR has latterly 
become a major conduit for external agency funding to sexual and reproductive 
health activities, in particular for USAID funds. SSR has a network of clinics in all 
the major urban centres of Bolivia, the majority of which include community 
based outreach programmes. I arranged my initial 2 months of fieldwork through 
my contact with HOPE, and was able to make direct contact with the community 
health team in El Alto and through them a group of 12 “promoters”, whom I 
visited on a regular basis.
There were five women (community promoters) with whom I maintained the most 
regular contact during this initial research period. Maria Jose2 who was a trained 
nursing auxiliary, was the only promoter who was de vestido. Doha Patricia and
1 The names of all organisations referred to in this chapter have been changed.
2 All names of individuals referred to in this chapter have been changed
204
Dona Nicanora (who were neighbours) were particularly well versed in local 
health knowledge, and were the source of many fascinating stories and insights. 
Perhaps the most interesting family for me at the time were Dona Nicolesa and 
her daughter Elena. Dona Nicolesa appeared to fulfil effortlessly the multiple 
roles of being a health promoter for the NGO, a partera (traditional midwife) and 
a yatiri (traditional healer). In the course of my fieldwork I became the madrina 
(Godmother) to Elena’s youngest daughter Julia.
One of my main observations during this period of fieldwork was that promoters' 
discourses on health and reproductive health shifted significantly (and often in 
apparently contradictory ways) according to the context of our conversation. For 
example very different conceptualisations of health were expressed according to 
whether we were talking about their work as a community health promoter, their 
personal experiences as poor Aymaran woman in El Alto, or their perception of 
the reproductive health practices of other women in the community. While 
donning their hats as health promoters, all espoused the virtues of modern 
contraception, however none of these women had ever used any of the methods 
they were promoting nor (with the exception of Elena) did they seem to have any 
intention of ever doing so. At the same time they cast many aspersions on their 
neighbours for their similar lack of interest, and hence their own inability to sell 
many of the socially marketed products they were supposed to be promoting. For 
me, a major question at the time was what their motivation was in becoming 
promoters for the SSR programme (which they seemed to have little interest in 
using themselves), and for which the economic motivation of selling condoms 
was clearly minimal. The answer seemed to lie in the symbolic value that these
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women placed on receiving training (and therefore access to a form of education) 
and the symbolic capital gained through their linkages with the NGO.
This initial block of fieldwork which lasted for two months was intended to form 
the basis for a longer period of field research to be undertaken the following year. 
My interest was to collect promoter’s narratives on a range of issues relating to 
health, and economic, social and domestic life in El Alto. My aim was to consider 
in more depth how these women negotiated their identity as “intermediaries”, 
operating between the interests and discourses of the external agency and those 
of poor, migrant Aymaran women. However, on my return to Bolivia the following 
year, I faced a number of problems in continuing my field-research.
I had only been able to return for this second more extensive period as a result of 
having received research funding from an international donor agency. From the 
perspective of the funder the output of the research was to be a set of “tools” for 
the participatory monitoring and evaluation of sexual and reproductive health 
programmes. However, as Luykx (1999) observes the act of “doing fieldwork” 
brings home the central importance of the unity of theory and method. During the 
course of my initial two-month investigation I had found that I could not exclude 
the central issues of agency, power and social identity from my analytical 
framework. My theoretical approach (as elaborated in Chapters 1 and 2) was 
clearly at odds with the accepted wisdom of sexual and reproductive health 
policy and programmes as promoted by the international donor community. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis returns to a consideration of how the disunity between 
the theoretical and methodological approach elaborated in this thesis and the
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demands of the external funding agency and programme implementers for a 
monitoring tool was addressed in the design of a method which I term the ‘peer 
ethnographic approach’.
I also faced a more immediate problem. Prior to my return to Bolivia, I had 
emailed my research proposal to HOPE for them to share with SSR for their 
approval, which I had duly received. However, on my arrival in Bolivia, I 
discovered that some difficulties had arisen with SSR, which would delay the 
start of my fieldwork. According to HOPE, SSR had some concerns that my 
proposed study on ‘the social contexts of sexual and reproductive health’ was too 
similar to another study carried out by an anthropologist earlier in the year. The 
study they were referring to turned out to by a standard KAP survey of 
reproductive health attitudes and practices, drawn from a sample of over 200 
respondents across the City of El Alto. This confusion regarding the objectives of 
my study served to highlight an ongoing problem throughout my research of 
convincing large implementing agencies of the utility of carrying out small-scale 
local level analyses of ‘social context’, with the active involvement of ‘programme 
beneficiaries’, as a means of assessing the value and impact of their 
interventions.
Nonetheless, it seemed at first that these conceptual difficulties could be 
overcome through a meeting with the Executive Director of SSR. I provided 
another summary of my proposed research activities, explaining the difference 
between my approach and that of a KAP study, and explaining that it formed part 
of a research project for which I had received funding from a major international
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donor (who was also a key player in Bolivia) to develop a participatory monitoring 
tool. A meeting was duly arranged with the Executive Director of SSR and in the 
meantime HOPE contacted the community health team in El Alto and arranged 
for me to meet with them the following day to organise my fieldwork. That 
afternoon, I received a phone call from HOPE informing me that there were 
problems with SSR, the meeting with the Executive Director was cancelled, and 
that the research could not go ahead. The reason I was initially given was that 
SSR did not consider the research to be significantly different from the KAP study 
that had already been conducted, and hence would not be of value to them.
Later that week I was able to meet with a Programme Officer in SSR who 
explained that the reason the research could not go ahead was that the 
promoters in El Alto had recently had a bad experience with two American 
researchers who had been very insulting toward them. Two weeks before my 
arrival the promoters had issued a declaration stating that they would not 
welcome any more researchers to the project and SSR had to respect their 
wishes. While this explanation presented the problem in very sound ethical and 
political terms in which SSR was clearly supporting and protecting the interests 
and rights of the promoters, the explanation did not somehow ring true to my 
situation. I was already known to the community health team and promoters and 
had established a good rapport with them during my previous fieldwork. HOPE 
had also informed me the previous week that the community health team were 
looking forward to my return, and had enthusiastically arranged to meet with me 
again. Being the comadre (co-parent) to one of the promoters I also had my own 
social obligation to visit the family and maintain my contact with them especially
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as I had promised I would return that year to be madrina (god-mother) for the 
retucha (first hair cutting) of my God-daughter.
Once I had finally set up fieldwork through another NGO which I shall call the 
Women’s Research Group (WRG), and had been working in El Alto again for 
some time I visited the community health team, and throughout my stay 
continued to visit the family of my ahijada (God-daughter) regularly. None of the 
promoters or members of the community health team seemed to be aware that 
there had been any previous problems with researchers and simply expressed 
regret that I had not been visiting them as had been planned, and invited me to 
return to the clinic to talk to them whenever I wanted to. In the intervening 
months it became apparent that SSR was under-going an internal crisis, which 
resulted in the resignation of the Executive Director. During this period the NGO 
was very concerned about its image with external funding agencies, and about 
securing ongoing support for its core programmes. While conspiracy theories are 
all too tempting to buy into, this experience serves to illustrate the highly 
politicised and extremely competitive environment within which NGOs 
channelling the large quantities of donor funding earmarked for sexual and 
reproductive activities in Bolivia vie for control over the market. Within this 
environment, research which is not under the direct management and control of 
implementing agencies is often viewed with suspicion and at times seen as a 
threat. The national forum of sexual and reproductive health organisations in 
Bolivia has now established a research and ethics committee, which reviews and 
to a large extent controls all research activities in the field.
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The NGO (WRG) through whom I eventually set up my fieldwork, is not directly 
involved in service delivery, their primary interest being in research related to 
gender, ethnicity and health. My research agenda was much more obviously 
consistent with their institutional objectives than with those of SSR. At the time, 
the NGO was involved in a small project providing training to local women 
running guarderias (nurseries) in the poorest and most peripheral zones of El 
Alto. The guarderias supported by the municipal government, provide day care 
for children between the ages of 6 months and 5 years. The ethos of the 
guarderia is to provide children in the poorest zones of the city with nutrition, 
education and medical care while their mothers are engaged in market trading, 
domestic employment or ad hoc work in the informal sector. The NGO was in 
principle willing for me to make contact with women in the community through an 
initial contact with the workers in the guarderia (who are themselves women from 
the neighbourhood). A meeting was arranged between the NGO and the care 
workers to seek their approval for the research to go ahead. I followed this up 
with a meeting with the care workers from one of the guarderias, located in one 
of the poorest zones of El Alto (which I shall call Zona Rosa) and home to many 
recent migrants. The care workers were very interested and keen to help, and so 
the fieldwork began to take shape.
I was keen to ensure that my presence in the neighbourhood was neither 
considered to be intrusive or exploitative. I spent my mornings helping out with 
the activities at the guarderia, and my afternoons visiting women who had invited 
me to talk to them in their homes. In the first week of my fieldwork a meeting was 
called at the guarderia in which the padres de familia (parents) were invited so
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that I could explain to them my reason for being there. I explained that I was 
interested in talking to women living in the neighbourhood about their everyday 
lives, experiences of living in El Alto, and how they initially came to be living in 
the city. I also explained that I had a particular interest in learning about 
experiences concerning their health and the health of their children. The following 
morning I arrived at the guarderia to find one of the women who had been 
present at the meeting waiting for me in the plaza. She said her name was 
Katrina Quispe and she asked me if I was going to visit her house as her 
husband Don Francisco was also there and would be interested to talk to me. I 
became a regular visitor at Doha Katrina’s house and through her was introduced 
to other women in the locality, her neighbours, a partera (midwife) who lived 
across the street from her, and her husband’s cousin who was also a yatiri 
(traditional healer). In return for all her help I later became madrina for the 
baptism of her youngest son Juan. The carers at the guarderia who were women 
from the local community also introduced me to other women in the 
neighbourhood, and so my contacts developed over the course of my fieldwork 
until I had a network of women whom I visited and talked to on a regular basis. In 
order to reciprocate the time they spent talking to me, I gave regular English 
lessons to their children, which supplemented the English they were being taught 
at the local school.
As time went on, these women became more and more willing to talk to me 
about their daily experiences eking out a living in El Alto; their altercations with 
husbands, neighbours and family; their health concerns and concerns for their 
children’s well-being; and how they perceived the dominant and affluent western
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society typified by the inhabitants of La Paz (which they referred to as the Ciudad 
[City]), and which was embodied for them in particular, in their encounters with 
the doctors from the health centres. Above all, I was struck by the astute and 
insightful commentary that poor, marginalized and socially excluded women gave 
of the historical, social, political and economic context in which their experiences 
of health, reproduction and sexuality were framed, and which raised my doubts 
about discarding local narratives as being unable to provide a reflexive and 
critical account3.
2. The Location
2.1. Zona Rosa
Zona Rosa4 is one of the most peripheral zones of the city of El Alto, and is home 
to Aymara speaking ex-miners, campesinos and market traders. The relocated 
miners live in rows of small adobe (mud) brick built houses with corrugated iron 
roofs, which were built in the Iate1980s with assistance from the Catholic NGO -  
CARITAS. These houses overlook a deep ravine, the upper reaches of which are 
the main refuge site for the zone. Most of the houses in Zona Rosa still lack 
sanitation facilities and the refuge dump also serves as a public toilet for many 
residents. During the rainy season the mud streets turn into channels of open 
sewage, with distinctive bright green puddles forming in the centre of the roads in 
the mid-day heat. Further down the road from the miners houses are small, 
scattered adobe dwellings, which are the homes of recent migrants from the
3 Some o f the data in this chapter were used in parts o f a book chapter (Hawkins and 
Price 2001).
4 All names of places in El Alto have been changed in this chapter
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altiplano. Behind these houses is a disused railway line, which runs alongside a 
row of closed down factories. The railway line also serves as a refuge site and is 
an important source of income for women and children from the poorest families, 
who collect discarded bottles and cans to sell to the factories in the centre of El 
Alto for re-processing.
The streets near the centre of the zone are the most affluent and boast larger 
houses, many of which are constructed from cement brick. These houses are 
mainly owned by Pacenas (residents of La Paz) who have either moved to El 
Alto in recent years in order to be able to afford to buy a plot of land on which to 
build their house, or who have invested in land in the peripheral zones of El Alto 
to build houses to rent. Some of the houses in this area are also owned by 
Altenas (residents of El Alto), the successful traders or commerciantes who have 
bought land on which to construct their own homes. While many of the homes in 
the outer reaches of Zona Rosa lack electricity, the streets in the centre are 
connected to supplies.
In the centre of the zone is the plaza, a flat mud square which serves as a 
football pitch, alongside which is a small market area. On one corner of the plaza 
is a community hall, which was constructed by an NGO during the 1990s and 
now opens once a week for a mothers club, supported by USAID. Opposite the 
mothers’ club is the school, which was closed during most of the time I was 
conducting my fieldwork due to a teachers strike. During the strike teachers 
organised numerous street demonstrations in El Alto, which were often dispersed 
by the army using tear gas, and resulted in two teachers being shot and killed.
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Zona Rosa also boasts several churches. The Catholic Church is situated along 
the main road, which runs to La Ceja (the market centre of El Alto). The Church 
is on the border of Zona Rosa and the neighbouring zone of Villa de la Virgen, 
and is located opposite the main market centre of the two zones. There are also 
numerous evangelical church groups scattered around Zona Rosa and Villa de la 
Virgen.
2.2. Health Care Resources in Zona Rosa
There are three main forms of health care resource available to the inhabitants of 
Zona Rosa: biomedical services provided by government health centres in the 
zone, and by NGO clinics and private physicians in the centre of El Alto; 
medicinas caseras or herbal cures sold in the market and administered by 
women in the home; and Aymara medicine available from indigenous healers or 
yatiris.
Two government health centres serve the residents of Zona Rosa. One health 
centre is situated next to the guarderia on the corner of the plaza in the centre of 
the neighbourhood. A second health centre, which is also used by residents from 
Zona Rosa, is situated in the neighbouring zone of Villa de la Virgen, and is 
located behind the Catholic Church. The health centre in Villa de la Virgen is run 
by one of the only women doctors working in the government clinics in the 
district. Both health centres have been improved and developed as part of a 
District Health Strengthening project, which has been supported by a European 
donor since the mid-1980s.
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The District Health Strengthening Project has been working in conjunction with 
the Ministry of Health to improve primary health care services and increase 
utilisation of government health services in the some of the poorest zones of El 
Alto, located in District X. The goal of the project is to contribute to reduction in 
maternal, infant and child mortality. In the early 1990s the project conducted a 
‘rapid diagnostic study’ of the health situation in District X, and identified the 
following constraints on service utilisation: limited access of the population of the 
district to economic resources; limited autonomy of women which limits women’s 
access to resources; lack of utilisation by women who prioritise their children’s 
health over their own; poor quality of care provided by health services; lack of 
continuity of service providers; inconvenient health centre opening times and 
poor communication between health care providers and the community.
The main approach of the District Health Strengthening Project to increasing 
utilisation of services has been to strengthen community participation in the 
delivery of health care and to improve the quality of care provided at the health 
centres. The main strategy to improve community participation has been training 
members of the community as health promoters (responsible popular de salud- 
RPS) and training traditional health practitioners to develop an effective referral 
system between the health centres and the community. A particular focus of the 
project has been to try to integrate traditional medical practitioners into the 
primary health care system. A focus has been placed on training traditional 
midwives (parteras) in conducting clean deliveries, keeping a register of all births 
and infant and maternal deaths that occur in the community, and referring
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obstetric emergencies to the doctors at the health centre or to the hospital in the 
centre of El Alto. The approach is similar to that adopted by various rural health 
programmes in Bolivia throughout the 1970s and early 1980s (Crandon 1983).
In the latter part of the 1990s the Health Strengthening Project has collaborated 
with a number of USAID supported NGOs in an effort to integrate a sexual and 
reproductive health component into the community health programme. In 
particular, the outreach programme has been designed to reach women in the 
community who have difficulty accessing maternal and child health services. A 
key element of the project strategy is “to address cultural constraints to increase 
use of modem contraceptive methods and use of modern health services through 
culturally appropriate communication strategies effective for the target 
population”. The community outreach programme includes: talks to groups of 
women at health centres on family planning, sexually transmitted diseases (STIs) 
and maternal and child health; education and distribution of condoms by trained 
community promoters; and referral to the health centres and NGO clinics in the 
centre of El Alto by the community promoters and parteras. In recent years 
several sexual and reproductive health NGOs have established clinics in La 
Ceja, most of which function on a cost-recovery basis charging fees for family 
planning, maternal health care, child health services and diagnosis and treatment 
of sexually transmitted diseases. In addition there is a plethora of private 
practitioners with practices scattered around the centre of El Alto.
Medicinas caserns are the most commonly used health care resource among the 
poor in El Alto. These are herbal cures administered in the home usually by the
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mother, in the form of mates.5 The practice of medicina caserns is based on a 
humoral theory and hot/cold dualism, influenced by Galenic medical theory from 
the Spanish colonial era (Crandon-Malamud 1991: 24). It forms part of the 
‘everyday’ knowledge of women and is central to women’s role as healthcare 
providers in the household. Ailments treated in the home fall into the category of 
medicinas caserns until they become serious, when specialist help needs to be 
sought. Within traditional Andean medicine there are many categories of 
specialist healers including herbalists, bone-setters, kallawaya and yatiri. In many 
parts of the Andes the kallawaya tradition is understood as a highly specialised 
and complex body of knowledge, practised by an elite group of indigenous 
healers whose knowledge passes from father to son. The Aymara version 
practised by the yatiri, the diviner of coca leaves, is a simplified folk version of the 
kallawaya (Crandon-Malamud 1991: 43), although in El Alto the term kallawaya 
is often use interchangeably with yatiri.
3. Belief, Knowledge and Symbolic Power
3.1 The Yatiri, the Pachamama and the Hungry Devils
According to Bastien (1982) the principles of specialism and reciprocity are 
fundamental to Andean ethnomedicine. The Pachamama is the essence of 
Aymara preventive medicine. Identification with the Pachamama is made 
explicitly throughout Aymara cosmology, and Harris (2000) suggests that in
5 Mates (pronounced matays) are herbal teas or infusions
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modern Bolivia the Pachamama has almost come to embody the existence of the 
oppressed Aymara majority within the boundaries of the nation-state.
The Pachamama is the giver of life and the force that created the world. The 
Pachamama is the focus of agricultural rites, healing rituals, ceremonies to bring 
luck and prosperity (for example baptism of new vehicles and homes), and 
offerings (such as burial of the placenta) to safeguard the health and well-being 
of the new-born child. In everyday life in El Alto, as elsewhere in the altiplano, 
whenever anyone takes a drink (be it alcohol or coca-cola) it is necessary to put 
a few drops on the earth as an offering to the Pachamama (see Crandon- 
Malamud 1991:125). According to Greenway (1998b) sacrificial offerings made to 
the Pachamama represent the principle of reciprocal relations between humans, 
spirits, the earth, deities and the ancestors. Making offerings to the earth is a way 
of ensuring a relationship of exchange and reciprocity between the deities (the 
cosmological world) and the human (social) world, resulting in a flow of energy 
that generates life, wealth and well-being (Greenway 1998b).
Aymara cosmology also incorporates an array of devils that reside in the earth 
and mountains and are the source of fertility and creativity, as well as danger and 
illness. The mines, for example are presided over by a devil known as the Supay 
or El Tio (uncle) whose female consort is the Pachamama (Harris 2000:209). The 
most distinctive feature of the devils is a rabid hunger, which can consume the 
souls of vulnerable humans. Not only are the mountains, sacred places and 
spirits of the dead classified as devils, but also at times so is the Pachamama. 
According to Harris (2000:210) the Pachamama belongs to a category of beings
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in which the idea of abundance, fertility and generosity is offset by acts of 
aggression and a refusal to give.
The Pachamama often appears in Aymara cosmology as a generalised source of 
illness and may be associated with both good fortune and witchcraft (Harris 
2000). The Pachamama is said to walk the earth at night, often in the form of an 
old woman in poor clothing. The toad is a particularly dangerous manifestation of 
the Pachamama, and Harris (2000) refers to accounts of toads being kept in 
houses in some parts of the altiplano and fed with sweets to ensure good luck. 
Toads are also associated with witchcraft (brujeria), which is commonly held to 
be responsible for swellings of the body and to cause the human body to change 
into a form similar to that of the toad. Doha Alicia a young de vestido woman who 
was born in the mining community of Viloca once described to me an illness of 
her madrina (God-mother) which occurred as a result of an envious neighbour 
using a toad in witchcraft (brujeria):
There was a lot of envy in the mines -  because there was a 
lot of money. There are people there who can make 
witchcraft -  using a yatiri- who believe in the devil -  a person 
who believes in the devil can kill someone with witchcraft.
My madrina was bad to people -  all the men in the mines 
liked h e r- but she shouted at her husband. One of the 
neighbours of my madrina she used a toad -  she took some 
hair from my madrina and a little doll that looked like her and 
she gave the doll the same name as my madrina -  and she
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made witchcraft using the toad. My madrina had a swelling 
that was full of pus -  the toad lived for three years and over 
those three years my madrina changed to look like a toad 
with big eyes -  her legs swelled up like a toad’s -  she went 
to the church, to the yatiri and to the doctor -  but they could 
do nothing -  she became really ugly. Eventually we found 
the person who had done this and we found the toad and 
killed it -  and the next day my madrina died- it was witchcraft 
that killed my madrina.
Dona Felicia a health promoter trained by the District Health 
Strengthening project also described the reason for the recent 
death of a neighbour’s daughter to me thus:
My neighbours’ daughter fell in the water-  in the street- 
there was a toad in the water - in the afternoon she was ill 
with a headache -  the girl was about 4 -  she slept in the 
night and was sick for a week -  she had fallen on a Friday -  
the next Friday she was dead -  they didn’t take her to the 
yatiri because at first they were not worried -  she was their 
only daughter-  she was taken by the hungry devil -  the 
achachillo -  they are yankha -  they always kill.
Doha Felicia’s narrative draws on several supernatural entities to explain the 
death of her neighbours little girl. While the toad is often a manifestation of the
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Pachamama the term Achachillo refers to devils that live in the mountains, rivers 
and under the earth. Achachillos are yankha, an Aymara term which means 
“harmful and noxious to health” (Crandon-Malamud 1991:126). Achachillos are 
also often described as hungry and therefore a threat to vulnerable souls, unless 
fed properly. As Dona Felicia’s narrative illustrates, illness and hence treatment 
therapies are an expression of a cosmology in which the human body and spirits 
are intertwined with the earth and the mountains in a relationship of reciprocity 
(Greenway 1998a). Illness aetiologies represent both the geographical 
embodiment of spiritual forces and the spiritual embodiment of social forces that 
may be dangerous as well as empowering (Greenway 1998a: 993). Lapses in the 
maintenance of reciprocal relations (for example through offerings to feed the 
Pachamama or the Achachillos) will lead to illnesses that may have various 
symptoms often leading to death.
Another sickness category referred to by some of the women in Zona Rosa is 
Kari Kari. While some women I talked to dismissed Kari Kari as a ‘belief of their 
grandmother’s generation, others warned me of the risk they encountered of 
being attacked by Kari Kari while travelling in crowded buses and collectivos 
(shared taxis). The Kari Kari in the colonial era and up until the early part of the 
twentieth century was widely known in the Bolivian altiplano as a phantom that 
appeared in the form of a Franciscan monk, and brought a disease that was 
diagnosable by incision marks left on the victim’s abdomen (Crandon-Malamud 
1991:120). Through these small incisions the Kari Kari was said to withdraw the 
fat from the victim’s kidneys, which was then given to the bishop to make into 
holy oil. Since the 1950s there has been a change in the conceptualisation of the
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Kari Kari. This change indicates that the Kari Kari stands as a clear metaphor for 
relations of exploitation and domination of the Aymara (see Crandon-Malamud 
1991). The Kari Kari is now conceived of as a foreigner a gringo (American) who 
takes the fat from the bodies of poor Aymara (usually whilst in crowded places) to 
sell to the United States to make into medicines and cosmetics. As Doha Felicia 
explained to me:
Kari Kari is not an illness -  a Kari Kari is a person who sucks 
the fat out of our bodies -  they do it on the crowded buses 
and you don’t know it is happening -  Kari Kari are strangers 
- foreigners -  they sell the fat to the factories in America to 
make soap and cosmetics. When the grease has been 
sucked out of a person they die. Kari Kari is not an illness -  
it is a bad deed -  there are some women who know how to 
prepare a medicine to cure Kari Kari -  but it is very 
expensive -  in Villa de la Virgen -  there is only one woman 
who sells it -  when you have Kari Kari you have blood in 
your urine -  my cousin and my aunt both died of this.
Through the divination of coca leaves the yatiri is able to bring luck and good 
fortune as well as cure illnesses of a supernatural causation, such as those 
described above. Traditionally a yatiri may be a man or a woman. Some yatiris 
are born with the gift of divination and healing, for others the skill is acquired 
through surviving an auspicious event such as being struck by lightning. The 
yatiri does not so much possess a body of specialist knowledge as the power to
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divine and to contact the supernatural forces of the Pachamama and her 
consorts (Crandon-Malamud 1991). Doha Felipa a yatiri who has recently 
migrated from the campo to El Alto explained to me how she acquired her power 
of divination:
The power of a yatiri comes from the head and the heart -  
for doctors it is different -  their knowledge comes from 
books. When lightning hits it kills -  but if you live you gain 
powers as a yatiri. Five years ago I was living in the campo -  
I was looking after the sheep and lightning fell - 1 was 
walking and did not bear in mind that there was thunder -  
lightning hit the door of my house and it struck the ground 
where I was walking- it killed four cows- from the lightning 
come people who know how to be yatiris -  the knowledge is 
in your head. Since then I have been able to read the coca.
Yatiris know how to read the coca -  from this they can cure 
-  they can see what has happened. I am a little bit of a yatiri- 
I am still gaining skills- now I can read the coca - but only 
when I am drunk.
There are numerous yatiris in Zona Rosa and during the fieldwork I interviewed 
three on a regular basis. Two had survived being struck by lightning. The other, 
the widow of an ex-miner who was living in a position of extreme social 
vulnerability and poverty (a single mother with three children, and partially 
disabled from polio) suddenly discovered her powers of divination as an
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economic survival strategy. She is now able to earn a living on the strength of her 
recently acquired specialist skills.
The auspicious days for yatiris to practice their art of divination are Tuesdays and 
Fridays, the days of the spirits and for giving recognition to the Pachamama. In 
order to read the coca leaves, the yatiri prepares a mesa (table) for the 
Pachamama, which Doha Nicolesa once did for me to bring me wealth and good 
fortune.
The mesa that Doha Nicolesa prepared consisted of a cloth on which she 
placed a herb, which she explained was a gift for Condor Mamani. Condor 
Mamani represents the force of culture (Aymara culture) that lives in the 
home. Condor Mamani is a protective force, but can withdraw his 
protective power if not frequently remembered and fed (Crandon- 
Malamud 1991:125). Doha Nicolesa placed sweets in the middle of the 
cloth with some white confetti and an effigy of a house and a car (symbols 
of wealth). After this she threw handfuls of coca leaves into the centre of 
the cloth, removing the ones that had fallen the wrong side up. These, she 
explained would bring me bad luck -  and that unfortunately I had a lot of 
them. The sweets and the coca were also for the Pachamama and Condor 
Mamani. She placed llama grease on the sweets and a leaf of gold plate 
for the Pachamama. She then informed me that the Pachamama would 
bring me good luck and health, but that I should also thank the 
Pachamama by leaving 50 Bolivianas on the mesa for her.
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While the details of the mesa often seem to vary, the principle of reciprocity and 
giving to the Pachamama and her male counterpart in the home, the Condor 
Mamani, remains central to the practice. Yatiris may not all bring health and good 
fortune. The yatiri may also be classified as a bruja (witch), depending upon the 
social relations she has established with her neighbours and within the 
community. Brujeria (witchcraft) and the casting of bad luck upon an envious or 
suspicious neighbour is rife in Zona Rosa and other neighbourhoods in El Alto. 
Yatiris abound in the market centre, a whole section of stalls in La Ceja being 
devoted to the sale of coca leaves, dulces (sweets), cigarettes and alcohol for 
the preparation of the mesa. These yatiris who operate in a highly competitive 
market place are often considered by the residents of El Alto to be a source of 
brujeria. Doha Felipa, explained to me:
Some yatiris are not good- they use brujeria -  they are 
brujas -  they say bad things about people and cause trouble 
between neighbours -  there is a place in La Ceja -  in the 
heart of the market in the centre of El Alto -  they are all 
brujas- this place is well known- for example if a person is 
envious of their neighbour they can go to these brujas -  and 
they can cause a bad thing to happen -  the person may 
have an accident. These brujas have kiosks where they sell 
coca leaves and cigarettes and alcohol. Brujas and yatiris 
are the same -  some yatiris are good and bring luck -  brujas 
make bad things happen.
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While yatiris are the main healers sought by residents of Zona Rosa for illnesses 
of a supernatural cause, local constructions of health and illness are fluid, 
borrowing from the different classificatory systems. As will be demonstrated in 
this chapter, the apparently conflicting bodies of knowledge’ represented in the 
indigenous and bio-medical systems are often drawn upon simultaneously and 
without contradiction, utilised as resources through which identity, class, and 
social capital are continually negotiated and redefined (see Crandon-Malamud, 
1991).
3.2. Doctors’ Discourses and The Heaith Belief Model
The health centres in Zona Rosa and Villa de la Virgen appear as clean, white, 
and usually empty obelisks, amid the mud, dust and open sewage that typify the 
landscape of the peripheral zones of El Alto. The doctors, trained in quality of 
care and community health, are perplexed, concerned, and a little irritated that 
their health centres remain largely devoid of patients. Both doctors offer slightly 
differing explanations for the low use of the health centres.
Dra de Silva, is the only woman doctor in the area and is the daughter of a 
mestizo woman from La Paz. She sees the fundamental reason for women’s 
reluctance to use the health centre as one of women’s oppression and women’s 
lack of access to education, knowledge and power. Her task, as she sees it is to 
draw women to the health centre so that she can educate them on ways to 
improve their health, and to offer them means of empowerment, in particular, 
through the use of family planning. While the Dra manages to attract women to
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group talks on health, the main obstacles she encounters are women’s 
reluctance to talk about their problems and their continuing lack of interest in 
using the reproductive health (including maternal and child health) services she 
provides. She explains the situation thus:
Let me tell you about women in our society. They are 
discriminated against in all areas of life -  they lack education 
and are expected to stay in the home and cook and look 
after the children. When you talk to the women here [in Zona 
Rosa] they may not tell you everything- they do not always 
tell you the truth -  they are not used to talking. This is the 
problem. I started giving talks to women at the health centre 
on health and family planning- but I noticed that they are 
afraid to speak -  so I decided to run a group on self-esteem.
I started the group by asking the women to say how much 
they felt they were worth from 1 to 10. The nurse and I both 
gave ourselves 1 0 - but none of the women in the group 
would give themselves more than 4 or 5. Later that day I met 
one of the women in the street and the woman told me she 
was bringing up six children on her own. I said to her ‘then 
you are worth more than me. I have a husband to help me 
and only 2 children -  and you look after 6 children on your 
own -  you are worth 15’. I started the group on selfesteem 
because none of the women would talk.
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The Dra does not see the health problems in the community as relating to 
poverty but rather as a result of ignorance and lack of education:
The people here they aren’t poor; they lack information. Lack 
of education that is the problem. For example, people spend 
money on coca cola which is bad for them. It is a cultural 
issue. It is a habit of the people of El Alto to drink coca-cola.
The traditions of the people here are not good. They always 
have money for dancing and fiestas -  but there is no money 
for food and clothes. People do not appreciate their health -  
they go to the kallawayas, parteras and yatiris, and they 
bring their children to me on the point of death. First they 
consult their neighbours, then they go to the woman who 
sells herbs and those with the kiosks in the market and 
finally they come to the doctor. They do not come to the 
health centre- because they lack confidence in outsiders.
Women prefer to go to the parteras because they have 
confidence in them -  people call Dona Maria [the partera/ 
because they have confidence in h e r- it is difficult to change 
this practice - The only thing that can change this is 
education.
The Dra also considers lack of information to be the essential reason for the low 
level of use of modern contraceptives by women in the zone:
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Women here do not have much interest in family planning- 
they do not give it much attention -  women lack information 
-  they have heard of family planning -  but they don’t really 
know much about it We give infomiation to women here in 
groups. After a lot of time they may come to me for 
information- there are a few people who use a method now -  
but not many. Women don’t say I want family planning - 
because they are subordinate to men- most use the calendar 
method. Language is important when you explain family 
planning to women here- you need to use very simple 
language because they don’t understand -women often 
refuse methods because they are afraid of them -  the say 
that the copper-T causes cancer.
Dr Aguilar is also a mestizo and lives in La Paz. In the afternoons he runs his 
private clinic in the centre of La Paz and in the mornings manages the health 
centre in Zona Rosa. Dr Aguilar has only been at the health centre for three 
months and is very frustrated by the low numbers of people using his services. 
He understands the problem as being related to both poverty and the ‘ignorance’ 
of the Aymara residents of the zone. He explains:
The main reason people do not use the health centres is 
money -  they think it costs them money. It is also their 
customs. Generally when patients do come here it is 
because they are in a bad state -  they say if I go to hospital I
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will die. It is important that we explain to them well about 
their health. Sometimes I do not wear my white coat-  
because it frightens some of them -  but sometimes I have to 
be hard on them and say why did you not bring your child to 
me earlier. They will not go to the clinic to give birth - the 
partera or the mother-in-law attends and then the child or the 
mother often dies. They give more importance to traditional 
medicine and herbs because this is their custom -they lack 
information and education. They prefer to put money in 
fiestas than their health. For this the Seguro Basico is bad 
for these people- it makes them think that if some health 
services are free -  such as maternal and child health -  then 
they are not worth anything- people have to leam to value 
their health. We use the mothers club to try to inculcate a 
value on health -  we tell them about maternal health and 
family planning. In the city it is easier - patients come to me- 
here I have to go out and look for patients.
Both doctors agree that their role is to educate the community on the value of 
good health. For both, it is a ‘moral imperative’ to provide services and public 
health information to those whose beliefs they consider serve them poorly as a 
basis for health behaviour (Good 1994). Both doctors place great faith in 
community based health education as a means of bringing about behaviour 
change to those groups in the population who experience high infant and
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maternal mortality and communicable diseases, having undergone “neither the 
demographic nor educational revolution” (Good 1994:2).
Both doctors subscribe to the ‘health belief model’, which underlies many of the 
health education approaches adopted by the government and NGO programmes. 
The health belief model emanates from social psychology and is closely related 
to behaviourist theories of motivation and decision-making. The model suggests 
that health-seeking behaviour (and we can also include in this fertility related 
behaviour) largely depends upon the value placed by the individual on a specific 
goal and the likelihood of an action achieving a specific outcome (Good 
1994:41). Such behaviourist theories have underpinned many of the behaviour 
change approaches adopted by sexual and reproductive health programmes. For 
example, Mann and Tarantola (1996) have suggested that many of the HIV/AIDS 
prevention strategies developed in the 1980s were largely shaped by a definition 
of HIV/AIDS as a problem of individual behaviour, resulting in public health 
strategies which were based on notions of changing individual risk behaviours. 
Similarly the reproductive health approach of the NGOs supporting the health 
services in Zona Rosa is based upon an understanding of behaviour as guided 
by beliefs and norms, and which implies that if people are educated and provided 
with accurate reproductive health information they will change their behaviour 
accordingly. The Executive Director of one of the NGOs providing training to the 
doctors in the health centres in Zona Rosa and Villa de la Virgen explained to 
me:
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We are basing our programme on an intervention that says 
‘we in the community have rights to our sexual and 
reproductive health’. We have developed a manual to 
facilitate sessions in the community to talk about these 
issues. We have developed a module for ‘rights, access and 
utilisation of services’. The module explains to women how 
to make an accurate decision, and an accurate decision 
needs education. If the pregnant women are not using the 
services, the RPS’s talk to them and invite them fora 
prenatal control. At the centre are posters and they can read 
what their rights are -  they receive pamphlets on questions 
that they should ask the service providers -  but always 
forget -  but they have the right to ask. In the prenatal 
session we talk to the women about pre and neo-natal 
problems -  and tell them about a range of family planning 
methods and about sexually transmitted diseases. We have 
developed a radio soap with 5 spots -  this is based on the 
behavioural change model of Fischbind and Bandura. We 
have adopted this behaviour change model. There are many 
psychological barriers around people accessing health 
services- they are not stupid -  they know that a yatiri cannot 
cure them of a haemorrhage. Everyone in the radio novella 
changes their behaviour -  the doctors, the health provider 
and the community.
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However, as with rational action theory, the health belief model is based upon a 
narrow conception of culture and human action. The theory of culture underlying 
the behaviour change model assumes a ‘universal economic rationality’ in which 
behaviour is understood to be oriented towards a specific goal, in this case 
positive health. Or as Good (1994:42) puts it the theory assumes that “[a]ctors 
weigh the costs and benefits of particular behaviours, engaging in a kind of 
‘threat-benefit analysis’, then act freely on their perceptions to maximise their 
capital”. In this paradigm, culture is understood as a set of ‘beliefs’, many of 
which are premised upon false knowledge. Hence, it follows that if public health 
education can provide accurate information and knowledge to people and get 
people to ‘believe the right thing’ they will use preventive services, obey doctors’ 
orders and utilize medical services appropriately:
“Educate the public... get them to believe the right thing and the problem
will be licked” (Good 1994:7)
3.3 The Mothers Club, the Raffle and the Health Fair: Behaviour Change
Strategies and Symbolic Power.
Both doctors have devised numerous strategies to bring about a change in 
behaviour among their target population and hence boost their health centres’ 
utilisation rates. Dra de Silva concentrates on educating women through talks at 
the health centre. During my fieldwork she carried out a series of charlas (talks) 
on family planning and child health, one of which I was able to observe.
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The Dra had gathered a group of about twenty women to the talk, five of 
whom were health promoters (RPSs) attached to the health centre. The 
Dra explained to me that all the women were there because they were 
keen to leam and be educated. All of the women in the group, except for 
two, were de pollera. Doha Maria the partera was also present. Dra de 
Silva had previously explained to me that she had developed a particular 
relationship of trust with Doha Maria, who refers patients to her if she 
encounters a problem, and informs the doctor of all the births and 
maternal and infant deaths that she encounters in the community. In our 
early meetings the Dra spoke very respectfully of Doha Maria, refemng to 
her as somebody who holds specialist local knowledge and has the 
respect of the women in the community, delivering most of the births in the 
zone.
The talk was about family planning. First, the Dra gave a lecture using a 
flip chart to describe the different methods of contraception. Following this 
she tried to prompt a discussion, asking the group why women in the zone 
did not use family planning. The two de vestido women were the only ones 
to talk through the whole session. They suggested that the main baniers 
to using family planning were: that they are poor and lack resources to pay 
for services, that they lack information about services provided at the 
health centre, that many women are concerned about the side-effects of 
different contraceptive methods and that women do not know how to talk 
to their husbands about such matters. Eventually everyone nodded in 
agreement, and it appeared that a general consensus had been reached
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in the group that lack of information and women’s lack of power and 
autonomy in marital relationships is the main banier to utilisation of family 
planning services. The doctor suggested running a further series of talks 
for men and couples, which everybody agreed would be a good idea.
Since taking up his post at the health centre in Zona Rosa, Dr Aguilar has 
developed a number of inspired strategies to recruit patients to his clinic and 
effect behaviour change among his elusive clientele. A loudspeaker has been 
erected outside the health centre, which broadcasts health education messages 
promoting child vaccination and antenatal care. The doctor has also declared a 
community health month during which he organises a health fair and a raffle for 
health. One of the main entry points for Dr Aguilar to reach women in the 
community with reproductive health information is through the mother’s club, 
which meets every Wednesday morning. Mothers are referred to the club by the 
doctors and the health promoters, if they have a sick or under-weight child. At the 
club, women are taught about hygiene and good nutrition and are provided with 
basic food supplements for their children, including oil, flour and milk. On the first 
day that I visited the mothers club there were about fifty women in the hall, all de 
pollera.
The women were all sitting around with notebooks on their laps, and those 
who were literate were copying down a recipe for meat- balls with quinoa 
which had been written up on a large black-board in the centre of the 
room. The recipe session was followed by a lesson’ from the 
representative of the Comite Popular de Salud (community health
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committee), which consisted of a series of sentences written on the 
blackboard, which the women also dutifully copied down. One of the 
sentences read:
“it is the role of the parents to set an example to their children -  we must 
satisfy their basic needs with food, love, security and affection”
During the session an older woman on one side of me started to tell me 
about her children. I asked her how many she had had, and she replied 
10. She was originally from the mining area of Viloca and most other 
children were born in the mines, before she moved to El Alto - 4  of them 
died. She had twins that died at birth and one child died of fright sickness 
(see sections 4.1 and 4.2) on the journey to the yungas (valleys).
The second time I visited the mothers club the women were being given a test.
The questions written on the black-board at the front of the room read: 1) 
how are respiratory infections transmitted? 2) why do we have 
vaccinations? 3) what is the triple vaccine for? While the women were 
trying to answer the questions, Dr Aguilar arrived with the dentist from the 
health centre. Entering like “the men in black”, (both wearing black suits 
and long trench-coats) they strode to the front of the room with a distinct 
air of authority. Dr Aguilar made a comment to the effect that he was 
pleased to see everyone working so hard, while one of the community
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health promoters (Patricia) ordered everyone to stop writing because the 
doctor was about to speak.
The doctor began with an announcement that the health centre was there 
for everybody, and informed the women that they should visit the health 
centre when they or their children were sick. He explained that every week 
he was going to visit the mother's club to talk about health, and that this 
week was about women’s health. The doctor then announced that in two 
weeks time the health centre would be running a campaign for women to 
come and have Pap smears. Why do we need Pap smears? - he asked 
rhetorically - “so that we can tell more about your health and so that you 
will not get cancer”, he explained helpfully. Following the doctor’s 
explanation of the Pap smear campaign the dentist embarked on a lecture 
about how to avoid having rotten teeth, writing a super-market shopping 
list of nutritious foods on the blackboard. The session was concluded by 
the doctor and dentist telling the women to “look on us as your friends -  
we are not people to be afraid o f -  when you have a headache or fever -  
go to the doctor- if you have a toothache go to the dentist”. During most 
of the session babies were screaming, women were talking and knitting, 
and nobody could hear what was being said. I asked the woman next to 
me if she used the health centre and she replied, “I do not like this health 
centre-1 do not have confidence in the doctor- he shouts at us- they do 
not treat you well in the health centre in Zona Rosa -  they sit there with 
their arms crossed and look at you”. Another woman next to her agreed 
“the doctor makes me afraid -  he makes me nervous - 1 don’t like him to
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look at m e -1  don’t like the doctor to touch me”. I asked where she gave 
birth to her last baby and she replied “en la casa no mas” -  in my home.
As a strategy to try to reach targets in priority health areas identified by the 
government, the doctor has hit upon the novel idea of a ‘raffle for health', the 
main prize being a cooker. Over the course of the month the doctor gives raffle 
tickets to anyone who comes to use the maternal, child or dental health services 
at the health centre. The word on the street is that the doctor is holding the raffle 
because he needs more patients to boost his already large income, or that he is 
trying to entice women into the health centre so that he can look at their bodies. 
The raffle results in vast increases in largely unnecessary dental work being 
performed, but makes little impact on utilisation of maternal and child health 
services.
The health month culminates in a health fair held in the school opposite the 
health centre. The mother’s club sets up nutrition stalls displaying different 
preparations of food and recipes, and loud speaker announcements are made by 
the doctor and the representative from the Comite Popular de Salud telling 
women that the health centre is there for them and that they should bring their 
sick children there for treatment. A series of games and displays are also 
organised throughout the day, which remind me of a similar health fair I saw 
organised by an NGO whilst on a previous visit to Bolivia. It was in a rural 
province in which the NGO had been running a maternal health programme for 
over ten years. The NGO had organised a group of local women, all of whom 
were de pollera, to stand in a line and answer questions on reproductive health.
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Each time a ‘cholita’ answered a question correctly they were applauded, and the 
one who answered the most questions correctly was awarded a prize, which I 
recall as being a new plastic mop and bucket. On another visit, I observed the 
NGO HOPE staging a similar show, in which 'cholitas’ from the local community 
were organised to play a game in which balloons were hung from the ceiling of a 
health centre and the women had to run up and down and burst the balloons by 
sitting on them and then answer the question on maternal and child health 
contained inside.
Whilst clearly being extreme examples, the behaviour change strategies 
described above, fall within a general approach informed by the health belief 
model. Local social practices which are carried out within specific social and 
cultural contexts, are understood in the health discourses of the doctors as sets 
of beliefs premised upon false knowledge. As a consequence, the doctors have 
adopted educational strategies aimed at changing the knowledge base of target 
groups in the community (in this case women) as a basis for behaviour change. 
The doctor’s strategies described above clearly have little real educational value 
or merit. Rather they have an over-riding symbolic value, in which the prevailing 
structure of power relations in Bolivian society (discussed in Chapter 3) is 
reflected in a bio-medical discourse, which legitimises the authority of the doctors 
as representatives of an elite social class over the impoverished and 
predominantly Aymara community they serve.
The process by which relations of power and domination are reproduced through 
indirect cultural means, such as through the discourses and practices of the
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doctors, is referred to by Bourdieu as the exercise of symbolic violence and 
symbolic power. For Bourdieu, symbolic violence is the process by which 
meanings are imposed upon groups or social classes in a way that is 
experienced as legitimate, but which obscures the power relations upon which 
these meanings are based (Jenkins 1992). Symbolic power is the process by 
which power and control is exercised through indirect cultural mechanisms in 
different areas of social practice (such as through education or health 
institutions), rather than through direct mechanisms of social control (such as that 
exercised by the army) (Jenkins 1992). Symbolic power is effective in that it is 
exercised through a process which appears to be legitimate (e.g. through 
education aimed at reducing infant and maternal mortality), but in which the 
nature of power relations being exercised is obscured:
“symbolic power...is defined in and through a given relation between 
those who exercise power and those who submit to it, i.e. in the very 
structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced. What 
creates the power of words and slogans, a power capable of maintaining 
or subverting the social order, is the belief in the legitimacy of words and 
of those who utter them” (Bourdieu 1991:170, original emphasis).
For Bourdieu (1991) “pedagogic agencies” (which include formal educational 
institutions as well as other institutions of socialisation such as the family and 
peer group) are the main instruments through which symbolic power is exercised. 
As educational authority is seen as fundamental and legitimate, it is often 
implicitly identified with the authority of the parent over the child, as the doctors’ 
pedagogic strategies described above illustrate. The relative effectiveness or 
strength of the pedagogic agency to inculcate meaning depends upon the 
relative position of the institution in the overall structure of power relations. Hence 
through pedagogic action the power relations within which the institution is
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operating are also reproduced. While the notion of technical competence is also 
often drawn on as an explicit claim to educational or pedagogic legitimacy, 
pedagogic power is always in reality a matter of institutional authority (Jenkins 
1992:104-05).
Within the Bolivia context, the delivery of sexual and reproductive health 
programmes as defined by the ICPD Programme of Action, has been 
incorporated into a bio-medical framework in which services (including family 
planning) are provided by health personnel from a highly clinical perspective. 
Within this framework, the dominant position of the medical practitioner (as a 
representative of the elite classes of the modern nation-state) is legitimised 
through a discourse in which the doctors’ practices are represented as founded 
upon scientific knowledge, while the everyday practices of Aymara women are 
understood as determined by a set of cultural beliefs, premised upon a false 
(folk) knowledge base.
However, as Good (1994:27) observes, the criticism of health institutions as 
agencies of surveillance and control (to use Foucault’s language), or agencies of 
symbolic power and symbolic violence which legitimise and reproduce existing 
relations of domination and sub-ordination (to use Bourdieu’s language), also 
stands in stark contrast to the evident need for basic health services to be made 
available and to reduce needlessly high levels of infant and maternal mortality. If 
we accept that there is an intrinsic value to bio-medical health care and an 
obvious efficacy in many of its preventive and therapeutic measures (Good 
1994:28), how then are we to make sense of the continuing low use of health
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services in Zona Rosa in the face of high morbidity and mortality (especially 
among women and children), without drawing on the notion that health-seeking 
and reproductive behaviour is determined by false cultural beliefs, which can be 
changed through the acquisition of more accurate knowledge?
4. Strategies of Resistance and Negotiation
4.1 Sobre Parto and The Embodiment of Relations of Power and Domination
Good (1994) somewhat provocatively draws parallels between the use of the 
concept of belief as a key analytical concept in the empiricist paradigm of the 
social sciences and that of religious fundamentalism. In an effort to bring about 
behaviour change, Good (1994:7) suggests that health education often employs 
similar strategies to that of missionary work, in which efforts are made to 
“convince the natives to give up false beliefs and take on a set of beliefs that will 
produce a new life and ultimate salvation” (Good 1994:7).
During the course of my fieldwork in Zona Rosa I was struck by the often 
apparently contradictory nature in which women referred to their health and the 
health of their children, and women’s discourses concerning their health and 
well-being appeared to shift according to conversational context. As Scott (1990) 
also observes in his account of fieldwork in a Malay village, not only are 
divergent accounts often given by people in the same community of a specific 
social phenomena, but the same person may also contradict her/himself in 
different social contexts. Scott (1990) refers to a growing awareness during his 
fieldwork of how power relations affect discourses, leading to differing accounts
242
being given depending upon the composition of the group, the issue in question 
and the context in which it is being talked about. I observed similar contradictions 
emerging in the discourses of both the doctors and of women in the community 
depending upon the context in which health and illness and sexual and 
reproductive health were being discussed.
Whenever I directly asked women about the illnesses they most commonly 
experienced their response was invariably that they did not get ill, apart from 
having coughs and colds. Again when asked their experience of using the health 
centre the most common response was that they had not used the health centre 
because they had not been ill, or that the medicines prescribed by the doctors 
were too expensive and therefore if they got coughs or colds they would treat 
themselves with herbs or mates. For example in one of our early conversations 
about the health centre Doha Katrina explained to me:
Here if we are ill we can go to the health centre or we can 
cure ourselves with herbs and mates - 1 do not use the 
health centre here - I  use herbs at home -  if it is very bad I 
can take my child to the doctor- but the medicines are very 
expensive and I cannot afford them. I have not been ill -so  I 
have not used the health centre-  if I have a cold or cough I 
prefer not to go to the doctor because he tells me to buy 
medicines I cannot afford -  the consultation does not cost 
anything but the medicines are expensive- 1 hear that
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sometimes the doctors sell medicines at high prices to make 
money out of them.
Dona Katrina’s discourse hints at an element of distrust at the economic 
motivation of the doctor, but largely emphasises that she has not utilised the 
health centre because she has not been ill. However, in the context of
i
I
| discussions concerning their children and their experience of childbirth, sobre 
parto along with susto (fright sickness - see next section) are the illness 
categories most commonly referred to by women. Every woman I spoke to had 
either had direct experience of sobre parto or seen another woman suffering from 
the illness. Sobre parto (or confinement sickness) is an illness category, which 
exists throughout the Andean region and refers to a general weakness and 
sensitivity to cold and heat, which is caused by insufficient rest and exposure to 
cold after child-birth (Larme 1998). Sobre parto as described to me, is often 
accompanied by fever and severe sweating and tremors. According to Larme 
(1998:1011) sobre parto can appear at any time in a woman’s life after giving 
birth if she is exposed to extreme temperatures or excessive work. Dona Katrina 
explained her experience of sobre parto to me thus:
After my first child was bom I had sobre parto. My hands 
went stiff and I couldn’t use them. The doctor said I had 
anaemia -  but it was sobre parto, I cured it with herbs. I 
stayed in bed for two weeks and then I had a relapse -  you 
have to take camomile for sobre parto -  so as not to feel the 
pain. Sobre parto can come months after child-birth -
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because of having been cold or taken something cold during 
child-birth -  you have to take care of the cold to avoid sobre 
parto. I had my first child in the hospital in the mines -  in 
hospital they do not take care of the cold or of the light -  at 
home there is a little risk in giving birth depending on the 
person -  but there is a much greater risk of getting sobre 
parto if you give birth in hospital.
Although many women who have given birth at home have experienced sobre 
parto, women who give birth in the hospital or clinic are commonly perceived to 
be at the highest risk. As Doha Maria the partera explained to me:
Women often have sobre parto after they give birth in the 
clinic or hospital, where it is cold, where women are not 
looked after property and are made to get out of bed and 
wash too early. None of the women I have helped have 
suffered from sobre parto. Sobre parto cannot be cured by 
doctors. The doctors do not believe in sobre parto, they say 
it does not exist, they say it is an infection and needs to be 
cured with antibiotics. But it cannot be cured that way, it can 
only be cured with special mates. Forme there is less risk of 
sobre parto in the home, because they [women] are always 
looked after in the home. In the hospital the cold makes 
them ill -  it gives them sobre parto in their bones. But in the 
house it is warm -  there is warm water and mates - and after
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birth they are quiet and drink hot chocolate. There are mates 
you can take to recover from sobre parto -  chichita made 
from cinnamon. The doctors say sobre parto is only cured 
with an injection- but the doctors cannot cure it -  the Dra 
cannot cure it -  she does not send patients to me to be 
cured of sobre-parto -  she sends them to hospital -  but it 
cannot be cured there.
Dona Maria dismisses medical knowledge as being impotent in the face of 
specific culturally defined illness categories such as sobre parto. However, both 
doctors simply dismiss sobre parto as being a false belief. Dra de Silva explains 
to me that sobre parto is a post-partum infection, caused largely as a result of 
unclean deliveries carried out by parteras or family members in the women’s 
home. Whilst discussing sobre parto with the Dra it is notable that her earlier 
discourses relating to Doha Maria, which reflected the health project’s ideology of 
respect for and integration with local practices, change considerably. While 
discussing sobre parto the Dra represents the partera as somewhat of a 
charleton whose practices are based on faulty knowledge and egotism, and 
whose motivation is largely economic, exploiting women’s ignorance:
Sobre parto does not exist -  it is a belief- they say they get 
sobre parto because they get cold in hospital -  but this is not 
true -  Doha Maria says she can cure sobre parto with herbs 
-  she is well known in the community and people have 
confidence in h e r- but that is rubbish -  sobre parto is really
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post-partum infection -  she cannot cure the infection- it is 
psychological - she cures them only through psychological 
factors because they trust her. I know Doha Maria tells them 
not to give birth in hospital because of the risk of sobre parto 
because she charges them a lot of money to attend births in 
the home- she will not tell me how much -  she says she 
does not charge-  because when the health project trained 
the parteras they told them they must not charge- but I have 
heard she charges 150 Bolivianas to attend a birth -  more 
for a boy than for a girl. The parteras are only useful to the 
health centre for reporting the number of births and deaths -  
nothing else. I have never seen Doha Maria attend a birth- 
she only calls me afterwards if there is a problem -  she 
keeps her practice to herself- she is an egoist- she puts a 
banier up -  she does not want to share her knowledge with 
me -  she does want me to know what she is doing.
In women’s discourses, treatment of sobre parto requires specialised bodies of 
knowledge, possessed by trusted members of the community (such as Doha 
Maria) and natuhstas (herbalists). This knowledge is accessed only through 
social relations and knowledge systems, which in the context of increasing 
poverty and lack of access to power and resources by migrant communities in El 
Alto, can be understood as also reaffirming the separateness and autonomy of 
the Aymara cultural identity.
247
While the Dra understands sobre parto as a false cultural belief which the 
parteras have a distinct interest in perpetuating (even though they know better as 
a result of their training by the health project), in women’s discourses, 
vulnerability to sobre parto is closely intertwined with the emotional experience of 
relations of power and domination implicit in their encounters with bio-medical 
health care providers. Sobre parto while being linked to giving birth in a hospital 
or clinic environment, categorically cannot be cured by bio-medicine. Hence, 
giving birth in a hospital is a high risk strategy which often severely threatens the 
health and well-being of the mother. These discourses are apparent, for 
example, in the following description given by Doha Matilda (who has been 
trained as a partera by the health project) on the relationship between the 
parteras and the doctors:
Women get sobre parto more in hospital because they are 
lazy in the hospital- they do not take care of you- and they 
do not feed you well -  at night the doctors sleep and they 
don’t care -  women don’t go to hospital to give birth because 
they are afraid. In Zona Rosa there is a birth room in the 
clinic -  but people do not use it- the parteras deliver in the 
home and ask the doctors to check if there is a problem- but 
the doctors say I do not have time to go to women’s houses 
to check the babies -  they do not care. Doctors often shout 
at the parteras. The health project is going to do a film 
looking at the difference between how the doctors attend a 
birth and how the parteras attend- they think the parteras
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are ignorant Dona Maria has been filmed. But I have seen 
some bad experiences of women giving birth in hospital - 1 
saw a woman die of sobre parto because the doctors were 
negligent -  they abandoned the patient and left her in the 
cold room- 1 was with two parteras and we went to attend to 
the woman and the doctor shouted at us -  she is not your 
patient he said -  the woman was shivering and we put a 
stove near her to keep her warm -  but by the morning she 
was dead.
In women’s narratives, experiences of their interaction with bio-medical health 
services are mostly phrased in terms of negative emotional consequences. 
Reasons for the non-use of health centres are expressed in sentiments such as: 
ltengo miedo’ (I am afraid), ‘the doctors shout at us, they look at us and criticise 
us’, ‘they say women are dirty because they do not wash, and do not wash after 
giving birth’, ‘I feel ashamed, when the doctor touches me to examine me’. Within 
this context, use of bio-medical services increases women’s vulnerability to 
emotional disturbance and hence to ill health. For example, Doha Katrina 
explained:
Some are afraid to visit the doctor- if they are afraid they say 
they will not return to the doctor- some say me asustado - 
the doctor gives me fright -  and they say that makes them ill 
-  for example they say the doctor gave me a fright when he 
took blood -  if a woman suffers fright she may have a baby
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prematurely -  if you have fear it weakens you -  it can make 
you ill.
The linkage of emotions to illness and the notion that individuals can bring on 
their own ill health through an inability to control emotions, has been noted in
| other studies of Andean ethnomedicine (Larme 1998:1013). Larme (1998)
!
i argues that while men and women are both susceptible to ill health as a result of 
emotional vulnerability, men have emotional outlets, such as excessive drinking, 
violence and extramarital affairs, which are largely unavailable to women due to 
cultural views of proper female behaviour. Hence, the cultural construction of 
gender roles increases women’s vulnerability to ill health as a result of emotions 
such as fear and shame.
Sobre parto can be understood as the physical embodiment of relations of power 
and inequity, which are experienced by women during their contact with bio­
medical health services, whilst in the vulnerable state of pregnancy and giving 
birth. Foucault has described the importance of the body in bio-medicine as a site 
of social control, Bourdieu also suggests that the body is the site of cultural 
expression, a vehicle for “less than conscious communication” and expressions 
of cultural codes (Jenkins 1992:179). Through embodied illness categories such 
as sobre parto, which in the narratives of women in El Alto is clearly linked to the 
symbolic power exercised by bio-medical health care providers, Aymara cultural 
identity is re-asserted and re-defined. Hence, the diagnosis of sobre parto, which 
draws upon specialised bodies on knowledge (as with fright sickness discussed 
in the next section), conveys both the historical struggle to assert ethnic and
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gender identity as well as the struggle of social classes to access economic and 
symbolic capital and resources (Greenway 1998c).
4.2 Losing Souls and Finding Churches: Belief and the Negotiation of Identity
Bourdieu (1977, 1990b) has suggested that in many everyday situations 
behaviour or social practice, far from being the result of economic calculations of 
outcomes or determined by adherence to sets of culturally prescribed rules, 
norms and beliefs, is an act of strategic improvisation which is performed within 
specific social contexts, constraints and opportunities. According to Bourdieu this 
strategic performance is also the means and the end of competitive struggle over 
access to social and symbolic resources (Jenkins 1992). This section considers 
how the inhabitants of Zona Rosa draw on the notion of ‘belief strategically, as a 
means of negotiating identity and control, in the face of poverty and lack of 
access to power and resources.
Scott (1985, 1990) also draws on the notion of strategy in considering how 
accounts of social practice often vary according to social context. Scott develops 
the notion of ‘the hidden transcript’, as the gap between stated norms, values 
and beliefs and actual practice. The hidden transcript is the domain of gossip, 
rumours, jokes and euphemisms, in which strategies of resistance to the status 
quo are carefully hedged to avoid out-right and open confrontation (Scott 1985, 
1990). Scott (1985:286) suggests that what is said by social actors in power 
laden situations is almost always in-authentic, the exercise of power driving a 
portion of the full transcript underground, with the individual only revealing part of
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his or her full transcript in encounters with the powerful that is both safe and 
appropriate to reveal.
The central objective of the government of Bolivia’s health strategy, which also 
defines the focus of the doctors’ strategies to increase attendance at the health 
centres, is the reduction of maternal and infant mortality. According to the doctors 
at the health centres, the most prevalent causes of infant and child mortality in 
Zona Rosa are diarrhoea and respiratory infections. As noted earlier in my case 
studies, the doctors are frustrated that parents do not bring their children to the 
health centre, and suggest that often when they do it is when the illness has 
become severe. The health centres have launched a concerted effort to have 
children vaccinated, and the RPS’s have all been trained in giving injections. 
During the vaccination campaign the RPSs go from door to door asking women 
to let them vaccinate their children, or alternatively encouraging women to take 
their children to the health centre for vaccination. The uptake of vaccinations 
during the campaign is limited. The majority of women I spoke to said they would 
not have their children vaccinated because they were afraid, and because the 
vaccination would give the child a fright.
During my fieldwork, Doha Katrina’s youngest grandson Roberto died, he was 18 
months old. I heard varying accounts of what had happened to Roberto. I first 
heard about the death of the little boy from Dr Aguilar. He told me that the child 
had been sick for several days of a stomach upset, but that the parents had not 
brought him to the health centre. He told me that they had tried to treat the child 
with herbs and that the child had got worse, when they finally brought Roberto to
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the health centre the child was very sick. The doctor said that he prescribed 
medicines for the child, but that the parents had not bought the medicines and 
Roberto had died in the night. Later that day I met Don Francisco and Doha 
Katrina coming back from the cemetery, they had buried Roberto that morning. 
Doha Katrina and Don Francisco told me that their grandson had taken ill two 
days before but that he had only been mildly ill with a fever and vomiting. They 
explained to me that they had taken Roberto to the health centre, but the doctor 
was not there because he was attending to his private practice in the City. They 
had given the baby mates in the night and took him back to the doctor the 
following morning. The doctor had said that the baby had an infection, and had 
prescribed medicines for him. Doha Katrina told me that they had bought the 
medicine from a pharmacist, but that after giving it to the baby he got a lot worse 
and died in the night. She said that when they went back to the doctor for the 
death certificate he had shouted at them for not taking the baby to him sooner 
and accused them of not giving the baby the medicine.
While many women in El Alto cannot recall a maternal death occurring, the 
experience of infant and child death forms a central part of women’s discourses 
on sickness and health. Every woman I interviewed had either lost one or more 
children, or knew of a neighbour of family member whose child had died. While 
sobre parto is the major cause of maternal morbidity, by far the most common 
serious childhood illness category is soul loss. Soul loss is caused by fright 
(susto), most commonly following a fall or an attack by a dog (a daily hazard in 
the streets of El Alto). Fright sickness, particularly affects babies and children, 
and is a common feature of Andean ethnomedical systems, although its
253
symptoms vary across different Andean contexts, from listlessness and lethargy, 
to diarrhoea and severe fever resulting in death (Greenway 1998c).
Fright sickness is caused by the soul leaving the body, and as with sobre parto, 
soul loss cannot be cured through the use of bio-medicine. The Aymara identity 
is associated with the existence of three souls, the animu, the ajayu and the alma 
(Crandon-Malamud 1991: 133). In traditional Aymara categorisation the animu 
does not become solidly entrenched in the body until adolescence. The animu is 
capricious, and in infants and young children can easily wander off and become 
lost. The animu may be coaxed back by the child’s mother, who calls the soul at 
night, enticing it by placing sweets and desirable items near the child’s bed. The 
ajayu and alma are more entrenched in the body at birth (Crandon-Malamud 
1991: 133). Loss of the ajayu, which may be eaten or stolen by spirits that live 
within the earth and mountains, is severe and requires the skills and knowledge 
of a yatiri to cure. The alma only leaves the body at death and cannot be 
retrieved. Doha Felipa described the death of her first child from fright sickness to 
me thus:
My son died from this - 1 was young and I had no experience 
- 1 was 16-1  was living in the campo then in the pueblo- 
and there are large rivers there. I was lost on the altiplano 
and I didn’t know where I was -  suddenly a bam owl 
appeared with big ugly eyes -  my son saw it and he started 
to cry really hard -  the owl took the soul of my baby -  he 
would not sleep -  he was vomiting and developed diarrhoea
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-  he was ill for 12 hours and then he died- 1 was young and 
inexperienced and I did not know what to do -  now if any of 
my children are ill I go directly to the Ceja to the yatiri -  now 
if my children are ill I go directly to the yatiri to call the ajayu.
When I talked to Don Francisco about the cause of his grandson’s death he 
dismissed the notion of soul loss as having any significance for him. He 
explained to me that the baby had died from an infection, and because the doctor 
had not been there to treat the baby soon enough and had not prescribed the 
correct medicines. In identifying the cause of his grandson’s death as being due 
to infection and the negligence of the doctor in attending properly to the needs of 
the people of Zona Rosa (giving preference to his practice in La Paz), Don 
Francisco was clearly asserting his identity as an educated ex-miner, a mestizo 
and a member of the oppressed social classes. Don Francisco dismissed the 
notion of fright sickness as a ‘belief of his grandfather’s generations, founded 
upon false ‘folk knowledge’:
Fright sickness is an Aymara belief -  it is an old custom 
from our grandfathers’ generation. The Aymara believe that 
there are three souls- the animu, the ajayu and the alma.
Some people say you can die from fright -  it is most serious 
in children but adults can also have fright sickness. This is 
an Aymara belief -  that the yatiris believe in -  but other 
religions conceive this differently. I am a Catholic -I do not 
believe in this -  the Catholic Church says it is wrong to
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believe in this -  yatiris are false idols. Fright is a mentality of 
those who are less educated- if you are well educated you 
do not suffer from fear. Some people are timid of the doctors 
- 1 am not timid -  my wife is -  she is afraid of the doctor-  
she will not go to him -  but I have been educated - 1 am not 
afraid.
A variety of opinions exist among members of the community in Zona Rosa on 
the nature of soul loss and the exact number of souls that constitute the Aymara 
and mestizo being. Discourses surrounding soul loss and fright sickness also 
shift according to social context. Those who are members of the Methodist 
church, such as the midwife Doha Maria, claim the existence of only one soul, 
thereby also dismissing the validity of the illness category soul loss. Doha Maria, 
is a mestizo by class identity, if not in ethnic origin. She was born in La Paz and 
has lived a good deal of her life in El Alto. She is economically successful, 
running a thriving business making pollera with her daughters, as well as 
performing her duties as a partera. She was initially a Catholic of Aymara 
parentage, but converted to the Methodist Church as a strategy to control her 
husband’s alcoholism and violence against her and her young daughters. The 
Methodist Church, she explains, does not allow alcohol and preaches against 
violence. After she and her daughters started attending the Methodist Church, 
she persuaded her husband to attend with them. He subsequently gave up 
alcohol and the violence stopped. Alcoholism and domestic violence, Doha Maria 
considers, is part of the Catholic way of life, which she equates with the 
traditional Aymara, the campesinos. Soul loss, she explains is a superstition, a
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false belief which belongs to the traditional Aymara culture, and is maintained by 
those who follow the Catholic church. Doha Maria says she does not believe in 
yatiris, or soul loss. She explained to me:
My first baby died of soul loss. He had a fright in the night, I 
think it was from the noise of an aeroplane leaving El Alto 
airport. He developed a fever and died in the night. That was 
when I was a Catholic. Since I have been a Methodist and 
stopped believing in soul loss and yatiris, all my children 
have been well and have not suffered from fright sickness.
Now I only have faith in God to cure me and my family -  only 
God knows how to cure.
Doha Rosa’s story expresses a greater degree of ambivalence regarding church 
affiliation:
I became a Methodist because my husband used to beat 
me. My first two babies died and a yatiri told me the babies 
had died because the Methodist Church had brought me bad 
luck, the children had lost their ajayu. There are two souls.
The animu and ajayu are the same, they are the Aymara 
soul. The alma is the Christian soul that goes to heaven 
when you die. After my babies died, I went back to the 
Catholic Church and all the rest of my children survived. I 
was a Catholic until my children were grown. I became a
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Methodist a few years ago because my husband had other 
women and was getting drunk and beating me. Now he goes 
to church with me and is a good man.
Crandon-Malamud (1991) argues that membership of the Methodist church 
stands for the Aymara as a twentieth-century metaphor for social class and 
upward social mobility. The Methodist church stands for a rejection of Aymara 
‘traditionalism’ and ‘ignorance’ (which is associated with the Catholic Church), 
and an acceptance of modernism. Through affiliation to the Methodist church 
individuals are able to reconstruct and negotiate ethnic identities according to 
their changing economic, political and social positions. Hence, membership of 
the Methodist church is congruent with Doha Maria’s rising economic position 
and social standing as a successful businesswoman and sought-after midwife. 
Church membership varies according to the social and economic position and 
context of the individual, who may switch membership strategically over the 
course of a lifetime. Through her membership of the Methodist church, Doha 
Maria is reaffirming her mestizo class identity, denying the traditional Aymara 
belief system which she perceives to be represented through membership of the 
Catholic Church. Her affiliation to the Methodist Church is also a strategy for 
negotiation and control of gender relations and protection of the economic and 
social well-being of herself and her children. Doha Rosa has employed a similar 
strategy as regards negotiation and control of gender relations, but changed her 
church alliance to safeguard the health and the well-being of her children. For 
Doha Maria and Doha Rosa, shifting church affiliation has formed an essential 
part of their sexual and reproductive health strategy.
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Dona Nicolesa is a campesino, a recent migrant to El Alto, who maintains a small 
plot of land on the altiplano. Doha Nicolesa is also a Catholic, a yatiri, and a 
partera (traditional midwife). She became a yatiri after lightning struck her when 
she was looking after her animals on her land in the altiplano. She moved to El 
Alto because her house was struck by lightning three times and because she 
could not make a sustainable livelihood from her land. Dona Nicolesa and her 
husband live in an adobe house which they have constructed on the periphery of 
the zone.
We are poor here” she explains, “there is no work. I earn a 
little money as a yatiri and partera. Many things, can cause 
soul loss such as susto (fright) andenvidia (envy). There are 
three souls, the animu, the ajayu, and the alma. They are the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. Susto in children is 
often caused by a fall ora dog barking. A neighbour shouting 
and saying bad things can also cause susto. Neighbours are 
envious and shout and say bad things, they say things in the 
street, about the pollera we are wearing, because we are 
poor. When people shout at you and say bad things it can 
make you feel weak because it makes your heart cry. The 
Methodists say bad things about the Catholics, they say we 
are drunk and poor, and that Catholics are evil because they 
believe in yatiris. The Catholic Church also says that 
believing in yatiris is sinful because it is believing in false
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idols, that we must pray to God for our souls. But only the 
yatiri can cure soul loss.
Dona Nicolesa’s narrative includes a strong expression of feelings of vulnerability 
in the face of increasing poverty and the competitive and individualistic 
environment of El Alto. Feelings of miedo (fear) and envidia (envy) form a major 
part of women’s discourses on health and social relations in this social context. 
Fright sickness befalls vulnerable and weak individuals. If a woman is 
economically successful, neighbours may become envious. Envy and name- 
calling (the utterance of bad sentiments) are another cause of susto. More 
seriously, an envious neighbour may use brujeria (witchcraft) to turn a person’s 
good fortunes to bad, and cause illness as a result of soul loss. The individualism 
and competitiveness of the market centre make it a particularly dangerous place, 
rife with envy and the potential for brujeria. As Doha Natty a market trader 
explained:
There is a lot of competition here, this is a busy m arket-but 
if we cannot sell our things we go broke -  every person in 
the market has a different character- some sell a lot and 
some sell less -  so there is envy everywhere -  those who 
are envious say bad things about you -  they lie about you 
and say things like -  that woman gets her money from 
visiting men -  there are women here who are envious of me 
-  you feel bad when they say bad things -  if someone has 
said something bad and people look at you -  you feel bad -
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if they something bad is going to happen to you -  through 
brujeria then it happens-1 am a Methodist - 1 do not believe 
in yatiris so it does not happen to m e - i f  I did believe I may 
have to look for another business.
In the narratives above, it is clear that vulnerability is not only understood in 
physical terms, but also in terms of social, gender, and class positioning. 
Crandon-Malamud (1991:57) suggests that medical metaphor in the altiplano is 
infused with the themes of hunger, vulnerability of subordination, victimization 
and exploitation, themes that have also dominated the history of Bolivian post­
colonial class and ethnic relations. In women’s narratives, feelings of social and 
economic vulnerability are expressed in the illness experiences encapsulated in 
sobre parto and soul loss, which embody the cultural construction of the Aymara 
‘self. Through the illness experiences of sobre parto and soul loss, social and 
ethnic identity is reaffirmed. Indeed, Greenway (1998c:996) has suggested that 
the diagnosis of soul loss can be considered as an indicator of contradiction and 
ambivalence about identity which can shift over the course of an individual’s life­
span as social, economic, and political circumstances change.
As a recent migrant in the competitive and individualistic urban environment of El 
Alto, Doha Nicolesa finds herself in a position of extreme vulnerability lacking 
access to social and economic resources and capital. However, through her 
access to specialised bodies of knowledge as a yatiri and partera (which the 
doctors at the health centre lack), and which reaffirm her Aymara identity, she is 
able to access strategic power in the hostile environment of El Alto.
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Through her role as a partera Doha Maria is also able to assert her Aymara 
cultural identity, whilst defining her class position as an upwardly mobile mestizo 
through her affiliation to the Methodist Church. Her rejection of soul loss as an 
illness category, and hence of Aymara traditionalism, does not however signify 
an acceptance of the knowledge base of the doctors and of their ability to cure 
illnesses of vulnerable individuals. Rather her Church affiliation emphasises a 
shift in allegiance from the power of the yatiri to the power of God. Indeed Doha 
Maria’s claim that while she believed in soul loss and yatiris her children often 
were ill with fright sickness, and that the best prevention is to stop believing, 
draws on a notion of ‘belief which Good (1994) suggests dates back to before 
the enlightenment. Prior to the enlightenment the notion of ‘belief simply meant 
to pledge ones allegiance to, or to put ones ‘faith’ in. It is only with the age of 
enlightenment that a clear distinction was made between belief and knowledge, 
with belief signifying falsehood and knowledge signifying truth (Good 1994). In 
this context Doha Maria’s statement that now that she has pledged her 
allegiance to the Methodist Church (and modernism) her children are protected 
from fright sickness, does not contradict her statement that while she pledged her 
allegiance to yatiris and traditionalism her children remained vulnerable.
Despite Doha Maria’s dismissal of the efficacy of bio-medical knowledge for 
treating serious maternal and infant health problems, she also considers the 
health centre to be an important resource (see Crandon-Malamud 1991). Indeed, 
Doha Maria is proud of the fact that she has received training by the health 
centre and proudly displays all her training certificates. In her work as a
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traditional partera, she is now closely affiliated to the health centre, attending all 
the meetings with the doctors and reporting numbers of births and infant deaths 
to the doctor on a monthly basis. Her affiliation with the health centre has not 
altered her knowledge base (as was hoped by the bio-medical training 
programme). Indeed it has conferred on her an elevated social status, and Doha 
Maria perceives that the powerful bio-medical system has legitimated her 
practice as well as enabling her to expand her client base as a result of contacts 
she makes through talks at the health centre. Similarly the health promoters, 
whilst maintaining their distance from the services they promote on the grounds 
that they and their children are never ill, gain significant social capital through the 
training and education they have received from the health project.
Don Francisco in rejecting the notion of soul loss and the power of the yatiri, is 
clearly rejecting the traditionalism of Aymara identity and drawing upon his sense 
of class identity to explain the death of Roberto. The doctor failed to help 
Roberto, not because he lacked the knowledge to cure the child, but because his 
class affiliation and interests lay elsewhere, among the prosperous mestizo and 
criolla patients of his private practice in La Paz. Whilst rejecting the Aymara 
traditions to which his wife adheres, as consisting of ‘false beliefs’, Don Francisco 
in the face of his abject poverty and loss of class identity continues to assert his 
class position through an allegiance to the Catholic Church, the church of the 
poor and most marginalized urban Aymara.
Dona Katrina on the other hand offered me another explanation for the death of 
Roberto. Doha Katrina had sought the help of medicinas caseras and the health
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centire to cure Roberto. She had not sought the help of a yatiri because she 
considered that all the yatiris in El Alto are brujas and are not to be trusted. As a 
migrant from the mining community, Doha Katrina expresses a strong mistrust in 
her neighbours, suggesting that the neighbours are envious and say bad things 
about her in the street. Unable to make a living among the competitive chola 
market traders, many ex-miners’ wives such as Doha Katrina continue the 
traditions of the mining ‘housewives’ working from the confines of their homes, 
knitting jumpers and weaving blankets for sale to outlets in the centre of El Alto. 
Doha Katrina’s identity is asserted through the strong ties she maintains with her 
pueblo (village), in particular returning to the pueblo if the children are ill, to seek 
the services of the yatiri. According to Doha Katrina, Roberto died of soul loss 
due to fright sickness, because she did not have the money to make the journey 
with him back to the pueblo in time.
Greenway (1998b) suggests that soul calling to heal soul loss is a metaphor for 
other feelings about social identity, and that animu calling is a way of restoring 
identity which is specifically related to Andean concepts of the body and the self. 
Concepts of embodiment are central to understanding the impact of political and 
social inequalities on individuals and how these are acted out in people’s health 
seeking behaviour and strategies for dealing with illness and health (Greenway 
1998b: 161). The diagnostic and therapeutic choices that people make are related 
to specific constructions of ethnic, class and gender identity. As such, illness 
categories like sobre parto and soul loss can be understood as the embodiment 
of ethnic identity and relations of social inequality and domination. The relations 
of inequality implied in these illness categories, and experienced through contact
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with bio-medical services, are rejected in strategies to cure illnesses of social 
vulnerability, through a process of seeking specialist bodies of knowledge which 
are only accessed through an affiliation with Aymara culture.
Hence, the negotiation of social relations and social identity is central to 
individual strategies such as church affiliation, use and non-use of bio-medical 
services, and adherence to traditional medical systems. The choices made and 
strategies selected are affected by a wide variety of factors such as social 
standing, economic position, gender relations and personal history of migration. 
Different strategies and choices may be employed at different times and in 
different contexts (see Crandon-Malamud 1991).
4.3 Fertility Regulation and the Empowerment of Women
The notion of women’s empowerment is central to the reproductive health and 
population policy discourse of the government of Bolivia, and of the many NGOs 
implementing sexual and reproductive health programmes. Bolivian social policy 
has given increasing priority to promoting women’s health and gender equity. In 
the 1990s a Vice-Ministry of Gender was established, receiving support from 
UNFPA (the United Nations Population Fund). The essentially pro-natalist 
heritage that dominated government policy in the 1980s has now been replaced 
by a focus on notions of sexual and reproductive rights.
Central to the rights discourse in Bolivia has been the struggle by NGOs and 
feminist activists for women’s right to access family planning services, which has 
come to be seen as synonymous with the empowerment of women and the
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promotion of gender equity. However, even though modern contraceptives have 
been available through the National Reproductive Health Programme since 1990, 
there is a recognition by NGOs and the government that for the indigenous . 
majority there remains a strong preference for use of indigenous fertility 
regulation methods. A study carried out by WHO (the World Health Organisation) 
in 1996 identified the major barriers to utilisation of family planning services by 
indigenous women as being: cultural distance between the providers and 
programme users; poor quality of care; lack of culturally appropriate information 
and education about family planning; lack of cultural acceptability of talking about 
issues relating to sexuality and the geographical inaccessibility of services.
Contrary to accepted stereotypes that suggest that cultural norms and beliefs are 
a major barrier to utilisation of contraceptives by indigenous populations, the 
discourses of urban Aymara women generally support fertility regulation.
However, women’s discourses on reproductive health, sexuality and gender are 
embedded within the wider construction and negotiation of social identity and 
power relations in a society in rapid transition. Far from being a question of 
access to, and utilisation of, sexual and reproductive health services, women’s 
conceptualisation of ‘empowerment’ is embedded primarily in their relative 
economic autonomy. The motivation for utilisation of fertility regulation methods 
is mainly expressed in terms of an economic motivation and a desire for the 
upward social mobility of women and their children. For chola women the desire 
for limiting family size is linked to an expressed preference for market work over 
housework (see Schuler 1994), which is synonymous with their class position as 
mestizos. As Doha Natty explained:
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Before in Bolivia in the time of my mother women were 
obliged to marry and have lots of children, it is not like that 
now -  women are not obliged to have lots of children -  this 
is better because a woman can work in the market and have 
money. Those in the campo have lots of children -  they do 
not give it [fertility regulation] importance- because they stay 
in the house and cook and wash clothes and their children 
do not go to school. I want to educate my children -  forme it 
is very important that my children go to school -  so that they 
do not drink and become thieves - 1 have learned how to 
take care -  so as not to have more children - 1 am happy not 
to have more children because there is not enough money to 
look after them -  and I have to work -  to look after my 
market stall -  so that I can educate them and they can have 
a profession.
Within the construction of class and gender relations within the mining centres 
the miner’s housewife was essential for the reproduction of the labour force. As 
Nash (1979) in her anthropological study of mining communities in Oruro 
observes, male workers received financial support for having children which re­
affirmed the miner’s masculinity and position as a member of a consolidated 
working class. Miners were congratulated by fellow workers and management 
alike for high fertility (Nash 1979:62). Notions of motherhood were 
sentimentalised in mining communities, affirming the ‘housewives’ status as
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synonymous with that of the criolla Senoras and hence securing their identity 
with women of the mestizo class. With the loss of their economic and social 
position following relocation from the mines, the mining housewives are 
conceptualised by the choia market women in Zona Rosa as socially inferior due 
to their large families and inability to earn an independent income through market 
trading. As Doha Natty explained:
Those women from the mines they are lazy -  they do not 
work because they are timid and they have lots of children -  
they are poor because the woman stays in the house and 
looks after the children -  so they cannot buy bread and they 
do not send their children to school -  but if the woman and 
the man work -  they can buy things -  if the woman goes out 
and earns money in the market she can buy rice, quinoa and 
potatoes -  those families where the woman does not work 
have many children and the men drink and they argue -  my 
husband is happy that I work -  my children as well and we 
do not argue -  but if women do not work there are many 
arguments in the marriage because they cannot pay for rent, 
electricity and food.
Despite the fact the above discourses clearly identify a positive correlation 
between class position, economic capital and fertility regulation, an inverse 
relationship exists within women’s discourses between notions of women’s 
empowerment and use of modern family planning methods. Fertility regulation
strategies form an accepted part of indigenous practices, in particular the use of 
herbal teas and the use of periodic abstinence (usually referred to as the rhythm 
method), backed up by massage to induce abortion. Sexuality and reproduction 
are not openly talked about and it has been suggested that women learn 
reticence about sexual matters at an early age (Schuler et al 1994: 213). Women 
control use of indigenous fertility regulation methods, and information on 
methods of fertility control is communicated through women’s kinship and other 
social networks. Use of modern family planning methods, on the other hand, 
necessitates social interaction with bio-medical health services and usually a 
physical examination by a male doctor, thereby crossing cultural boundaries of 
appropriate gender interactions.
In discussing family planning at the health centre, women generally refer to lack 
of knowledge, fear of side effects and husband’s disapproval as their main 
reasons for the non-use of modern methods. However, within women’s 
discourses on sexuality and fertility control, women who are the least 
economically empowered and therefore the least empowered in the marital 
relationship, are seen to be most in need of modern family planning methods. 
Women who are not economically empowered lack the means to control and 
negotiate sexual relations with their husband and therefore to use abstinence as 
an effective fertility control method. The use of modern family planning methods 
intersects with women’s constructions of power and control over their bodies, 
sexuality, esteem and empowerment. Hence, women’s discourses on family 
planning shift according to their relative economic independence and class 
position. For example, for Dona Maria, the effective use of traditional fertility
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regulation is synonymous with women’s economic empowerment and gender 
equity in marital relations:
Many women do not have esteem because they are 
timid and feel fear, they are afraid to work and have to 
stay in the house and depend on their husbands. This is 
dangerous because they cannot leave their husband and 
survive on their own if they have to. I have never used 
modem methods of family planning; my husband is a 
good man. He understands not to trouble me; he sleeps 
in a separate bed. The best method of family planning is 
the rhythm method. The best way to practise the rhythm 
method is to have sex once or twice a month. I have 
seen the IUCD and pills make women ill, and I try to 
explain to them how to use the rhythm method. Many 
women cannot use the rhythm method because their 
husbands are not good men. Many women are timid and 
cannot control their husbands.
Similarly one of the health promoters, Doha Maria-Jose explained to me that she 
did not need to use modern family planning methods because she had a ‘good 
husband’ and was able to control her fertility through periodic abstinence. 
However, she considered that modem contraceptives were very important for the 
poorer women in Zona Rosa, those who could not control their husbands, and
270
whose husbands got drunk and hit them. These women she classified as being 
the campesino migrants and relocated miners:
Life here in the city is getting worse because people do not 
have any money -  in the country women have many children 
because they do not know how to take care of themselves.
The campesinos come to the city and end up sleeping in the 
streets -  they are lazy and they don’t want to work - 1 am a 
mestizo - 1 have always worked. The government talks 
about reproductive health -  about ‘responsibilidad de 
partida ’ [responsibility of the partner] -  but they do not 
understand what this means. Most women do not know how 
to talk to their husband - 1 know how to talk to my husband -  
I have only 3 children -  I have always used the calendar 
method -  because my husband is a good man and he does 
not bother me. I have been trained as a promoter - 1 talk to 
women about these things and about family planning - 1 tell 
them they should go the clinic and get the IUD -  because 
they are poor- they have many children because they 
cannot control their husbands -  but most will not use family 
planning because they are afraid and they are afraid to go to 
the doctor.
The only woman in the network of women I interviewed over the course of the 
fieldwork who had used a modern method was Doha Elena, who had an IUCD
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(intra-uterine contraceptive device) fitted at a reproductive health clinic in the 
centre of El Alto. At the time Dona Elena was twenty-four and had six children. 
She grew up in the campo (countryside), and lived with her grandfather who beat 
her. She married her husband at sixteen to escape from her grandfather and they 
moved to El Alto. Her husband has occasional work constructing houses. Elena 
only works outside the house when her husband needs her to help him. He will 
not let her work alone because he is jealous. She does not want more children:
My mother told me about the rhythm method - but my 
husband does not understand. He agrees to use it and says 
he does not want more children, but when he gets drunk he 
hits me if I do not want sex. After the last baby, my husband 
agreed that I should use something to stop me getting 
pregnant, but I could not afford to go to the clinic. My 
comadre gave me the money to go to the clinic and have an 
IUCD fitted.
Dona Elena’s decision to use a modem contraceptive method was a result of her 
increasing disempowerment due to poverty and lack of power to control sex 
within the marital relationship. Lacking her own economic independence, she had 
to draw upon social capital in the form of the comadre relationship to act upon 
the decision she and her husband jointly made for her to have an IUCD fitted.
The notion of control of sexuality as a source of empowerment has been noted in 
other social and historical contexts. Schneider and Schneider (1995:190) suggest
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that use of coitus interruptus as a birth control practice in rural Sicily was imbued 
with a moral value of sacrificing pleasure for social betterment, supporting 
Foucault’s argument that restraint can be empowering. However, within women’s 
discourses sexual desire is largely portrayed as a male characteristic which 
women are obliged to satisfy (Schuler 1994:217). Hence control over their 
husband’s sexuality is central to notions of women’s empowerment. Drawing on 
ethnographic material among the Yoruba of Nigeria, Pearce (1995: 204) also 
notes that the possibility provided by modem contraceptives to divorce sexuality 
from reproduction is not universally perceived as a source of women’s 
empowerment. Among Yoruba women the practice of terminal abstinence to end 
childbearing is perceived as a well-earned rest and that the Yoruba practice of 
abstinence, particularly terminal abstinence, “conflicts with the western liberal 
view of female sexual rights and the biomedical perception of biological needs” 
(Pearce 1995: 203-4).
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have suggested that in Bolivia the ICPD policy agenda of sexual 
and reproductive health and rights has been incorporated into a bio-medical 
framework in which services (including family planning) are provided by health 
personnel from a highly clinical perspective. I have suggested that the health 
education strategies adopted by health professionals in the zone are informed by 
a health belief model, in which health practices and health seeking behaviour of 
women in the community are understood as determined by sets of cultural beliefs 
premised upon false knowledge. However, I have argued that the health
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education strategies adopted by the doctors have an over-riding symbolic value, 
in which the prevailing power structure of Bolivian society is reproduced in a 
medical discourse which legitimises the authority of the doctors, over the poor, 
predominately Aymaran communities they serve. I have also suggested that 
embodied illness categories such as sobre parto and soul loss are central to 
strategies of resistance, through which Aymara cultural identity is continually re­
asserted and re-defined in the encounter with bio-medical services. However, I 
have also argued that the apparently conflicting bodies of knowledge7 
represented in the indigenous and bio-medical systems are often drawn upon by 
women in Zona Rosa, simultaneously and without contradiction, being utilised as 
social resources through which identity, class, and social capital are continually 
negotiated.
I have argued that the Cairo discourses of empowerment and sexual and 
reproductive health and rights which are largely premised upon a western neo­
liberal construction of the autonomous individual, have been implemented within 
a bio-medical paradigm. However, sexual and reproductive health and rights, 
cannot be understood as separate from other spheres of social and economic 
life. In the context of marginalized migrant populations in the city of El Alto, the 
concepts of reproductive health and rights only gain meaning when considered in 
the specific social and economic context of women’s lives. Notions of sexual and 
reproductive health cannot be isolated from the wider historical and economic 
context in which health, sexuality and reproduction are embedded. Hence, my 
analysis suggests that the objectives of Cairo can only be achieved in the context 
of much broader development approaches, which enable poor and marginalized
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peoples to access economic, social and political resources, which reach far 
beyond those provided by sexual and reproductive health programmes.
In the following chapter I outline a methodological approach which I suggest has 
potential to empower poor and marginalized groups to enter into a process of 
critical dialogue with programme implementers and policy makers, and to 
incorporate into development practice an understanding of how social actors 
negotiate identity and difference in specific social contexts.
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Chapter 5
Drunkards, Prostitutes, Gangsters and Wizards 
(A Reflection on Method)
. .nothing classifies somebody more than the way he or she classifies”
(Bourdieu 1990: 131)
1. Introduction
Central to the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapters is an 
exploration of how constructions of identity and difference shape social and 
political practice at the national and local level. Drawing upon case study 
material from Bolivia, Chapter 3 explored how constructions of identity and 
difference are embedded in historical and structural conditions of inequality 
and exploitation. Through an ethnographic study Chapter 4 has considered 
how these structural conditions of inequality become embodied in and 
reproduced through everyday practices, which ultimately shape the 
experience of health and well being among the poor and socially marginalized 
and excluded groups. In this chapter, I suggest that a truly reflexive and 
participatory approach to implementation and monitoring of development 
policy and programmes requires a methodology which incorporates into 
development practice an understanding of how social actors negotiate identity 
and difference.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I suggested that attention to narratives that locate actors
within the concrete situations of their everyday lives and personal life
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histories, is 'undamental to the research process. However, within actors 
narratives, practice may be subjected to competing interpretations and the 
representations that actors produce may vary according to social context and 
social positbn (see Bourdieu 1990: 131). In this chapter, I outline a 
methodologcal approach which I call “peer ethnography” through which local 
people (in particular excluded and marginalized groups) assume responsibility 
for collecting narratives among their peer networks, as a basis for 
incorporating into development practice an understanding of how people
| classify their social worlds in the context of their everyday practice and lived 
experience1.
2. A Discussion on Method
A reliance on empiricism has dominated much applied sociology and related 
social policy in the post-war era (Calhoun 1995). Within mainstream 
demography the notion of “theory” has been understood in a highly empiricist 
fashion, placing an emphasis on the testing of propositions, with the goal of 
accumulating objectively verifiable facts concerning population dynamics,
(e.g. population growth, migration, mortality, fertility), reproduction and health 
related behaviour. As a result, mainstream demographic and family planning 
research has relied heavily upon positivist research methodologies, the goal 
being to produce 'empirical’ and concrete knowledge concerning the variables 
that govern population dynamics, such as mortality, migration, and sexual 
and fertility-related behaviour.
1 Sections of this chapter will form the basis for an article for submission to a peer-reviewed journal.
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The large-scale sample survey has remained the dominant method of 
demographic research, and has provided much of the empirical basis for family 
planning and other sexual and reproductive health programme design, 
monitoring and evaluation, most notably through the use of knowledge, attitude 
and practice (KAP) surveys. The high value placed on the survey method has 
centred on its apparent ‘scientific’ legitimacy and the objectively verifiable and 
therefore generalisable data produced. However, social theorists have criticised 
knowledge, attitude and practice surveys on two major counts. First, on 
methodological grounds early KAP studies such as the World Fertility Surveys 
were criticised for utilising poor sampling, interviewing and data collection 
methods, and for shortcomings in the interpretation of findings (Warwick 1982, 
1993; Hauser 1993). A second and more substantial strand of criticism has 
focused on the epistemological value of surveys for studying the complexities of 
social life and the complex nature of health and fertility related behaviour (Baum 
1995; Greenhalgh 1990; Hammel 1990; Lockwood 1995; Warwick 1982). Most 
importantly, while a well-constructed sample survey can provide important data 
on trends in social behaviour, it cannot easily inform about the contexts in which 
different behaviours occur, that is, about causality. Statistical data can only 
accurately represent an empirical pattern at one point in time, whereas causality 
depends upon an analysis or understanding that goes beyond the collection of 
surface facts and figures (Calhoun 1995). A major weakness of positivist 
methodologies such as the KAP survey is that while they may describe surface 
social phenomena, they fail to reveal the internal tensions of the social world as 
experienced by social actors (Calhoun 1995: 5).
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Over tthe past two decades there has been a notable increase in the use of 
qualitative methods for applied policy research (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). 
These methods have increasingly been employed in family planning and 
sexual and reproductive health research. The value of qualitative methods is 
seen to lie in their potential to explore and probe more deeply into actors’ 
perspectives than is possible through survey methods, allowing for more 
contextual analysis of the data. However, the issue of interpretation cannot be 
collapsed entirely into the contrast between the use of quantitative and 
qualitative methods, and the use of qualitative methods does not necessarily 
imply a move from empiricism and positivist theoretical frameworks to a more 
interpretivist approach (Calhoun 1995:68). On the one hand quantitative 
sociology also often depends on sensitive interpretation of the data. Much of 
Bourdieu’s empirical research is grounded in the use of statistical data as an 
essentially descriptive tool (Calhoun 1995:68). On the other hand, a good deal 
of qualitative social research remains informed by positivism, aimed at 
eliciting “social norms” which are understood to be prescriptive of behaviour. 
The use of focus group research is a case in point (see Cunningham-Burley et 
a /1999).
In recent years the focus group has become one of the most highly utilised 
qualitative methods in the field of sexual and reproductive health (as well as in 
the field of social policy). Its utility is seen to lie in its ability to elicit descriptive 
data, opinions and attitudes from population subgroups, and for establishing 
the norms that guide their behaviour (Bender and Ewbank 1994). As Fricke
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(1997b:826-827) suggests, the focus group has become an increasingly 
popular method for demographic research:
“not least because it provides a glimmer of what the unscripted voice 
sounds like; in a desert of dry prose, even those of us who like 
statistical tables are delighted to hear a human voice. And it is 
gratifying when that voice illustrates a correlation or two or leads to a 
new regression”
The popularity of the focus group for policy related research has grown with 
the increasing emphasis placed by both public and private sector planning 
and strategy development on accessing the views of individual clients and 
consumers (Cunningham-Burley et al 1999:186). The focus group was initially 
developed as a tool for market research, and typically operates within a 
positivist paradigm, which holds that stated opinions, preferences and 
descriptions of behaviour can be regarded as “objective” social facts. Focus 
group participants are constructed as passive subjects who hold a set of fixed 
opinions and preferences which can be generated and collected in a carefully 
facilitated group setting. As such, the focus group does not allow for an 
understanding of subjects as active agents producing a range of narratives on 
social life according to specific concrete social situations.
The uncritical and unreflexive use of qualitative methods such as the focus 
group in family planning and reproductive health research, often produces 
simplistic, descriptive normative accounts of social practice, which fail to take 
account of fundamental issues of power and control in the generation of the 
data (Cunningham-Burley eta l 1999; Obermeyer 1997). Empirical and 
descriptive accounts of norms, such as those produced by focus groups, tell
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us little about how, when and why people use norms to legitimise behaviour or 
use other strategies that contradict social norms (Lockwood 1995). One of the 
main limitations of the focus group lies in its very tendency to produce 
normative responses, and its failure to produce a diversity of social 
commentaries:
“...focus group participants may be unlikely to openly discuss experiences 
that deviate from accepted social norms...While focus group discussions 
offer important insights into group norms and dominant values, they tend 
to be less effective in documenting variations from the norms, or values 
that deviate from dominant culture patterns” (Parker et al 1991: 91-92).
While positivist approaches may successfully elicit socially and morally 
prescribed principles for behaviour, they are limited in their ability to lay bare the 
concrete reality of everyday actions that often deviate from these norms and 
values. As Chapter 2 has argued, because of the implicit assumptions made by 
functionalism regarding the normative nature of social behaviour, the distinction 
between stated social norms of behaviour and everyday social practice is largely 
overlooked in the main body of demographic research (Lockwood, 1995). 
Furthermore, accounts of different sets of actors (including the most 
marginalized) are often missing from demographic accounts of sexual and 
reproductive behaviour.
The recognition by development agencies and practitioners of the limitations 
of positivist research methods for generating valid and appropriate information 
on social behaviour, has led to an increased interest in employing rapid 
participatory appraisal methods which give voice to the intended beneficiaries 
of development programmes (Manderson and Aaby, 1992). Participatory rural
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(or rapid) appraisal (PRA) and participatory learning for action (PLA) methods, 
which have developed out of a concern for listening to actor’s perspectives 
and empowering marginalized groups to have their voice heard, are 
increasingly being taken up by public sector organisations and NGOs 
concerned with sexual and reproductive health. The popularity of PRA 
emanates from its potential to generate community views, in a way that is held 
to be more reliable than conventional social research methods (Chambers 
1983; Chambers 1991; Mosse 1994).
Nonetheless, a major limitation of PRA methods is that the views expressed 
by key sections of the community, those who wield most “capital”, often 
become identified with the general interest, whilst the perspectives of the most 
marginalized groups remain unheard. Mosse (1994: 497) suggests that it is 
the focus placed by PRA methods on generating consensus views in a public 
setting which makes the production of local discourses most susceptible to 
the effects of what Bourdieu refers to as “officialising” strategies. The very 
technique of PRA generates data in a social context in which the influence of 
power, authority and gender inequality are likely to dominate (Mosse 
1994:505):
“...the paraphernalia of PRA research - paper, charts, coloured powders 
etc - may in fact generate a greater sense of mystification than 
conventional research methods... PRA, far from providing a neutral 
vehicle for local knowledge, actually creates a context in which the 
selective presentation of opinion is likely to be exaggerated, and where 
minority or deviant views are likely to be suppressed”.
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One of the major shortcomings of PRA is that it often represents an activity far 
removed from informal, everyday life, hence promoting the production of a 
consensus view and normative discourse from participants:
“It seems highly probable that this social formality imposes a selectivity on 
the kind of information which is presented and recorded in PRAs. At the 
very least, where critical debate in public is not an established convention, 
we should avoid unwarranted assumptions about the accountability of 
publicly processed information... PRAs tend to emphasize the general 
over the particular...tend towards the normative ('what ought to be’ rather 
than 'what is’), and towards a unitary view of interests which underplays 
differences... The tendency to give normative information may be 
encouraged by faulty interviewing techniques... but often the very 
structure of the PRA sessions -  group activities leading to plenary 
presentations -  assumes and encourages the expression of consensus.” 
(Mosse 1994: 508)
The shortcomings of the above methods allude to the need for a 
methodological approach to researching sexual and reproductive behaviour 
that enables a more rigorous engagement with the realities of the everyday 
lives of poor and marginalized people. Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis have 
suggested that achieving understanding across lines of difference requires a 
complex process of engagement, in which the researcher and the subject 
gradually improve understanding of each other through a dynamic process, 
and that central to this process is the mutual engagement in conversation and 
practical activity (Calhoun 1995). The investigation of actors’ views of their 
social world has largely been the domain of the anthropologist. Through 
ethnographic fieldwork, in which the researcher is able to observe concrete 
actions and collect the narratives of people as they go about their daily lives, 
the claim of anthropology is to be able to reach below the surface of reported 
social norms. The ethnographic approach is based on the premise that what
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people say about social life and behaviour changes according to the level of 
familiarity and trust established between the researcher and researched. 
However, one of the major limitations of the ethnographic approach, such as 
that used to develop the Bolivian ethnography in Chapters 3 and 4, is that 
fieldwork has to be carried out over a substantial period of time to enable a 
rappo rt and relationship of trust to build up between the researcher and the 
researched.
Recent debates in anthropology have raised questions over the inherently 
unequal power relations that exist between the anthropologist (who is usually 
a privileged northerner) and the researched (who is usually an under 
privileged Southerner) (Caplan 1997). Critical anthropology has referred to a 
crisis in representation, in which the very nature of the research process and 
representation of other cultures as presented through the anthropologist’s text 
(the ethnography) is increasingly being challenged (Marcus 1999). The 
question being raised within anthropology is how the western voice of the 
anthropologist as inscribed in many ethnographies can conceivably meet with 
the representations of the indigenous subject (Howard-Malverde 1997). As a 
result, anthropological narrative is experimenting with new ways to 
incorporate the subjectivity of both the researcher and the researched into the 
text. Caplan (1997), for example, has used personal narrative and 
biographical material written by a key informant in the field, as the basis for an 
ethnographic text. However, efforts to adopt a critical perspective on 
ethnographic representations and to integrate analysis of power and 
authorship into ethnographic writing has also been criticised for obscuring
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local niarrative, through theoretical debates which “weave another veil of elitist 
discourse between author and reader” (Luykx 1999:xvii-xviii). Indeed some 
critics have suggested that it is highly debateable whether the post-modern 
debate concerning the crisis in ethnographic representation “extends beyond 
a tiny coterie of hyper-educated intellectuals” (Barnes and Duncan 1992:251). 
Nonetheless critical debates within anthropology concerning the nature of the 
research process and ethnographic representation, have led to changes in the 
nature of research practice and a shift in the character of fieldwork (Marcus 
1999:7). Increasingly anthropologists are turning their attention to subject 
matter closer to home, and focusing on their own communities, institutions 
and organisations as the objects of inquiry.
However, as yet, in the field of international development, few advances have 
been made beyond the use of rapid participatory appraisal methods, to 
engage in a critical dialogue with the subjects of development policies and 
programmes. In the following section I present a methodology, entitled “peer 
ethnography” which I suggest provides a potential for engaging marginalized 
and excluded groups in active and critical dialogue with development 
programmes. The method is based on the notion that central to the 
researching of social life is the gathering of actors’ discourses and accounts of 
everyday life and practice. Nonetheless, I argue, these accounts must be 
understood as situated in concrete social situations in which social identity 
and relations of difference and power are continually being negotiated. People 
say what they say not as a result of abstract theorising, but as a result of their 
experience in concrete social, economic and political situations (Calhoun
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1995). In this sense, I suggest that engaging with local narratives must also 
be a critical and political process.
3. The Peer Ethnographic Method
The peer ethnographic method that I present in this section is derived from the 
anthropological approach I used during my ethnographic fieldwork in Bolivia.
The approach was developed as a part of a research project, funded by an 
international development agency, aimed at developing tools for the 
participatory appraisal and monitoring of sexual and reproductive health 
programmes. As a result of the research project a peer ethnographic tool was 
developed2. The basic premise of the peer ethnographic approach outlined in 
the tool (Hawkins and Price 2000) is that traditional research subjects 
(especially marginalized and excluded groups) can become active researchers 
of their social worlds and that through the research process can be empowered 
to engage in critical dialogue with programme implemented and policy makers.
The method was field-tested in Lusaka, Zambia, over a four month period, 
between October 1999 and January 2000, in collaboration with an international 
NGO implementing an adolescent sexual and reproductive health project. The 
initial design of the NGO project had been informed by an extensive PLA 
process, involving 10,000 young people. Following the PLA exercise, the NGO 
project was designed with the following key components: the establishment of 
youth-friendly counselling corners in government clinics; a cadre of trained youth
2 See Hawkins and Price (2000)
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educators to lead discussions with young people in the community and provide 
counselling in the youth-friendly comers; and the establishment of community 
agents to promote and sell contraceptives to young people (Hawkins and Price 
2000).
The peer ethnographic method has been designed to address some of the 
limitations of other applied research methods discussed in the previous section. 
Most importantly the aim of the method is to facilitate greater participatory 
dialogue between programme implemented and the people in the community 
that they are aiming to reach. The approach builds upon classical 
anthropological notions of social networks and is most applicable to urban 
situations in which a person may be a focal point for a number of social 
relationships including kin-groups, age-groups, informal peer networks, school­
mates and work-mates (see for example Epstein 1969). However, the approach 
makes a break from classical functionalist perspectives which suggest that 
social networks prescribe and sanction norms of behaviour to which peer groups 
conform.
The peer ethnographic method is based upon training people within local 
communities to conduct in-depth and unstructured interviews with individuals 
selected by them from their own social networks. A basic tenet of the 
approach is that the peer researchers have an established relationship with 
the people they are interviewing and as a result, the fieldwork does not 
require the same amount of time for rapport building as conventional 
anthropological ethnography or some PRA exercises. However an important
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consideration in designing the approach is an understanding that social 
networks are not made up of consensus groups, but often include 
relationships of conflict, contradiction and mistrust. Indeed as Colson (2000) 
notes in situations such as in urban Zambia where declining economic and 
social conditions impact on households and kin dynamics, hostilities and 
tensions within community networks are often exacerbated. The method also 
recognises that the same individual may answer questions differently in 
different contexts, and that as a result differing and conflicting perspectives 
will emerge in the interview narratives. The aim of the interviews is not to 
collect demographic data or social ‘facts’ through individual accounts of 
personal experience, but to elicit the meanings that actors attribute to the 
social behaviour of others in their social networks. An important aspect of the 
method, therefore, is that all interviews are conducted in the third person, so 
that interviewees are not asked to talk about themselves, but to talk 
generically about ‘other people like themselves’. The aim being to elicit 
narrative accounts of how interviewees conceptualise the social behaviour of 
‘others’ in their networks, not accounts of their own behaviour or normative 
statements about how they ‘ought’ to behave.
The method was also designed with the awareness that it is not possible to 
observe the behaviour or to record the narratives of others without filtering the 
data through an analytical framework, involving some level of meta-analysis. 
The method that was designed and subsequently field-tested in Zambia was 
therefore structured around several key analytical issues, central to the social 
analysis of sexual and reproductive behaviour. The framework tested in
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Zambia consisted of a set of five conversational interviews aimed at eliciting 
perceptions of social identity and social networks, health and illness, sexual 
knowledge and sexual behaviour, reproductive behaviour and fertility 
decision-making, and access to and quality of health services. Each 
interviewee was engaged in all five conversational interviews, over a three 
month period, with the aim that conducting a series of in-depth interviews over 
time with a small sample of people, will produce more valid data on social life 
than interviewing many respondents once only.
The field-testing was undertaken by eight young people who had previously 
been trained as youth educators by the NGO project. Four were female and 
four male, with three still in school/college, two in part-time employment, and 
three being unemployed. Each of the peer researchers interviewed between 
four and six young people, with a total of 30 young people interviewed. Prior 
to the fieldwork, the peer researchers underwent a participatory training in the 
use of the method. A set of conversational prompts were developed for each 
of the interviews, to assist the peer researchers to initiate conversations and 
to follow up on key issues. Some of the prompts covered the same issue 
through different ways of asking, in order to allow probing and changes in 
conversational context. The prompts were presented to the peer researchers 
as a framework for their conversations, rather than as an interview script. 
During training the peer researchers suggested significant changes to the 
prompts, refining them so that they translated easily into appropriate local 
language and context. Some of the initial prompts were found to have little 
meaning in the context of young people’s lives in urban Lusaka, while other
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important issues and topics had not been covered in the initial framework. The 
peer researchers field-tested different ways to raise the same issue with 
different interviewees, according to the age, gender, and ethnicity of the 
interviewee. Following the training the peer researchers piloted the 
conversational interviews in the community for a week, during which time they 
were provided with support and supervision. Following the field-testing, the 
prompts were refined further, so that the interviews that the peer researchers 
finally took to the field were locally specific versions of the generic interviews 
that had initially been designed.
During the field-testing of the method, its potential as a dynamic and flexible 
approach, which can be continually adapted and re-designed as part of the 
research process, became evident. Indeed, following its field-testing by the 
peer researchers, the final version of the interview framework was quite 
different to the one that had initially been designed, and which had been 
based upon the project’s ethnocentric assumptions about issues that would 
be of importance to young people. In this sense the project’s ownership and 
control over the method diminished in the course of it being used in the field. 
When I recently adapted the method for use with informal commercial sex 
workers in Cambodia, the peer researchers identified the main categories for 
the conversational interviews themselves. During this further adaptation of the 
approach in Cambodia, the prompts were also developed by the peer 
researchers during the training process. This was a substantial improvement 
on the initial approach field-tested in Zambia. Unfortunately I am unable to
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present the results of the peer research in Cambodia in this chapter, as the 
data collection is still in process.
It was not intended that the peer researchers should record a detailed script of 
each conversation they held or produce vast quantities of authentic 
conversational narrative or qualitative research data. The data collection 
prompts were designed to assist the peer researcher to record phrases and/or 
events given most importance by the interviewee during the course of the 
conversation. The intention was that the interviewee should participate in the 
data recording process through confirming that the phrases and events 
recorded by the peer researcher were the most important ones in their 
narratives and explanations. The peer researchers recorded the key words, 
phrases and data from each interview on a prompt sheet, and during data 
analysis these sheets were used to show how different themes had emerged 
in different conversational contexts.
A key issue that the method sought to address lies in the domain of language 
and interpretation. It was considered to be of particular importance that the 
interviews were conducted in local languages, particularly as the research 
focused on such intimate issues as sexuality, health, illness and reproduction. 
One of the strengths of the peer ethnographic method is that it facilitates 
interviews to be carried out using local colloquialisms and nuances. The major 
linguistic and interpretative problems arise at the level of interpretation of the 
peer researchers narratives, which could be considered as amounting to the 
“meta-analysis”. During the data collection process, I had to interview the peer
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researchers (who became my key informants) in English, as I did not have the 
time in the field that conventional anthropological ethnography would allow for 
learning the local language. A further limitation of the method was that the 
peer researchers had to be sufficiently literate to be able to record the 
conversational interview data. This requirement may, therefore have 
precluded the most marginalized groups from becoming peer researchers. 
However, the approach has potential to be developed as a purely ‘oral’ 
method with non-literate groups, although this adaptation of the tool has not 
yet been field-tested.
One of the main concerns of the participating NGO was that the approach is 
vulnerable to the criticism that the sample of respondents may be biased and 
unrepresentative. A further concern that was voiced was that it would be 
important to validate the data to ensure that the peer researchers were telling 
the truth about their behaviour and social lives. It is, perhaps, at this point that 
the method makes its greatest departure from positivism. A key strength of 
the method lies in its lack of claims to any positivist criteria for the collection 
and presentation of ‘objective’ or ‘standardised’ data. The peer ethnographic 
approach is not seeking social ‘truths’, as positivist methods may understand 
them, but an understanding of the social commentary and dynamics through 
which identity is negotiated and behaviour given meaning. The main focus of 
the method is on analysing contradiction and difference in the discourses of 
social actors within a network, rather than on gathering ‘social facts’. The 
field-testing in Zambia also highlighted that there was a good deal of diversity 
within peer researchers social networks. Diversity among interviewees was
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further ensured by selecting peer researchers from range of ethnic groups 
and socio-economic backgrounds, as well as ensuring an equal balance of 
male and female researchers.
One of the key social dynamics that the method draws upon is that of gossip 
(see Epstein 1969; Hammel 1990). Epstein (1969:125) has suggested that the 
exchange of gossip denotes a certain “community of interest” and that through 
gossip the norms of behaviour specific to a social network is expressed. 
However, one of the important aims of the peer ethnographic method is to 
highlight contradictions between normative statements made by groups 
regarding social behaviour and the everyday behaviours that individuals 
gossip about. These contradictions provides us with important data 
concerning relations of power and social context. The initial participatory 
training of the peer researchers served to highlight young people’s normative 
discourses regarding sexual and reproductive behaviour. For example, during 
the initial training peer researchers referred to sexual abstinence as the norm 
to which their peers adhered. However, the interview narratives highlighted 
the very contradictory nature of these normative statements and actual 
accounts of sexual behaviour. As Scott (1985:282) suggests, it is the act of 
violation of expected behaviour that makes an event worth gossiping about, 
the rule or norm in question often only being brought to consciousness as a 
result of its violation. Scott (1985) also suggests that gossip is an important 
form of resistance in conditions where the operations of power make open 
acts of disrespect dangerous. For the poor and socially marginalized, gossip 
may achieve the expression of disapproval, contempt, and disaffection with
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the social order, while minimising the risk of political reprisal. As Bourdieu 
(1991:106) suggests agents possess power in proportion to their symbolic 
capital. As such, gossip can be seen as the currency of social networks, 
providing valuable insights into how power operates at the local level, and into 
the strategies employed by poor and marginalized groups in their daily 
struggles for symbolic, social and economic capital.
However, one of the main limitations of the tool is that it does not immediately 
locate subjectivity and narratives within the historical and social context in 
which they are produced. The following section therefore provides a brief 
social context to young people’s sexual and reproductive health in Zambia 
before considering the key issues that emerged from the peer narratives.
4. Background Social and Economic Context in Zambia
At the beginning of the 21st Century Zambia is facing a severe economic and 
human development crisis. Macro-economic stability is extremely fragile, and 
over the past decade Zambia has experienced serious declines in human 
development indicators. Indeed of the 79 countries for which Human 
Development Index (HDI) data are available since 1975, Zambia is the only 
country where the HDI value for 1997 was lower than its 1975 value (UNDP 
2001).
Zambia’s current economic crisis has emerged out of the economic structure 
which evolved in the late 1890s in which Zambia became very dependent on
294
a single commodity, copper, for its foreign export earnings (Cleary 1989; 
Mwanza 1992). In 1911, the copper rich territory to the north of the Zambezi 
river was officially created as Northern Rhodesia under British occupation and 
control. With the development of the railway from the south to the north of the 
Zambezi river, there was an influx of white settlers to Northern Rhodesia at 
the turn of the 20th Century, and by the 1920s there had been a rapid 
expansion of mining activities in Northern Rhodesia’s Copperbelt region.
Many of the white settlers who went to Northern Rhodesia during the copper 
boom were ill-educated and unskilled workers. Nonetheless they enjoyed 
significant privileges over the indigenous black population, benefiting from 
preferential treatment as mine employees, civil servants and local government 
administrators (Mwanakatwe 1994: 12). The soaring price of copper and the 
leap in world copper consumption produced huge confidence in Northern 
Rhodesia’s copper mining industry by the late 1920s (Mwanakatwe 1994).
The local black population provided the much needed labour force to work the 
large farm estates and mines owned by the white settlers. During the colonial 
era much of the revenue created by the copper mining industry in Northern 
Rhodesia was also used to underpin industrial development in Southern 
Rhodesia (Cleary 1989).
At independence (gained in 1964) the new government inherited an economy 
in which there had been little investment, apart from into the mining sector. 
Copper mining provided the economic base for Zambia’s industrial 
development, while the colonial government had paid little attention to
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,investment in agriculture, the net result being a decline in agricultural 
production, particularly of food (Cleary 1989:13). While there had been some 
industrial development in Zambia in the 1960s and 1970s, Zambia remained 
highly dependent on imports. Once the world copper price began to collapse 
in the 1970s, Zambia was unable to turn to alternative sources of foreign 
exchange, entering the 1980s in deep economic crisis. The country was also 
unable to benefit from a brief rise in copper prices in the mid-1980s as 
productivity had been severely weakened due to lack of investment in the 
mines (Cleary 1989).
In the late 1980s there was another dramatic decline in the world copper 
price, severely affecting Zambia’s foreign exchange earnings and growth in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) throughout the 1990s. These developments 
led to a growing trade deficit for Zambia rising from $27 million in 1997 to 
$159 million in 1998 and reaching $186 million in 1999 (UNDP 2001). In 1999, 
the Zambian economy registered a growth of 2.4%. While this represented an 
improvement over a decline of 1.8% registered the previous year, the 
economic growth was lower than the population growth rate of 3.1%, implying 
that in per capita terms growth had been negative (UNDP 2001).
Equally important to Zambia’s economic crisis has been the burden of 
external debt, which has continued to grow as the economy has contracted. 
The extreme burden of debt has left the country little choice but to yield to the 
demands made by the IMF and World Bank for measures of “structural 
adjustment” to the economy (Ferguson 1999:9). While Zambia has recently
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been granted debt relief under the second Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
initiative (HIPC 2), civil society groups have been advocating through the 
Jubilee 2000 Campaign for the complete cancellation of debt as the only 
solution to Zambia’s economic crisis. Under the HIPC initiative Zambia will 
obtain relief of up to 75% of its debt stock, covering both bilateral and 
multilateral debt, amounting to some US$3.8 billion over a 15 to 20 year 
period (UNDP 2001).The debt relief which began in January 2001 will 
continue to be effective on condition that Zambia completes the process to 
finalise its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), accelerates 
expenditure on social services and continues to implement structural reforms.
The structural adjustment programme in Zambia has been implemented on an 
on-off basis since the late 1970s, when the parastatal sector first started to 
come under heavy criticism by donors for inefficiencies in its operations. In the 
late 1980s the Zambian government briefly suspended the IMF sponsored 
adjustment programme in the face of a deepening economic crisis, 
introducing its own New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP), which 
severely curtailed debt servicing. Most foreign donors refused to support the 
NERP, urging the government to return to the IMF programme. Following 
President Kenneth Kaunda’s defeat in the 1991 elections the government 
returned to the implementation of an IMF led structural adjustment 
programme. The main austerity measures of the adjustment programme have 
included devaluation of the currency, deregulation of foreign exchange, the 
removal of subsidies and price controls for food and other essential 
commodities, the retrenchment of state support to the health and education
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sectors, and the privatisation of the major parastatal corporations (Ferguson 
1999). In particular, the privatisation of the mines has been seen by 
international financing agencies as essential for regenerating the sector and 
boosting productivity, despite the fact that the privatisation programme has 
experienced extreme difficulties in securing external investment. The 
completion of privatisation of Zambia’s biggest state-owned enterprise the 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) has recently failed to take place. 
While the Structural Adjustment Programme has been seen by international 
financing institutions as the only path to economic stabilisation, civil society 
groups are highlighting the profound impact of the adjustment measures on 
equity and human welfare. In particular the removal of state subsidies and 
privatisation of the mining sector has led to mass retrenchment and early 
retirement of workers, including loss of access by ex-miners to social services 
such as housing, health care and education which were previously provided 
by the mining corporations (Catholic Centre for Justice Development and 
Peace-CCJDP 2002).
Formal sector employment as a ratio of the labour force in Zambia has always 
been small, dropping from 12.1 percent in 1996 to 11 percent in 1999. Most of 
the labour force is employed in the informal sector, with subsistence farmers 
making up 66.2% of those classified as economically active. The productivity 
of the agricultural sector has also been severely affected by a number of 
factors in recent years. The liberalisation of agricultural markets has had an 
impact on farmers in areas outside the line of the railway, due to the loss of 
guaranteed markets for their produce and a fall in net farm incomes (UNDP
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I2001). Poor agricultural performance has been exacerbated in recent years 
by erratic rainfall. The poor rainfall in some parts of the country and excess 
rainfall in others during the 2000-1 and 2001-2 seasons means that the 
precarious food security situation in the country is likely to worsen (National 
Early Warning Technical Committee 2002). In an economy where the majority 
of the poor depend on agriculture for their survival, poor growth in this sector 
is a major factor in the worsening conditions of poverty.
In addition, households have increasingly faced difficulties in ensuring 
nutritionally adequate food due to rising cost of staple foods, largely as a 
result of the complete removal of food subsidies as part of the structural 
reforms (UNDP 2001). The government has contracted the private sector to 
import maize to meet the current short-fall. However, due to the high import 
costs of maize the price of 25 kilos of mealie-meal rose in some areas from 
18,000 Kwacha (approximately £3) to 30,000 Kwacha (approximately £5), in 
2001. By December 2001 the price of maize meal had risen by 53% in some 
shops in Lusaka, putting the staple food beyond the reach of many Zambians 
(CCJDP 2002). The rising cost of food has resulted in worsening of the 
malnutrition situation in the country with a rising incidence of stunting among 
children (UNDP 2001).
Investment in social sectors was severely curtailed during the 1990s as a 
result of the economic restructuring programme. The health sector reforms 
implemented in 1993, introduced a system of user-fees in order to supplement 
government financing of services. Government spending on health went down
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from US$5.1 per capita in 1991 to US$2.8 in 1997 (Bias and Limbambala 
2001). A recent study on the impact of health sector reforms during the period 
1993 to 1997 suggests that user payments led to dramatic declines in 
utilisation of health services by the poorest (Bias and Limbambala 2001). 
Given the high proportion of extremely poor people in Zambia and the 
worsening economic situation, even small increases in the cost of health care 
services have severely affected access. The use of self medication by many 
poor people has been attributed mainly to lack of money to visit health centres 
rather than to the specific nature of the illness (Bias and Limbambala 2001).
In 1995, the Zambian government introduced the policy of cost-sharing for 
basic education. Estimates based on published reports such as those of the 
World Bank (Zambia Education Sector Expenditure Review 1990-1996) and 
the Central Statistical Office (Priority Survey II, 1993) suggest that households 
spend nearly twice the amount on primary education as that provided through 
the public budget (Oxfam/JCTR 2001). Consequently, education enrolment is 
on the decline with 15% of children not having any access to basic education 
(UNDP 2001). Girls are adversely affected with lower enrolment, higher 
attrition and lower completion rates as compared to boys. At the same time 
there has been a decline in education standards attributable to deteriorating 
facilities and decline in the supply of teachers. While the government has 
recently announced that school-fees for basic education will be abolished, civil 
society groups warn that that elimination of fees alone will not significantly 
improve attendance. Without a greater budgetary commitment to basic
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education, the elimination of fees may serve to only further reduce the quality 
of education and access to basic materials.
Within the above context of enduring poverty and economic decline, Zambia 
is facing a severe HIV/AIDS epidemic with current prevalence rates estimated 
at nearly 20% of the adult population (Government of Republic of Zambia, 
1999a). Protestantism has framed much of the discourse within which morality 
and sexuality are debated in Zambia, often fuelling contradictory responses to 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In 1996 Zambia was declared constitutionally a 
Christian nation, and Church membership has assumed an increasing 
importance in the organisation of social life. With Protestant groups often 
invoking a sense of personal blame and moral chastisement of people 
suffering from HIV and AIDS, people living with HIV and AIDS remain highly 
stigmatised. The HIV/AIDS epidemic also took a hold in Zambia at a time 
when the country was firmly locked into the neo-liberal adjustment policies of 
the IMF and the World Bank (Bujra and Baylies 2000). Public health and 
education services have been severely weakened due to lack of government 
investment, and user fees and cost-sharing present major barriers to access 
to health and education for many of the country’s poor (an ever increasing 
majority).
There is strong evidence that social factors of poverty, gender norms of 
sexuality, combined with moralistic messages which promote abstinence and 
stigmatise condom use, are major factors in increasing vulnerability to HIV 
infection in Zambia. However, within policy discourse there has been a very
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strong tendency to identify specific cultural practices as major factors 
contributing to the epidemic. In particular the practices of dry sex and sexual 
cleansing have received a significant amount of attention in public policy 
discourse. The discourse relating to these cultural practices is based upon 
broad generalisations largely derived from a few small-scale studies carried 
out by NGOs, and are not supported by in-depth anthropological analysis. 
Zambia is extremely culturally diverse, with over 70 ethnic groups, and 
specific cultural practices are by no means universally practised. For example, 
as yet there appears to be little evidence to suggest that dry sex is as 
commonly practised as is currently perceived. Anthropological data from 
among the Tonga in Southern Province, suggests that while dry sex is 
practised by women who have recently given birth, the practice is neither very 
widespread nor given much importance important by men and women 
(Gausset 2001).
The term sexual cleansing has been used in public health discourse to refer to 
ritualised practices by which penetrative sexual intercourse is performed with 
the spouse of a deceased person, and is often equated in policy discourse 
with widow inheritance. While widow inheritance has been reported among 
ethnic groups in Zambia with both matrilineal and patrilineal descent systems 
(Malungo 2001), anthropological studies suggest that ritualised sexual 
cleansing is by no means universally linked to widow inheritance (see Price 
1998). There are also strong indications that with increased awareness of 
HIV/AIDS there has been a decline in the practice of sexual cleansing 
(Gausset 2001; Malungo 2001). Price (1998:34) also suggests that among
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the Gwembe Tonga post-partum sexual abstinence is declining with increased 
awareness about HIV/AIDS, as women fear that compliance with the taboo 
will force their husbands into sexual relationships with other women 
(especially sex workers).
The declining economic situation combined with gender norms of sexuality 
significantly increase women’s vulnerability to HIV infection. While women 
have become more economically autonomous in recent years, in the context 
of declining economic conditions, sexual exchange for money is becoming an 
increasingly important economic survival strategy for many women (Ferry et 
al). As has been noted in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the balance 
of power at household level is shifting slowly and unevenly as a growing 
number of rural households have come to depend on women’s income for 
daily subsistence needs (see for example Mbilinyi and Kaihula 2000).
Knowledge of HIV and AIDS is very low among young people in Zambia. 
Stigmatisation around HIV and AIDS, and lack of open debate concerning 
sexuality is a major barrier to young people accessing sexual health 
information and services. Condom use remains low among adolescents, with 
only 16% of young people reporting condom use during the most recent 
sexual act (Government of Zambia, Central Statistical Office 1998b). This 
figure is considerably lower than among older age groups. As the economic 
infrastructure of Zambia continues to decline, the population lacks access to 
basic food and social services and the HIV epidemic continues to hit the
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majority of households, there is an increasing sense of vulnerability among 
young people in Zambia.
5. Classifications and Issues Emerging from the Peer Researchers’ 
Narratives
The peer research presented in this section was carried out in three 
compounds in Lusaka. Each compound is served by a government clinic, in 
which a youth-friendly corner has been established. While the compounds are 
relatively close to each other (Compounds Y and Z border each other), they 
are also quite distinct in character and layout. The most affluent compound 
(Compound X) was constructed by the government in the 1970s to provide 
housing to state employees, although housing passing from government to 
private ownership during the 1990s. Compound X has a higher proportion of 
residents in employment than either of the other two compounds and a 
relatively well developed infrastructure. Compounds Y and Z differ 
significantly from Compound X, with much higher levels of unemployment and 
poverty. Houses in Compounds Y and Z are mainly one-room buildings 
constructed by residents from mud bricks with corrugated iron (or cardboard) 
roofs, in contrast to the largely brick built two-three room houses of 
Compound X. While Compound X is built around an infrastructure of roads, 
Compounds Y and Z are accessible only by dirt tracks. All three compounds 
are ethnically mixed: residents include Bemba, Shona and Nyakusa and 
Nyanja.
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As Werbner (1996:2) notes in the context of post-colonial Africa, disparate 
identity strategies emerge in the context of everyday life, expressed through 
local language and the “cultural richness of specific idioms, images, 
metaphors and metonyms”. Locating narratives in their specific socio-cultural 
context, therefore provides a basis for understanding how identity is 
continually negotiated by social actors in concrete situations. Hence, the 
interview narratives produced by the peer researchers provided rich data from 
which to build an understanding of young people’s social networks and 
experience of sexual and reproductive health.
Within young people’s narratives, by far the most important aspect of social 
organisation and identity was church membership. Each compound has a 
multiplicity of churches including Catholic, Evangelical, Jehovah’s Witness, 
Seventh Day Adventists, and Spiritualist. Church membership provides structure 
to young people’s daily lives, both in terms of a moral framework of behaviour to 
which they aspire, and access to a social support networks. In many of the 
narratives out-of-school and unemployed youth talked about the church as a 
major social resource in their community and a focus for their daily activities.
The interview narratives showed a surprising consistency in the terms and 
categories used by young people to describe the different groups of people that 
live in their compounds. For young people, neither ethnicity nor kinship were 
important categories in describing their social world. Rather, categorisations 
were based on perceived social behaviours, placed within a predominantly 
moral framework, supported by a Christian discourse. The most common
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categories used by interviewees to describe the people in their compounds were 
churchgoers, school-goers, self-employed, poor/unemployed, drunkards, 
thieves, prostitutes, and gangsters (yos). Although the church provides young 
people with a set of ideals of moral behaviour, in young people’s narratives 
being a church-goer does not stand in contradiction to being a member of 
those groups whose behaviours are described as “immoral” or unchristian, 
such as drunkards, thieves and prostitutes.
Wizards also appeared as a significant category in young people’s 
classifications. According to the peer researchers’ narratives, wizards are 
pervasive throughout the compounds, identified as those members of the 
community who practise witchcraft (usually at night). Colson (2000) notes that 
witchcraft accusations are rife in Zambia despite the increasing importance of 
the Christian church. Wizards appear to occupy an ambivalent place in young 
people’s discourses, illustrative of their ambivalent position vis-a-vis their 
traditional culture. However, the ambiguities of the discourse surrounding 
witchcraft also reflect the very complex and contradictory socio-economic 
reality within which young people negotiate their identity. Most young people 
describe wizards as being older people, who by practising witchcraft show 
themselves as unchristian: the churches teach that believing in witchcraft is 
the equivalent to worshipping the devil. On the one hand young people reject 
witchcraft as a false and traditional (and therefore unchristian) belief, on the 
other hand in many narratives young people suggest that they are only 
protected from the effects of witchcraft by virtue of their allegiance to the 
Christian church, and hence the protection offered to them through the blood
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of Christ. In other words, young people associate witchcraft with the traditional 
belief systems of their parents’ and grandparents’ generation from which they 
are socially and culturally separated. Colson (2000:334) suggests that 
witchcraft accusations arising out of suspicion of kin and neighbours may 
reach a high point during economic distress. With the Christian church 
offering no explanation for personal misfortune or worse invoking a sense of 
moral failure as the cause of much of illness and distress, Colson (2000:335) 
suggests that it is not surprising that the growing influence of Christian 
Churches is associated with pervasive fears of witches. However, the 
conflicting discourses on traditionalism and Christianity also have important 
implications for how young people negotiate their identity and sexual and 
reproductive health.
The categories of social behaviour used to describe the groups of people 
living in their compounds, are also closely linked to young people’s 
perceptions of poverty and livelihood strategies. Those described as being 
businessmen, are mainly young men who own small shops or bars in the 
compounds or who drive or work as conductors on mini-buses, the informal 
transport services that link the compounds to the town. The category of self- 
employed includes those who work as market traders (such as women who 
sell fruit and vegetables) and young men or ntemba boys (who sell sweets 
and biscuits from small kiosks at the side of the road). While market traders of 
their parents’ generation are not necessarily perceived as being rich, ntemba 
boys are perceived by their peers as being well-off having their own 
independent source of income. Gangsters (yos), identified by their style of
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dress (T-shirts and wide trousers) and their following of black American cult 
music figures (such as Notorious BIG), are also categorised by other young 
people as influential, self-employed or businessmen. Gangsters are therefore 
identified by virtue of their individual economic and social status, as opposed 
to being part of a gang culture.
Bars and nightclubs emerged as an important part of social life in the 
compounds, particularly for those young people who are out-of-school. The 
category ‘drunkards’ refers to those young men who spend their days around 
the many small bars in the compounds. These young men usually earn 
money from piecework (casual labour). One interviewee described drunkards 
as those who “after earning a small amount from piecework, spend it in the 
bars and on chibuku (locally brewed beer) and dagga (marijuana)”. While bars 
are a focal point for social networking they are also important contact points 
for piecework which is usually contracted through these informal social 
networks.
‘Prostitute’ was a significant category referred to in the interview narratives. 
These narratives indicated that the nature of commercial sex activity varies 
between the different compounds. In Compound X commercial sex appears to 
be more organised (in a 'red-light area’), whereas in Compounds Y and Z 
commercial sex seems to be a more pervasive activity throughout bars and 
nightclubs. While young women’s narratives tend to associate commercial sex 
with vulnerability and poverty, young men’s discourses relate such activities to
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“bad behaviour”, with moral judgements and condemnations of commercial 
sex often referring to young men’s vulnerability to HIV/AIDS:
Prostitutes talk about how to make money. There was this girl who, 
before she was married, was a prostitute because she had nothing to 
do at home and no money. She joined a small group of girls who used 
to go in the street and hang out around the cabs. She was lucky 
because she did not get HIV and found her husband while she was a 
prostitute. She told him about being a prostitute and he offered to 
marry her... now she says she will never be a prostitute again (girl)
Prostitutes are different to people like me. They don’t have good 
morals - even though some of them do go to church... Prostitutes 
cause worry because sometimes they go round knocking on single 
men’s doors looking for business. Some men are not strong enough to 
resist (boy).
Poverty is described in many of the narratives as the major determinant of 
health. The rich or well-off are identified as those who have three meals a 
day, can afford the costs of medicines, are in good health, and look fat and 
confident. Those who are poor eat one meal a day (and sometimes none), 
cannot afford to buy medicines, and consequently suffer from poor health. 
The main illnesses about which young people are concerned are sexually- 
transmitted infections (STIs) and HIV/AIDS, malaria, cholera, diarrhoea, and 
tuberculosis.
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The narratives also revealed the very ambivalent nature of young people’s 
health-seeking behaviour. Few young people trust nyangas (traditional 
healers), who are referred to variously as ‘witches’, ‘cheats’, and ‘tricksters’, 
and seen as “unreliable and expensive”. Narratives describe nyangas as 
causing distrust in the community because of their association with witchcraft. 
In particular nyangas have access to empowering medicines which can be 
used both for personal protection from witchcraft as well as for causing 
misfortune to others (see Colson 2000). Narratives also referred to nyangas 
having the medicines and herbs to enable wizards to travel at night to conduct 
their witchcraft through use of magical devices such as planes (baskets in 
which wizards fly), and trains (made of coffins) in which wizards can move 
invisibly through the compounds.
Young people consider bio-medical health professionals (doctors and nurses) 
as having the appropriate knowledge and skills to treat their illnesses. 
Nonetheless, there is an apparent contradiction between discourses on health 
knowledge and belief systems, and narratives describing health-seeking 
behaviour. Peer researchers in their discussions observed that while young 
people say they do not trust nyangas, many stories indicate that a significant 
proportion of young people still visit nyangas, in particular for treatment of 
STIs. This is largely attributed to lack of accessible, available and affordable 
treatment from government clinics and private doctors.
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Narratives on sexual relationships also indicate that sexuality presents itself 
as a major area of conflict in young people’s lives. The majority of young 
people cite abstinence as the preferred option for protection against HIV. 
Abstinence is the message received by young people from the church as the 
‘moral standard’ to which they should adhere. Sticking to one partner and 
using condoms are mentioned in the interviews largely as second options, if a 
person is unable to abstain. However, narrative accounts of sexual 
relationships present a very different reality: sexual relationships are an 
integral part of most young people’s lives and an important source of social 
and emotional support and self-esteem. Sexual relationships are described as 
being important because they are “fun”, “enjoyable” and “help you experience 
new things” and because it is “not normal to not have a sexual relationship”.
Economic exchange forms an integral part of young people’s sexual 
relationships, and the giving of gifts by boyfriends is talked about by young 
women as an important part of a caring sexual relationship. While young men 
referred to women’s physical appearance as being one of the most important 
concerns in choosing with whom to have a sexual relationship (eg “she is 
pretty”, “she wears nice clothes” etc), young women refer to men’s economic 
status and sexual behaviour. A boy who expects a girl to have sex with him 
and who does not make her feel good by giving her nice gifts such as biscuits, 
body lotion and make-up, is considered not only undesirable but also immoral. 
For many young women, boyfriends are their only means of accessing 
desirable consumer goods, as well as money to pay for essentials such as 
school fees.
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Economic criteria figure largely in young women’s descriptions of their ideal 
boyfriends. In particular young women describe ideal partners as being 
ntemba boys (kiosk owners), bus drivers and bus conductors, and those who 
have the ‘four C’s’ (a car, a crib/house, cash and a cell-phone). However, men 
who have access to income also figure largely in the narratives as those most 
likely to have multiple sexual partners, and to engage in high risk sexual 
activity, especially around bars and night-clubs. Young men talk about sexual 
relationships as central to their esteem and social status, but also refer to 
sexual relationships as difficult when they do not have money to buy gifts for 
girlfriends. Hence, for young men securing an income appears to be as much 
about being able to secure a girl-friend as it is about access to a livelihood. 
For young women, a sexual relationship is as much about being able to 
secure a livelihood as it is about achieving sexual and emotional security. 
Hence, sexuality and livelihood strategies are closely intertwined in young 
people’s construction and negotiation of sexual relationships, and the social 
contexts in which they engage in high-risk sexual activity. Unwanted 
pregnancy emerged as a major concern for young women, and the majority of 
pregnancies described by young people in their social network were 
unplanned. While abortion is legal in Zambia (requiring the signature of three 
doctors) only one of the stories referred to a young women accessing a safe 
abortion through the University Teaching Hospital in Lusaka. All the other 
narratives concerning abortion described unsafe abortions, procured through 
insertion of instruments into the vagina or consuming large quantities of
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chloroquine. Several narratives refer to unsafe abortion leading to death, and 
to young women disposing of new-born babies in pit latrines.
Cost of services emerged as a major barrier to young people’s access to 
health care. As with the interviews on health-seeking behaviour, interviews 
concerning access and quality of services indicated that young people 
consider clinic personnel as having the most appropriate skills and knowledge 
to meet their needs. The majority of young people indicated that personnel at 
government clinics would be their first choice of service provider, while those 
with access to income tend to seek services from private doctors. 
Nonetheless, interviews identified some significant barriers to young people’s 
access to treatment and services. Most young people know that STI services 
are provided free of charge at government clinics, and select clinics as their 
first option for treatment. However, while young people consider that clinic 
staff are the most appropriate providers to diagnose infections effectively and 
accurately, government clinics are often short of drugs, and young people are 
unable to afford prescriptions. As a consequence many young people turn to 
self-medication, using drugs sold by peddlers (which are usually expired), or 
turn to traditional healers.
Condoms are provided free as part of the government family planning 
programme, available at clinics. Interviews indicate that barriers to young 
people accessing family planning services include lack of knowledge of their 
availability, negative attitudes of nurses, and fear of being seen at clinics. 
Public sector family planning services are provided within the maternal and
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child health clinic, and young men in particular describe feeling self-conscious 
about visiting such female environments to ask for condoms. Socially- 
marketed condoms are available at kiosks, bars and pharmacies in the 
compound (three condoms retail for the price of a glass of chibuku). Lack of 
access to economic resources was identified as a major concern for all young 
people interviewed. The lack of availability of free condoms at community- 
based outlets located close to centres of high-risk sexual activity (such as 
bars and night-clubs) emerged in discussions with peer researchers as a 
major barrier to access. As one peer researcher put it: “If a young man is at a 
bar, and he has been drinking beer, and he meets a girl, if he has a choice 
between spending his money on condoms or buying another chibuku, he will 
buy another chibuku”.
6. Conclusion
The data presented above amounts to what could be considered as a 
‘meta-analysis’, in which the peer researchers’ narratives have been drawn on 
as a primary source of ethnographic data. In effect, the peer researchers have 
become key informants during the data analysis process. During the data 
collection, I was able to complement in-depth interviews with the peer 
researchers (on their interview narratives) with participant observation in the 
compounds. I was also able to meet and interview friends and kin of the peer 
researchers, as well as community members who were not an immediate part 
of the key informants social networks, such as nyangas, church leaders, bar 
owners, and health care providers. Hence, as key informants the peer
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researchers were able to provide strategic entry points into the community, 
which enabled the meta-analysis of the interview narratives to be placed 
within a broader social context.
As has been argued in previous sections of this thesis, theory always 
underlies the interpretation of narratives and practical activity. The efforts of 
social scientists to interpret other cultures are never free from the larger 
structures and historical conditions that bring different cultures into a 
relationship with each other (Calhoun 1995:52). My interpretation of the data 
has, therefore, necessarily been filtered through an analytical framework, the 
theoretical background to which has been outlined in previous chapters of this 
thesis. The peer researchers also conducted their own data analysis, in which 
they worked as a group to identify what they considered to be the key issues 
emerging from the interviews and of most importance to feedback to the NGO 
project. At this second level of analysis, the peer researchers also brought 
their own perspectives and world view to bear on their interpretation of the 
interview narratives. As Jenkins (1992:69) observes:
“Every society, every culture, every group of people who recognise 
themselves as a collectivity, has theories about the world and their 
place in it: models of how the world is, of how the world ought to be, of 
human nature, of cosmology. These are what tend to be revealed in 
the ‘official accounts’ which form the core of informant’s testimony to 
interested researchers. But the point to bear in mind about these 
accounts is that they are learned and constructed in, through and as 
apart of the business of everyday life”
Peer ethnographers also utilised the data they collected to identify key areas 
in which the NGO project could be improved or strengthened from young
people’s perspective. These included: reaching young people with information
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and condoms in places where they meet such as bars, night clubs, and on 
mini-buses (especially for out-of-school youth); using peer networks to make 
free condoms more easily available; and increased advocacy on behalf of 
young people, for example, to increase their access to effective drugs for 
treating STIs. One of the major challenges raised by the peer researchers to 
the NGO project was that young people require more information on access to 
safe abortion services. However as the project was funded by USAID, project 
staff refused to enter into a dialogue with the young people on this issue, 
despite the research highlighting it as a major area of concern for young 
people in the compounds.
One of the most important outcomes of the data collection and analysis 
process was the ensuing dialogue that it generated, both between the peer 
researchers and the project staff and between the peer researchers and other 
young people in their social networks. However, while the peer research 
provided a basis from which the young people involved were able to challenge 
some of the assumptions and premises of the project, it cannot be assumed 
that the necessary shift in power relations ensued to enable the views of the 
researchers to be fully heard by project staff and therefore integrated into the 
project design. In this respect the research process served to highlight the 
very disempowered situation of the young people involved in the project as 
youth educators, despite the fact that training young people as youth 
educators was the project’s main participatory and empowerment strategy.
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Nonetheless, in challenging the programme on a number of core issues, for 
example, young people’s access to information on safe abortion services and 
to STI drugs, the peer researchers began to enter into a critical and political 
dialogue with the project. A major issue that emerged during the research 
process was the strong dissatisfaction of the volunteer youth educators with 
the lack of adequate compensation they were receiving for their time spent on 
project activities. In addition through their dynamic engagement in dialogue 
with their peers in the community the peer researchers were able to begin to 
devise strategies by which the project could reach marginalized and excluded 
young people in the compounds.
Furthermore, the peer researchers suggested that peer ethnography was an 
important means for reaching these more marginalized groups and increasing 
their participation and dialogue with health care providers. While the NGO 
project viewed the peer ethnographic method as a useful means of gathering 
research data, for the peer researchers the approach appeared to offer a 
potential for greater political engagement with their peer group on issues of 
central importance to their identity and everyday social practice. However, 
introducing into policymaking and programme implementation a truly 
participatory and reflexive approach which engages with the very complex 
contexts in which identity and diversity are negotiated and experienced, 
requires more than simply training peer educators or peer researchers in the 
field. As the concluding chapter suggests, it also implies the need for 
fundamental changes in the operation of institutional power at the local and 
national level, as well as in the processes by which development decisions
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are made, resources allocated and policies formulated (see Blackburn and 
Holland 1998).
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Chapter 6 
Critical Social Analysis
The Implications For Policy and Practice 
(Conclusion)
“Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being 
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the 
reproductive system and to its functions and processes. Reproductive health 
therefore implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and 
that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and 
how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition is the right of men and women to 
be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable 
methods of family planning of their choice, as well as other methods of their 
choice for regulation of fertility which are not against the law, and the rights of 
access to appropriate health-care services that will enable women to go safely 
through pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with the best chances of 
having a healthy infant In line with the above definition of reproductive health, 
reproductive health care as defined as the constellation of methods, techniques 
and services that contribute to reproductive health and well-being through 
preventing and solving reproductive health problems. It also includes sexual 
health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations, 
and not merely counselling and care related to reproduction and sexually 
transmitted diseases" (POA ICPD 1995: para 7.2)
1. Reconsidering the Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights 
Discourse
1.1 Reproductive Health: A Global Discourse
This thesis began with an exploration of the historical and political context in 
which international population policy has developed, and in which the ICPD 
discourse of sexual and reproductive health and rights has emerged. In this final
319
Chapter, I return to a consideration of sexual and reproductive health and rights 
as a global discourse, which I argue has arisen out of a process of globalisation 
of policy frameworks within which neo-liberalism has become a hegemonic policy 
discourse.
Since the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development the 
concept of reproductive health and rights has gained prominence in international 
population and development policy discourse. A universal definition of 
reproductive health was set out for the first time in Chapter VII of the ICPD 
Programme of Action (POA), in which reproductive health is described as a state 
of “complete physical, mental and social well-being”, as opposed to merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity.
The ICPD definition of reproductive health has been re-affirmed in subsequent 
global conferences and ensuing documents such as the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action (1995), and incorporated into national population policy 
frameworks, as the case study example from Bolivia (Chapter 3 of this thesis) 
illustrates. Chapter 1 of this thesis has outlined that through the incorporation of a 
‘feminist inspired fertility paradigm’ (see Thomas and Price 1999:795) the ICPD 
POA appears to present a new policy paradigm in which the central focus of 
international population and development policy is on individual rights, freedoms 
and choices, as opposed to demographic targets. Within the ICPD discourse the
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notion of reproductive health is inseparable from the notion of reproductive rights 
which according to the ICPD POA (1995: para 7.3):
“ rest on the recognition of the basic rights of all couples and individuals to 
decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their 
children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to 
attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health. It also 
includes the right to make all decisions concerning reproduction free of 
discrimination, coercion and violence, as expressed in human rights 
documents. In the exercise of this right, they should take into account the 
needs of their living and future children and their responsibilities toward 
community. The promotion of the responsible exercise of these rights for 
all people should be the fundamental basis for government- and 
community-supported policies and programmes in the area of reproductive 
health, including family planning. As part of their commitment, full attention 
should be given to the promotion of mutually respectful and equitable 
gender relations and particularly to meeting the educational and services 
needs of adolescents to enable them to deal in a positive and responsible 
way with their sexuality. Reproductive health eludes many of the world’s 
people because of factors such as: inadequate levels of knowledge about 
human sexuality and inappropriate or poor-quality reproductive health 
information and services; the prevalence of high-risk sexual behaviour; 
discriminatory social practices; negative attitudes towards women and 
girls; and the limited power many women have over their sexual and 
reproductive lives”.
Reproductive health and rights is a recent addition to the discourse of 
international human rights (Eriksson 2000). In defining decisions about fertility 
and health as a basic human right, the ICPD discourse draws upon existing 
human rights frameworks, outlined in international treaties and human rights law. 
As the ICPD POA (1995; 7.3) states:
“Bearing in mind the above definition [of reproductive health], reproductive 
rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in 
international law, international human rights documents and other relevant 
United Nations consensus documents”.
321
The notion of ‘universal human rights’ is itself a relatively new development in 
international policy discourse, having come into everyday usage only since World 
War II and the founding of the United Nations. The liberal notion of universal 
human rights enshrined in UN consensus documents (including the ICPD POA) 
is rooted in the enlightenment concept of ‘natural rights’, in which rights were 
understood as pertaining to all human beings based upon natural law and the 
universal progression of society towards a state of modernity and scientific 
rationality.
The liberal notion of universal human rights, chief among which are the right to 
‘life, liberty and freedom’ (Steiner and Alston 1996:1110), only became 
incorporated into international development discourse during the Cold War era. 
The UN declaration of human rights provided a global framework for the 
assertion of the rights of the individual, and formed the basis upon which the 
liberal notion of the free and autonomous individual able by personal choice to 
make his or her own way in the world (Calhoun 2000) became incorporated the 
international human rights and development discourse. As Chapter 1 has argued, 
within the Cold War rhetoric, the notion of a ‘quintessential’ West in which the 
rights, freedom and liberty of the individual were protected as sacrosanct, was 
counter-posed to a notion of a ‘quintessentially’ underdeveloped East and the 
Third World (Wolf 1982).
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Ever since the first UN World Conference on Human Rights, held in Teheran in 
1968, the relationship between human rights and development has occupied a 
prominent position in the international policy discourse (Steiner and Alston,
1996). The debate concerning development and rights brings together a number 
of important concerns including the links between human rights and democratic 
government (good governance in current policy rhetoric), the relationship 
between individual and collective rights, and the extent to which the international 
community bears responsibility for assisting states whose resources are 
inadequate to ensure the rights of all citizens. Above all, the understanding of 
rights within an international development context cannot avoid a consideration 
of the effects of the globalisation of the economy and the impact of the near- 
universal embrace of the neo-liberal economic agenda on poor and marginalized 
groups (Steiner and Alston 1996:1110). Hence, this thesis has argued that rights 
must also address the global and historical processes by which certain groups 
become excluded and marginalized from access to economic and social 
resources.
1.2 Globalisation, Rights and Health
Globalisation is a theme that has been raised implicitly rather than explicitly 
throughout this thesis. The term globalisation is used variably in the current 
literature to refer to the dominance of supra-national institutions (such as the 
IMF, World Bank and the UN system) in the shaping of policy options for nation
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states, the impact of global economic processes on diverse economic and 
cultural systems, and the rise of neo-liberalism as a hegemonic policy discourse 
(Burbules and Torres 2000:2). It also refers to the process by which global 
cultural forms shape relations of identity and difference at the local level. All of 
these themes have been central to the critical analysis of the reproductive health 
and rights discourse outlined in this thesis. The thesis has demonstrated that 
central to the global discourse on reproductive health and rights are the concepts 
of neo-liberalism, the nation-state, restructuring and reform, citizenship rights and 
gender equity, all of which are central themes running through debates on the 
impact of globalisation (see Burbules and Torres 2000:2).
This thesis has suggested that policy frameworks have become increasingly 
globalised, with many countries undertaking restructuring and reform in the 
context of neo-liberal economic policies. The economic restructuring that 
emerged in the 1980s, went hand in hand with neo-liberal policies which 
diminished the state’s responsibility to ensure the health and welfare of citizens. 
An increasing faith was placed on the free-market as the mechanism through 
which to increase ‘choice’ and improve quality of services provided to individual 
citizens, through ‘partnerships’ formed between international funding institutions 
and the private sector. The obligation imposed on states by global rights 
frameworks to ‘respect’ the rights and freedoms of citizens living on its territory, 
also implies that states are required to abstain from intruding into specific areas 
of social life (Eriksson 2000). In this context, the rights discourse incorporated
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into the ICPD POA can be seen to sit within the neo-liberal agenda of 
international economic and development policy.
The notions of citizens’ rights and civil society have also gained increasing 
prominence within development policy discourse over the past two decades. The 
liberal notion of citizens’ rights is intertwined with the idea of civil society as a 
‘free’ space that exists between the state and market institutions, in which 
individuals can form themselves into groups and voluntary associations in order 
to realise their interests (Taylor 1996). Implicit in the neo-liberal policy agenda is 
the hope that economic growth will eventually improve conditions for the poor, 
while private or voluntary sector agencies pick up what is left out by state 
programmes (Burbules and Torres 2000). However, as the Bolivian case study 
has demonstrated, making a distinction between the operations of the state and 
those of the market has limited analytical value in analysing the operations of 
institutional power at the local level. Rather, as Taylor (1996) suggests, it may be 
more useful to view the state and the market as different institutional forms in the 
totality of social relations. The Bolivian case study has also suggested that civil 
society is riven by unequal power relations embedded in historically specific 
relations of class, gender and ethnicity. The peer ethnographic material from 
Zambia has also demonstrated that the notion of ‘community’ and social identity 
within peer networks is full of contradictions, grounded in locally specific relations 
of power and inequality. Both these case studies have suggested that there is
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little apparent community basis within civil society for the assertion of individual 
citizens’ rights.
Indeed, it is difficult to see the concept of citizenship and citizens’ rights outside 
their international or global contexts. Advances in global capitalism have rarely 
led to improvements for the most socially marginalized, and it is clear that not all 
have benefited equally from the flows of global capital (Taylor 1996). Attempts to 
meet citizens' rights through neo-liberal public policies, have increasingly led to 
the marginalisation of those groups who are excluded from access to welfare 
provision whilst also being unable to compete as market consumers (as the case 
studies from Bolivia and Zambia have illustrated). The process of privatisation of 
health care which is being promoted be many restructuring programmes, is 
occurring in a context characterised by a new global division of labour in which 
inequality and difference are heightened at the local level. There is a marked 
tendency for the health and living standards to be lower among those groups 
who have been further marginalized by the process of globalisation. Indeed, the 
process of globalisation over the past two decades has only exacerbated 
difference and inequality at global, national and local levels (Roy 1999:116).
At the same time there is an increasing concentration of power in supra-national 
organisations (such as the World Bank and the IMF) promoting a more global 
perspective on policy, in which the state becomes a mediator between global 
institutions and the diverse groups and communities within its boundaries
326
(Bjorkman and Altenstetter 1997). Global economic forces and imposed western 
values increasingly interact and conflict with local cultures (McMurray and Smith 
2001). As the Bolivia case study has illustrated those who are best able to 
survive the process of social change and globalisation are those with the ability 
to become entrepreneurs and consumers in the free-market. Those, such as the 
miners in the Bolivia case study example, who are unable to forge a new identity 
in the global market economy have become increasingly marginalized and 
excluded from social and economic resources.
While there have been global improvements in health indicators over the past 
few decades, these improvements are marked by substantial inequalities in 
health status between regions, countries and socio-economic groups. As yet, 
there have only been limited attempts to provide an international overview of 
inequalities in health (Leon and Walt 2001). Nonetheless, it is clear that the way 
in which society is organised, and the structure of power relations which 
determine where resources are invested and in whose interests they are 
deployed, has a profound impact on the health of individuals (Leon and Walt 
2001). As the Bolivian case study has sought to illustrate, inequalities in health 
and risk of poor health outcomes, reflect profound historical and structural 
differences within societies and between different socio-economic groups. Hence 
I have argued that the relationship between social organisation, health and 
fertility related behaviour is inextricably bound up with historical constructions of 
inequality and difference. As the Bolivia case study has demonstrated, even
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where health services may be available these structural inequalities severely 
constrain access for marginalized and excluded groups.
With the insertion of population paradigms into health policy, health professionals 
have increasingly assumed responsibility for producing demographic outcomes. 
In the context of neo-liberal restructuring and reform to health sectors, 
professional health practice has been characterised by an increasing emphasis 
on achieving goals and outcomes (as Chapter 4 illustrated), and the need to 
demonstrate to funding bodies that health resources are being used efficiently 
and effectively (Taylor and White 2000). As a result there is increasing attention 
being paid to the evidence base of health practice and health outcomes. 
However, as Taylor and White (2000:5) suggest, the problem with evidence- 
based practice and the production of outcome measures (such as service 
utilisation rates) is that they are concerned exclusively with how knowledge is 
used. They pay little attention to how knowledge is constructed and produced 
both by health professional and service users in specific social contexts. In other 
words, they do not allow for an analysis of the meaning that professionals 
(agents of the state and global institutions) and potential programme users place 
on the strategies and practical actions they employ. In the case study from 
Bolivia presented in Chapter 4, I have explored how versions of events and 
reproductive health decisions, presented by different parties, differ significantly 
according to context and power relations. The analysis has suggested that the 
issue of inclusiveness (e.g. whether marginalized groups are able to access
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services) is not simply a quantitative matter, which can be measured, for 
example, through service utilisation rates. It is also a matter of how policies and 
programmes incorporate and recognise difference and identities, through 
processes of working with marginalized and excluded groups, whilst challenging 
the political processes and structural conditions of inequality within which these 
identities are negotiated.
Current research into health inequalities has largely failed to address adequately 
the relationship between structural conditions, access to power and resources, 
and individual health outcomes (Graham 2001). Evaluative research on health 
inequalities has been disproportionately weighted towards the evaluation of 
interventions targeted at individuals and risk behaviours rather than an 
understanding of the circumstances in which people live and the structural 
conditions and social contexts that shape everyday health practice. However, 
there is little evidence that behavioural interventions aimed at reducing risk 
behaviours have any positive effect on poor, marginalized and socially excluded 
groups (Graham 2001). Graham (2001) suggests that policy to address 
inequalities in health needs to be founded upon an approach, which combines 
epidemiological research on individual health with sociological research on the 
contexts of social inequality. According to Graham (2001) a ‘scientific approach’ 
to policy development should combine a patterning of health over the life of 
individuals integrated into a sociological analysis of locally specific social 
relations and structures of inequality.
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The framework for critical social analysis suggested in this thesis takes up the 
notion of the relationship between the individual and the structural conditions of 
social inequality suggested by Graham (2001), through the adoption of a 
theoretical framework which considers the dialectic nature of the relationship 
between social and historical conditions (structure) and concrete social practice 
(agency) in specific social contexts. However, the framework takes a theoretical 
and methodological step beyond that suggested by Graham in questioning the 
very notion and validity of the ‘scientific’ foundation of population policy and 
sexual and reproductive health programmes.
2 The Practical Application of Critical Social Analysis
2.1 Critical Social Analysis: The Relationship Between Theory and Method
As has been discussed in Chapter 1, social research to support the formulation 
and implementation of population policy and programmes (and in this I now 
include the new reproductive health and rights paradigm), has primarily been 
drawn from demography. Through a critical review of the literature, Chapter 2 
argued that mainstream demographic research with its orientation towards 
positivism and empiricism has largely overlooked more critical and reflexive 
social theories.
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Drawing on literature emanating from institutional demography, political-economy 
and anthropology, Chapter 2 has critiqued mainstream demographic theories 
(such as transition theory and cultural diffusionism), arguing that fertility 
behaviour, and reproductive and sexual decision-making are deeply embedded 
in locally and historically specific social, political and economic conditions. 
Chapter 2 argued that the notion of human agency encapsulated in mainstream 
fertility theory is based upon a utilitarian notion of human action grounded in an 
economic means-end rationality, which leaves the subjective meaning of human 
action wholly unexplored (Calhoun 2000). The challenge of postmodernism, 
which rejects the enlightenment notions of development and modernisation, and 
universalism and grand narrative, has not become part of the discourse of 
demography. While postmodernist social science challenges the very notion of 
objective social truth, and of the autonomous, individual and economically 
rational human agent (Van de Kaa 2001), postmodernist thought has had little 
impact on demographic research and population policy discourse. However, 
Chapter 2 has also suggested that in its rejection of universalising discourses 
and modernist utilitarian notions of human action, much postmodernism locates 
human action entirely in the realm of subjective meaning and interpretation, 
abstracting action from the concrete economic and historical context in which it is 
embedded.
Drawing eclectically upon developments in critical social theory and practice 
theory, I have suggested that an analytical approach to fertility, sexuality and
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reproductive behaviour which considers the dynamic relationship between 
structure and agency is required. Such an approach, which I have termed critical 
social analysis, seeks to locate an understanding of how actors experience their 
social world through their everyday practical activity, within an analysis of the 
historical processes and structural conditions within which practice is embedded.
Central to the critical social analysis outlined in this thesis is the question of how 
social policy recognises and responds to identity and difference among the 
diverse groups in civil society. Through exploring the world of social actors in 
concrete historical, economic and social contexts, critical social analysis has the 
potential to contribute to the development of equitable policy frameworks which 
avoid false universalisms. Counter to the claims of nationalist policy discourses 
which seek to forge a unitary national identity (as discussed in Chapter 3), this 
thesis has argued that identity and difference are central to the experience of 
social life (Calhoun 2000). In everyday practice people continually negotiate 
multiple and complex identities in strategic attempts to increase their access to 
social and economic resources or capital. The framework for critical social 
analysis set out in this thesis has argued for policy and programme approaches 
that recognise the importance of identity and difference at global, national and 
local levels, rather than deny it.
However, in the context of development policy and programmes the act of 
differentiating social groups can often become a top-down act of ‘labelling’ or
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stereotyping. Through using outside planners and consultants to identify specific 
groups for targeting by policies and programmes, identities which may be 
asserted by specific groups in specific social and political contexts often become 
seen as fixed and immutable as opposed to fluid, strategic and negotiable (Beall
1997). Beall (1997:11) suggests that what:
“ ...’naming1 and ‘claiming’ suggests for social development is that policy­
makers, planners and practitioners can label and target people as ‘the 
poor’, ‘vulnerable groups’, ‘children in difficult circumstances’, ‘lone 
parents’, ‘women’, ‘youth’, ‘elderly’, ‘disabled’, ‘minorities’, ‘refugees’ or 
whatever. Ultimately, however, these groups will respond to the top-down 
ascription of identities only if it provides viable solutions for them out of the 
limited choices and options available, or if the labels themselves have 
resonance for them at a particular time in their life-cycle”.
The challenge, therefore, is to find an approach to policy and programme 
development that is both true to the experience of social actors (and in particular 
marginalized and excluded groups), whilst being grounded in an understanding 
of social and historical conditions of inequality and difference.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have sought to demonstrate that the theoretical framework 
outlined above is inextricable from methodology. In Chapter 5 ,1 have suggested 
that a truly reflexive and participatory approach to implementation and monitoring 
of policy and programmes requires a methodology which incorporates into 
development practice an understanding of how social actors negotiate identity 
and difference. Chapters 2 and 5 have raised fundamental questions concerning 
the validity of empiricist research methods for understanding social practices as 
enacted in specific social contexts. Nonetheless, the power of empiricism and
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technocratic concerns in policy and programme development is reflected in a 
growing body of operational techniques such as cost-benefit analysis, operations 
research, systems analysis and strategic planning, in which knowledge becomes 
defined by scientific procedures (Fischer 1985:232). I have argued in Chapter 5 
that while positivist approaches may successfully elicit socially and morally 
prescribed principles for behaviour (i.e. norms and values), they are limited in 
their ability to lay bare the concrete reality of everyday actions that often deviate 
from these norms and values. Furthermore, accounts of the most marginalized 
and socially excluded groups are often missing from demographic accounts of 
sexual and reproductive behaviour.
In Chapter 5 ,1 outlined a methodological approach which places a primary focus 
on actors’ categorisations and interpretation of events, emphasising the 
collections of narratives as opposed to the collection of ‘social facts’.
I have suggested that the process of incorporating actors’ narratives into social 
research and monitoring is one step to ensuring that the process of ‘naming’ or 
identifying marginalized groups during programme design and implementation 
does not occur uncritically. The approach makes a break from positivism, placing 
the actor and their social networks at the centre of the research or programme 
design process. As Chapters 3, 4 and 5 suggest, for a truly critical social analysis 
to take place, there is a need to understand actors’ discourses and narratives 
within the historical and social context in which these practices and actors 
interpretations of events are organised. As the Bolivia case study has shown,
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narratives need not simply be statements of what is occurring at present, but can 
also be accounts of how prior events or actions limit and orient subsequent ones. 
Hence, comparisons of narratives produced in different contexts, such as that 
carried out in Chapter 4, can facilitate a form of cross-situational knowledge 
(Calhoun 2000:507).
Through the collection of local narratives, the peer ethnographic approach 
outlined in Chapter 5 goes some way to enabling policy and programmes to 
listen to what Scott (1990) refers to as the ‘hidden transcript’, which remains un­
spoken in power-laden situations. Through this methodological approach local 
people, and in particular the excluded and marginalized, assume responsibility 
for reflecting on policy and programme implementation, within the context of their 
everyday lived experience. As Forester (1985a:xiv) suggests:
“Unless critical social research can illuminate the situated, interpretative, 
and judgemental character of social action, we may never understand 
politically the very real pragmatic meanings that a simple ‘no’, a simple 
silence...might have in the day-to-day play of power”
2.2 The Implications For Policy and Practice
This thesis has been an attempt to analyse critically the gap between population 
policy discourse and the reality of how reproduction, sexuality and health are 
experienced by poor and marginalized groups in specific social contexts. In 
exploring this issue I have suggested that the ICPD discourse of equity, 
empowerment and rights, is consistent with a neo-liberal economic and
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development policy framework. International organisations, technical cooperating 
agencies and international lending institutions exert a decisive influence over 
national policy, directly or indirectly legitimising certain policy frameworks whilst 
condemning others (Stiefel and Wolfe 1996). Central to the neo-liberal policy 
framework is the notion that social institutions can influence forms of private life 
(such as the family) through empowering individuals to act as ‘rational’ subjects 
to pursue specific goals (Calhoun 2000:533). The neo-liberal notion of 
empowerment incorporated into the ICPD discourse, is not one of collective 
empowerment of marginalized and excluded groups. Rather the emphasis is on 
enabling individuals to participate as entrepreneurs in the free-market and to 
pursue individual health and fertility outcomes (identified by policy as being for 
the public good) through policy frameworks which remove obstacles to individual 
choice and freedom, as a result of liberalisation and privatisation.
While globally there may be a general decline in maternal and infant mortality 
and fertility rates, in specific localities, mortality and fertility may be rising as a 
result of impoverishment and the curtailment of public services (Stiefel and Wolfe 
1996). In this context, participatory approaches to health policy and programme 
development have become an important part of the neo-liberal policy discourse. 
The neo-liberal notion of empowerment is closely linked to participation 
ideologies which seek to stimulate popular or voluntary initiatives by civil society 
to look after their own interests, in the face of depleting public resources. With 
national governments facing increased budgetary pressures and a trend towards
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privatisation and reduced responsibility for welfare provision, the role of the state 
becomes one of creating an ‘enabling environment’ (a recent addition to neo­
liberal development policy rhetoric) in which vulnerable and marginalized groups 
are ‘empowered’ to develop self-help initiatives. However, for many, the 
aspirations for social mobility implicit in the neo-liberal discourses of freedom, 
choice and equity are blocked by lack of access to economic and social 
resources as a result of historically-embedded relations of power and inequality.
The critical social analysis outlined in this thesis also has a direct methodological 
bearing on policy analysis and formulation. The view that there is one objective 
version of reality (in this case reproductive behaviour) which can be captured and 
explained through empirical and positivist research paradigms has been 
challenged. Rather, as the case study material has illustrated, reproductive 
health is a messy and complex business, in which social actors are continually 
trying to develop and negotiate strategies for dealing with competing interests 
and multiple perspectives in concrete social situations. The thesis has tried to 
demonstrate both the theoretical and methodological importance of engaging 
with actors’ perspectives. However, this is not to argue for a position of 
relativism. Rather, the framework for critical social analysis that I have drawn 
upon attempts to bridge the gap between positivism and relativism, and structure 
and agency. I have argued that critical social analysis as applied to policy and 
programmes must always be grounded in an analysis of the historical and social
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conditions in which practice is embedded and in which social narratives are 
produced.
I have suggested that critical social analysis is necessary not only to identify the 
distributional effects of policy on different groups in the population, but also to 
identify the historical processes by which certain groups become excluded and 
marginalized in the policy reform process. As yet the application of critical 
analysis to public or social policy remains limited (Forester 1985b; 1993). Little 
policy analysis looks at how policy making and policy implementation reshapes 
the lived world of actors, impacting on social worlds in ways that alter actors’ 
opportunities and access to economic and social resources. Hence, critical social 
policy analysis needs to explore the social infrastructure in which policies are 
implemented and the mediating institutions which link the lived world of actors to 
the broad structures of society. The critical content of such analysis is centred on 
how historical and structural conditions shape policy frameworks, and the 
implications of implementation of policy frameworks on social practice in specific 
social and political contexts. In assessing the potential impact of policies, it is not 
enough to assess what the poor ‘ought’ to want in terms of reproductive health 
outcomes (Stiefel and Wolfe 1996). Indeed I have argued that good reproductive 
health outcomes mean different things to different groups in the population, in 
different social contexts, and hence that policy analysis must take account of 
social action and the actor’s perspective. Policy reform cannot just be a technical 
issue but must also be a political process, which challenges the underlying
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structural relations of power and inequality which deny marginalized groups 
access to the necessary resources and capital to realise their rights. In such a 
process:
“consensus and sharing may not always be the goal, but the recognition
and appreciation of differences, in the context of confrontation with power”
( Young 1986:76 [original emphasis], cited in Taylor 1996: 161).
Taylor (1996: 163) suggests that the concepts of rights and entitlement should be 
tied to a notion of fulfilment of need, in which need is understood as 
contextualised and differentiated as opposed to universal and abstract. The 
meeting of need then implies not just a set of abstract rights, but also the 
concrete power to meet needs through access to the necessary resources. 
Hence, rights can only be meaningful if they raise the possibility of access to and 
control over the resources necessary for human development, and tied to a 
framework which recognises the gendered, ethnic and class basis of power 
inherent in the institutions of global capitalism, state and market mechanisms 
(Taylor 1996).
Above all, policy analysis must be open to a critical discourse in which diverse 
groups in civil society are understood as having unequal chances, and capacities 
for action which are embedded in historically specific relations of power, 
inequality and difference (Calhoun 2000). I have suggested that the central 
issues of identity and difference need to be understood by all partners in the 
development process, through a truly participatory approach, which recognises
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the unequal ability of different groups in society to participate in the development 
process. This thesis has also suggested that the mechanisms for implementation 
of reproductive health and rights frameworks do not lead to social equity. Rather 
the implementation of the ICPD discourse through national policy and 
programme frameworks, often reproduces existing inequalities and power 
relations. The rights of citizens and civil society cannot be realised through a 
public policy alone which seeks the enhancement of individual choice and 
freedoms through partnerships between global institutions, the state and market 
agencies (Taylor 1996).
Improving reproductive health and promoting equity are apparently founding 
principles of the ICPD POA. However, this thesis has argued that the abstract 
universal notions of rights, freedoms and choices encapsulated in the ICPD 
discourse, fails to address the underlying structure of power relations which 
underscore practices of national and global institutions in local social contexts 
and impact on health outcomes. In drawing upon global rights frameworks and 
assuming a universal definition of reproductive health and rights, the ICPD 
discourse lacks a consideration of historical context and of the structural 
conditions that are necessary to support the individual freedoms, choices and 
decision-making power of ‘citizens’ to enable them to realise their rights and 
health. The abstract notion of universal individual rights upon which the ICPD 
discourse draws, needs to be revisited to consider the central issue of power and 
differential access to resources. Indeed, until the social conditions which enable
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equitable access to power and resources are in place, reproductive health and 
rights will remain an abstract liberal ideal, as opposed to a concrete social and 
political reality for the majority of world’s poor and socially marginalized.
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